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SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN
MASSACHUSETTS LAW
I. SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
During the Selected Developments year, Massachusetts courts fo-
cused on a number of substantive and procedural criminal law
issues. Noteworthy judicial developments addressed constitutional
rights under the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, as well as responded to modern social devel-
opments. In the area of search and seizure, the Supreme Judicial
Court limited a Massachusetts statute authorizing police officers to
engage in warrantless electronic surveillance. The Court held that
such surveillance constitutes a search under article 14 of the Dec-
laration of Rights where the participant recording the conversation
is not known to the nonconsenting party and the recording occurs
in a private home, thus infringing on that party's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. In so ruling, the Court granted nonconsenting
parties greater protection under article 14 than under the federal
equivalent in the fourth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. The Supreme Judicial Court limited another statute that
prohibited a person from permitting a child to pose nude for the
purpose of taking a photograph. The Court ruled that the statute
was unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amend-
ment of the United States Constitution because such acts could not
be isolated from the constitutionally permissible expressive act of
taking a photograph.
In the area of ineffective assistance of counsel, both the Su-
preme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court decided
a number of cases that underscored the difficulties for a defendant
attempting to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Absent
a clearly egregious error by the attorney, such as failing to pursue
the only reasonable defense available to the criminal defendant,
these courts have demonstrated a reluctance to grant relief to de-
fendants on the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
In addition to these procedural and constitutional issues, Massachu-
setts courts have focused on a number of social issues. One impor-
tant social development addressed by the Supreme Judicial Court
and the Appeals Court revolves around the increased awareness of
drunken driving. These courts have evidenced a trend towards
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stiffening the penalties for driving under the influence, as well as
restricting the opportunity for crafty defendants to escape prose-
cution through artful interpretations of statutory language and con-
stitutional challenges to the booking procedures following the de-
fendant's arrest. Finally, although not specifically adopted by
Massachusetts courts, the Appeals Court demonstrated a willingness
to adopt the battered woman's syndrome, if future advocates com-
plied with the necessary evidentiary requirements for admitting
scientific evidence and expert testimony, as a viable supplement to
self-defense law for women who kill abusive husbands after living
in conditions of physical and psychological torment.
A. *Limiting Warrantless Participant Monitoring by Undercover Law
Enforcement Officers
Under chapter 272, section 99 of' the Massachusetts General
Laws, "investigative or law enforcement officers" may engage in
warrantless electronic surveillance under certain circumstances) In
particular, section 99(B)(4) allows such officers to record or transmit
wire or oral communications 2 without a warrant during investiga-
tions of designated offenses if they participate in the communication
or have received prior consent to record or transmit by a party to
the communication.' This type of electronic surveillance, in which
*Thomas A, Knowlton, Staff Member, l3os'l'ON Cot.i.r.tm LAW REVIEW
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 99 (1986). Section 99(4)(8) states that '''investigative or law
enforcement officer' means any officer or the United States, a state or a political subdivision
of a state, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of', or to make arrests for, the
designated offenses, and any attorney authorized by law to participate in the prosecutions
of such offenses."
2 "[Wire communication' means any communication made in whole or in part through
the use of facilities for' the transmission of communications by tire aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception." Id. § 99(11)(1).
"'[O]ral communication' means speech, except such speech as is transmitted over the
public air waves by radio or other.similar device." Id. § 99(B)(2).
The federal electronic surveillance statute — Title 111 of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 — is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§: 2510-2521 (1982 & Supp, IV
1986). For a t horottgli discussion of federal and state elect nmic surveillance laws, see J. CARR,
THE LAW or ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (2d ed. 1987).
3 Section 99(13)(4) authorizes this warrantless electronic surveillance by defining "inter-
ception" to exclude certain forms of electronic surveillance, See MASS. GEN. L. cll. 272,
§ 99(4)(4). Section 99(13)(4) states that:
"Interception" meal's to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to
secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral communication
through the use of any intercepting device by any person other than a person
given prior authority by all parties to such communication; provided that it
shall not constitute an interception Cm - an investigative or law enforcement
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one party to a conversation has consented to the taping, is referred
to as "participant monitoring." This statutory scheme complies with
current fourth amendment doctrine, which allows all warrantless
participant monitoring.' Similarly, until 1987, section 99(B)(4) com-
plied with article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,
which closely parallels the language and purposes of the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 6
In 1987, the Supreme Judicial Court, over a strong dissent,
held that certain types of warrantless participant monitoring violate
article 14. 7 Thus, the Court ruled that article 14 requires the
suppression of evidence derived from such monitoring. In Common-
wealth v. Blood, the Court held that, where the participant who
records the conversation is not known to the nonconsenting party
as a police officer, and where the interception occurs in a private
home, the recording invades the nonconsenting party's reasonable
expectation of privacy. 8 Thus, according to the Blood Court, such
electronic surveillance constitutes a search for purposes of article
14. 9
 The Court further held that, if the police did not obtain a
warrant authorizing the search, an unreasonable search occurs in
violation of article 14. 10
officer ... to record or transmit a wire or oral communication if the officer is
a party to such communication or has been given prior authorization to record
or transmit the communication by such a party and if recorded or transmitted
in the course of an investigation of a designated offense as defined herein.
Id.
"Participant monitoring" refers to three distinct forms of consensual electronic sur•
veillance: a participant's l)recording the communication, 2)using an electronic device to
transmit the communication to a third party or 3)consenting to a third party's interception.
Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with
the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 CoLum. L. REV. 189, 190 n.9 (1968). For a
discussion of the federal electronic surveillance statute's provisions regarding the exclusion
of evidence derived from participant monitoring, see Note, Interceptors and Innocent Recipients:
Applying the Federal Wiretapping Law's Exclusionary Rule to Private Participant Monitoring, 30
B.C.L. REv. 901 (1988).
See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750-51 (1979); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 751 (1971).
" Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271, 286, 424 N.E.2d 250, 259 ("Because on the
facts of this case we find no violation of the State Constitution, we need not decide whether
other forms of warrantless surveillance would violate art. I4."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1147
(1982).
Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 62, 66 n.6, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1030, 1032 n.6
(1987).
"Id. at 70, 507 N.E.2d at 1034.
9 Id. at 68-71, 507 N.E.2d at 1033-35.
Id. at 70, 507 N.E.2d at 1034.
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The Blood Court recognized that the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution does not proscribe the warrantless par-
ticipant monitoring authorized by section 99(B)(4)." Under current
fourth amendment doctrine, the Court noted, participant monitor-
ing does not invade a person's reasonable expectation of privacy
because a person assumes the risk that others with whom he or she
speaks are police informants and may be recording their conver-
sation. 12
 Accordingly, the Court conceded that participant monitor-
ing does not constitute a search or seizure for purposes of the fourth
amendment. The Court stated, however, that article 14 of the Mas-
sachusetts Declaration of Rights affords more substantive protec-
tion."
In Blood, the defendants James Blood and Ernest Lorenzen
were found guilty of conspiracy to break and enter a building and
conspiracy to commit larceny." In furtherance of their plan, they
conspired to break into a building at the Eastern Smelting & Refin-
ing Company in Lynn, and steal $3,000,000 in gold bars stored
there."' The police prevented the theft because an alleged third
conspirator, Charles Hudson, acted as a police informant"'
At the police's request, Hudson recorded two conversations that
he had with the defendants." Both conversations took place in
homes of conspirators not on trial with the defendants."' Hudson
failed to obtain the consent of any of the conspirators before the
tapings.I 9
The Blood Court rioted the general rule that police activity must
invade a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in order to
constitute a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and
article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 2" The Court
ruled that the informer's participant monitoring invaded the defen-
dants' reasonable expectation of' privacy. 2 ' Privacy, according to the
at 67, 507 N.E.2d at 1032.
' 2 1d. at 72 n.12, 507 N.E.2d at 1035 n.12.
15
 Id. at 62, 66 n.6, 507 N.E.2d at 1030, 1032 n.6.
' Id. at 62, 507 N.E.2d at 1030.
Is id,
1 q Id. at 62-63, 507 N.E.2d at 1030.
17 Id.' at. 63-64, 507 N.E.2d at 1030-31.
1 " See id.
a See id. at 68, 507 N.E.2d at 1033. The fourth amendment "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test originated in justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
2i Blood, 400 Mass, at 68, 507 N.E.2d at 1033.
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Court, is the right of individuals to control the extent to which
personal information is communicated to others. 22 Because the con-
versations occurred in private homes, without the defendants' man-
ifest intent to make the contents of the communication known to
the general public, the Court concluded that the defendants exhib-
ited an actual expectation of privacy. 2'
The Court also ruled that society recognized the defendants'
actual expectations of privacy as reasonable. 24 In so ruling, the
Court examined common law notions of privacy, legislative recog-
nition of privacy, the purposes underlying article 14, and the pe-
culiarly intrusive nature of electronic surveillance. 25 The Court con-
cluded that these sources demonstrated that the defendants enjoyed
reasonable expectations of privacy. 2°
The Court first examined common law notions of privacy. 27 At
common law, according to the Court, persons had the right to
control the extent to which their own words were made public. 28
The Court also pointed to certain pieces of state legislation evi-
dencing the reasonableness of persons' claims to control the flow of
personal information. 29
 The Fair Information Practices Act, 3° the
statutory right to privacy,'" and other portions of the state wiretap-
ping statute that outlawed electronic surveillance absent the consent
of all parties to the conversation, 32 according to the Court, dem-
onstrated the reasonableness of the defendants' expectation of pri-
vacy."
In addition to finding support in the common and statutory
law, the Court buttressed its conclusion by looking to the Massachu-
setts Declaration of Rights."'[ The Court held that the drafters of
article 14 intended it to protect Americans in the "right to be let
alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
22 Id. (citing A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967)).
25 Id.
2' Id. at 68-70, 507 N.E.2d at 1033-34.
25 Id.
2" Id. at 70, 507 N.E.2d at 1034.
27 Id. at 69, 507 N.E.2d at 1033.
zx Id.
2 Id .
5" MASS. GEN. L. ch. 66A (1986).
" MASS. GEN. L. ch. 214, § (1)(B).
32 See. MASS. G. L. ch. 272, §§99(B)(4), 99(C)(1).
• Blood, 400 Mass. at 69, 507 N.E.2d at 1033.
" Id. at 69-70, 507 N.E.2d at 1034.
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by civilized men." 35
 The Court also reasoned that, because the pe-
culiarly intrusive nature of' electronic surveillance greatly threat-
ened personal privacy, article 14 required the Court to extend the
article's protection to such intrusions. " ' The Court therefore held
that the defendant's expectation of privacy was reasonable, thus
placing the participant monitoring within the scope of article 14
sea rc hes." .
The Blood Court then considered the reasonableness of the
warrantless search." The Court stated that the exception for war-
rantless participant monitoring institutionalized the precise danger
that article 14 sought to protect, and concluded that it was an
unreasonable search.'`' I n holding that the search was unreasonable,
the Court analogized to the writs of assistance, which British officers
used to justify general searches during the colonial period before
the Revolution." Such writs, according to the Court, placed the
liberty of citizens in the hands of British officers. 4 ' Similarly, the
Court argued, warrantless participant monitoring places personal
liberty at the hands of any police officer fortunate enough to find
a consenting informant. 42 The Court concluded that such electronic
surveillance should only be acceptable when a neutral and detached
magistrate first authorizes it by issuing a warrant. 4'
Justice Nolan wrote a vigorous dissent, which Justice Lynch
joined.'" Justice Nolan first disputed the majority's holding that the
police conduct constituted a search: 15 According to Justice Nolan,
the Massachusetts Legislature properly decided that members of
organized crime who converse about designated offenses do not
have reasonable expectations of privacy in those conversations."
Thus, according to Justice Nolan, the informant's warrantless sur-
veillance did not rise to the level of a search for purposes of article
55 Id, at 09,507 N.E.2d at 1034, (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478
(1938) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
56 Id. at 70,507 N.E.2d at 1034.
57 See id.
,8
 Id. at 70-71,507 N.E.2d at 1034-35.
" Id. at 70,507 N.E.2d at 1034.
4" Id, at 71-72,507 N.E.2d at 1035.
I Id. at 71,507 N.E.2d at 1035.
1 ' Id. at 71-72,507 N.E.2d at 1035.
0 See id. at 75-77,507 N.E.2d at 1037-38.
" Id. at 78-81,507 N.E.2d at 1039-40 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
45
 Id. at 79-80,507 N.E.2d at 1039-40 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
41i Id.
610	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 30:601
14.47
 Even if the police activity constituted a search, Justice Nolan
stated that the warrantless participant monitoring was constitutional
because it was not unreasonable. 48
Justice Nolan first noted that, according to current search and
seizure analysis, a search cannot occur where a person does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 49
 Justice Nolan stated that
section 99(B)(4), the statutory provision authorizing certain war-
rantless participant monitoring, represented a sound legislative
judgment that members of organized crime who converse about
certain designated offenses do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in those conversations." Thus, according to the dissent, the
police conduct in question did not constitute a search for purposes
of the fourth amendment and article 14. 51
Justice Nolan then questioned the sources from which the ma-
jority determined that the defendants had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the conversations. 52
 The majority, according to Justice
Nolan, relied on dissenting opinions and Massachusetts legislative
provisions other than section 99(B)(4) to determine which expec-
tations of privacy the people of Massachusetts consider reasonable. 53
Justice Nolan stated that the majority, by failing to use such external
sources as section 99(B)(4), had substituted their own values for
society's to determine what constitutes a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 54
Justice Nolan argued further that, even if the defendants had
a reasonable expectation of privacy and, therefore, the police con-
duct rose to the level of a search, the search was not unreasonable
because the benefits from such surveillance outweighed any danger
to personal liberty. 55
 Section 99(B)(4) lists four criteria that the
police must satisfy before they may bypass the warrant process:
"[t]he police must (1) have the consent of a party to the conversation
which (2) they reasonably suspect will (3) involve organized crimi-
nals (4) planning a designated offense."56 These four criteria, ac-
cording to Justice Nolan, represented a sound legislative determi-
" Id.
4" Id. at 80-81, 507 N.E.2d at 1040 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
4" Id, at 79, 507 N.E.2d at 1039 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
4" Id.
" 1 Id.
"Id. at 79-80, 507 N.E.2d at 1039-40 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 79, 507 N.E.2d at 1039.
Id. at 80, 507 N.E.2d at 1039-40 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 80, 507 N.E.2d at 1040 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
56 Id. (citing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, 99(B)(4) (1986)).
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nation that the benefits to law enforcement officers from these
searches outweighed the intrusion on personal privacy."
Justice Nolan also stated that the majority used a "truncated
analysis" to conclude that the statute's exception for warrantless
electronic surveillance violated article 14's proscription of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." Because the majority, according to
Justice Nolan, framed the issue in such a way that it only considered
one of the four statutory criteria, and thus failed to perform the
same balancing test as the legislature, the majority "ask[ed] and
answer[ed] the wrong question."59 Justice Nolan concluded that the
majority's liberal interpretation of article 14, which protected mod-
ern privacy rights but ignored the needs of modern law enforce-
ment, had, "in the guise of protecting privacy," protected "only .
those who are [privacy's] greatest threat."""
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Blood
marks another instance in which state courts have interpreted their
own constitutions to afford more substantive rights than the anal-
ogous provisions of the United States Constitution."' The Blood
decision also answers a question left unanswered by Commonwealth
v. Thorpe, a previous Supreme Judicial Court decision involving the
constitutionality of section 99(B)(4). Thorpe left open the question
of whether section 99(B)(4) violated article 14 in situations other
than those in which a police officer, known to the nonconsenting
party as an officer, taped a conversation." 2 Although the Blood de-
cision may represent sound policy, it lacks a principled constitutional
analysis.
One important aspect of Blood is that it answers the question
left open by Commonwealth v. Thorpe. 63 In Thorpe, the Court found
that participant monitoring by a police officer, who was known to
the nonconsenting party as a police officer, did not violate article
14." The Thorpe Court explicitly left open the question of whether
other forms of warrantless participant monitoring may violate ar-
r'7 Blood, 400 Mass. at 80, 507 N.E.2d at 1040.
Id.
"9
°'° hi, at 81, 507 N.E.2d at 1040 (Nolan,,]., dissenting).
" 1 Of Commonwealth v, Upton, 394 Mass, 363, 371-73, 476 N.E.2d 548, 555-56 (1985),
and cases cited.
42 See Blood, 400 Mass. at 67-68, 507 N.E.2d at. 1032-33; see also Commonwealth v.
Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271, 2115-86, 424 N.E.2d' 250, 259, reit denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982).
Thotpe, 384 Mass, at 285-86, 424 N.E.2d at 259.
Id.
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tick l4."5 The Blood Court, by grounding its decision in the fact
that the interceptor, Hudson, was not known to the nonconsenting
parties as a police officer, distinguished and affirmed Thole."
Although the Blood decision may represent sound social policy,
the Court applied flawed reasoning and analysis. One flaw is that
the Court used questionable sources to conclude that the defendants
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In addition, even if the
participant monitoring at issue constituted a search, the majority
failed to demonstrate persuasively its unreasonableness. Finally, the
Court offered no principled reasons for reconciling its conclusion
that the participant monitoring at issue was an unreasonable search
and seizure with the fact that an informant's actions fail to constitute
a search.
To justify its conclusion supporting the defendants' reasonable
expectation of privacy, the Blood Court pointed to legislative rec-
ognition of the right to privacy and dissenting opinions from United
States Supreme Court cases that upheld the constitutionality of
warrantless participant monitoring.t' 7 As Justice Nolan pointed out
in his dissent, however, the Court ignored the fact that, although
the legislature recognizes certain rights to privacy, it explicitly au-
thorized this participant monitoring. 68 It seems difficult to argue,
therefore, as the Court does, that society recognizes the defendants'
expectations of privacy as reasonable because the legislature has
recognized various privacy rights, when the same legislature passed
section 99(B)(4), which rejected the reasonableness of the precise
privacy claim at issue.
Even if the participant monitoring constituted a search under
article 14, the Court failed to offer persuasive reasons why it was
an unreasonable search. Section 99(B)(4) contains four criteria that
the police must satisfy before they may bypass the warrant process:
(I)consent by a party to a conversation which (2) the police reason-
ably suspect (3) will involve organized criminals (4) planning a des-
ignated offense." These criteria limit the circumstances under
which the police may use section 99(B)(4). Although the Supreme
Judicial Court has held these criteria sufficient in the past to find a
"5 Id. at 286, 424 N.E.2d at 259.
" See Blood, 400 Mass, at 66 n.6, 507 N.E.2d at 1032 n.6.
"'See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's conclusion
that the defendants possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy.
"See Blood, 400 Mass. at 79, 507 N.E.2d at 1039 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
"See MASS. GIN. L. ch. 272, 4 99(B)(4) (1986).
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search reasonable, 7t) the Blood COurt ruled that, when the informant
is not generally known to be a police officer, and the conversations
take place in a private home, these criteria do not suffice. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Court ruled that the language and purposes
of article 14 demanded such an interpretation." The Court failed
to apply the cost-benefit analysis it frequently used to decide the
reasonableness of a search.
The third shortcoming. in the Blood decision is its failure to
explain why the Court's conclusion did not compel a finding that
the use of informants also implicates article 14 and the fourth
amendment. The police may place an informant in the midst of a
conspiracy for the purpose of eliciting incriminating testimony, even
if the informant is not known as a police officer, without implicating
article 14, but, under Blood, may not allow the informant to preserve
a more accurate record of his or her findings on tape without
causing an unreasonable search and seizure:72 The Court failed to
explain why this distinction exists. Instead, the Court simply pointed
to the fact that those Supreme Court justices most adamantly op-
posed to warrantless surveillance do not hold that an informer's
testimony implicates the fourth amendment." If privacy is, as the
Court claimed, the right of an individual to control the extent to
which personal information is communicated to others, then it is
unclear why an informant's actions constitutionally differ from elec-
tronic surveillance when informants also significantly intrude on
that definition of privacy.
In addition, article 14, according to the Court, protects persons
in their "right to be let alone." Informants, however, also intrude
on the right to be let alone. The Court failed to explain why it did
not extend the privacy protection to informants, and thus require
the police to obtain some kind of warrant before using informants.
In sum, the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Blood offers
more protection from police surveillance than the fourth amend-
ment. Its decision answers the question left open by Thorpe, but also
leaves several questions unanswered. The Court ignored the legis-
lature's conclusion as to what society finds to be a reasonable ex-
7" See Corontonweahh v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271, 286, 424 N.E.2d 250, 259, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1 147 (1982),
7 ' See Blood, 400 Mass. at 711-72, 507 N.E.2d at 1034-35.
' 2 Compare Commonwealth v. jarabek, 384 Mass. 293, 297-300, 424 N.E.2d 491, 492-
93 (1981) with Blood, 400 Mass. at 66 11.6, 507 N.E.2t1 at 1032 n.6.
7" Blood, 400 Mass. at 78, 507 N.E.2(1 at 1038-39.
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pectation of privacy and replaced the legislature's conclusion with
its own.
B. *The Regulation of Non-Obscene Nude Photography of Children
The United States Supreme Court accords states great leeway
in regulating the pornographic depiction of children.' Restrictions
on child pornography are permissible, despite any incidental in-
fringement of first amendment freedoms, because of the state's
compelling interest in preventing the psychological and physical
harm suffered by children who are subjects of pornographic works. 2
In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that
criminalized the dissemination of material depicting sexual conduct
by children. 3 In so doing, the Ferber Court held that the  entire
category of child pornography is unprotected by the first amend-
ment.' The Ferber Court did not, however, define the category of
child pornography, other than to state that it includes visual depic-
tions of sexual. conduct by children.5 The Ferber Court left open the
question of whether the visual depietion of child nudity could be
classified as child pornography. 6
During the  Selected Developmenti year, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v. Oakes, struck down
constitutionally ove rb .rOad in violation of the first amendri-ient a
Massachusetts statute that prohibits causing, encouraging, or know-
ingly permitting a child to pose in a state of nudity for the purpose
* Eric Jaeger, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
I New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1981) (unanimous decision).
2 Id. at 756-58.
3 Id. at 774. The statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263 (McKinney 1980), provides, in pertinent
part:
§ 263,15
A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when,
knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes
any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen
years of age....
263.00(5)
"Promote" means to ... disseminate 	 • .
§ 263.00(3)
"Sexual conduct" means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate
sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or
lewd exhibition of the genitals.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
5 Id. at 764.
6 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
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of taking	 photograph.' The statute defines nudity to include
"uncovered post-pubertal	 genitals, pubic areas, [or] . . . the fe-
male breast." The statute at issue in Oakes differs in two significant
respects front th -e one at issue in Ferber: first, the conduct proscribed
by tbF ; ;Oakes statute includes simple nudity," whereas the conduct
proscribed by the Ferber statute extended only to sexual conduct
and the lewd exhibition of the genitals;'" second, the Oakes statute
proscribed the act of permitting a child to pose in a state of nudity,"
rather than the dissemination of a photograph.' 2 In striking down
the statute, the Oakes Court held, first, that the defendant's conduct
in permitting' his stepdaughter to pose naked from the waist up
could not be isolated From the expressive process of photographing
her;' 5 and, second, that the statute was overbroad because it in-
cluded within its ambit depictions that could be considered, neither
obscene nor pornographic."
7 901 Mass. 602, 518 N.E.2d 836, cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1999 (1988). The statute struck
clown in Oakes as overbroad provides:
Whoever with knowledge that a child is'under eighteen years of age, or whoever
while in possession of such IT:!.cts that he should' have reason to know that such
Iverson is a child under eighteen years of age, hires, coerces, solicits or entices,
employs, procures, uses, causes, encourages, or knowingly permits such child
to pose or be exhibited in a state of nudity or to participate or engage in any
act that depicts, describes or represents sexual conduct for purpose of visual
representation or reproduction in any book, magazine, pamphlet, motion pic-
ture film, photograph, or picture shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for a term of not less than twenty years, or by a line or not less
dum ten thousand dollars nor more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both such
fine and imprisonment.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 29A (1986).
Mnss. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 31 (1986). Section 31 defines nudity as
uncovered or less than opaquely covered post-pubertal human genitals, pubic
area, the post-pubertal human female hreast below a point itnrnediately above
the top of the arcola, or the covered male genitals in discernibly turgid state.
For purposes of this definition a female breast is considered uncovered if the
nipple or the nipple or amnia only are covered. in the case of pre-pubertal
persons nudity shall mean uncovered or less than opaquely covered pre-pubertal
human genitals or pubic area.
Id,
Mnss. GEN. L, ch, 272, §§ 29A, 31 (1986). For the full text. of §§ 29A and 31, see supra
notes 7, 8 respectively.
1 " N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263,15 (McKinney 1980). For the full text of § 263.15, see .supra
note 16.
Mnss. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 29A (198(i). For the full text of § 29A, see supra note 7,
Pi See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
' 3 Commonwealth v. Oakes, 401 Mass. 602, 603-04, 518 N.E.2d 836, 837, cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 1994 (1988).
" Id. at 609-05, 518 N.F.,2d at 837-38.
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In Oakes, the defendant had permitted his fifteen year old
stepdaughter to pose naked from the waist up for photographs that
the defendant took of her within their home.'`' The state prosecuted
the defendant under a law making it illegal to permit a child to
pose naked for a photograph. 16
 A jury convicted the defendant of
violation of the statute.'"' The defendant challenged his conviction
on two grounds: first, that his conduct was speech protected by the
first amendment;' 8
 and, second, that the statute was substantially
overbroad, and therefore facially invalid.'"
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declined to rule on
whether the first amendment protected the defendant's conduct,
instead holding that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. 2"
The Oakes Court began by stating that photography is speech pro-
tected by the first amendment. 2 ' Going further, the Court reasoned
that the defendant's conduct in permitting his stepdaughter to pose
could not be isolated from the expressive process of actually taking
the picture. 22
Where activity involves both speech and conduct, the Oakes
Court noted, a substantial government_ interest can justify incidental
restrictions on first amendment guarantees." The Oakes Court ques-
tioned, however ;
 whether the instant case presented a substantial
government interest, given that, as the Court found, the photo-
graphs taken by the defendant were neither obscene nor porno-
graphic, and were not intended for distribution. 24
 Whether the state
had demonstrated a substantial government interest was irrelevant,
however, because the Court found that the sweep of the statute
extended substantially beyond any possible legitimate interest. 25 If
the plain meaning of the statute were given effect, the Court found,
a parent could be penalized as a result of, for example, taking a
15 Id. at 603, 518 N.E.2d at 837. The dissent in Oakes further provides that the daughter
was "atop a bar, clad only in a red scarf around her neck and bikini type white panties, arid
with her breasts exposed — if not highlighted." Id. at 606, 518 N.E.2d at 838 (O'Conner, J.,
dissenting).
15 Mass. GEN. L. ch. 272, §§ 29A, 31 (1986). For the full text of §§ 29A and 31, see .supra
notes 7, 8, respectively.
17 Oakes, 401 Mass. at 602, 518 N.E.2d at 836.
' 8 id. at 603, 518 N.E.2d at 837.
18 Id.
'" Id,
Id, at 603-04, 518 N.E.2d at 837.
22 Id.
25 Id. at 604, 518 N.E.2d at 837.
2 ' Id.
25 Id. at 605, 518 N.E.2d at 837-38.
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picture of his or her naked one year old child, an act that the
government could hardly detnOnstrate a legitimate interest in pre-
venting."
justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Nolan and Lynch, dis-
sented from the majority's holding that the defendant's act of per-
mitting his stepdaughter to pose naked was insevctable from the
expressive condtict of actually taking or disseminating a photo-
graph.° Justice O'Connor reasoned that a distinction exists between
the dissemination of a photograph, which is protected speech, and
the conduct required to set up the photograph." Only conduct that
directly and immediately communicates constitutes speech for the
purposes of the first amendment, according to Justice O'Connor. 29
In support of his position, Justice O'Connor cited two other state
supreme court opinions upholding similar statutes. Both opinions
stressed that nonexpressive conduct, rather than speech, was at the
"epicenter" of the offense for which the defendants had been pros- .
ecuted." To punctuate his conclusion, Justice O'Connor pointed
out that setting a house on fire is not conduct entitled to first
amendment protection, even where the purpose is to photograph
a burning house."
The Oakes Court's ruling raises three issues: first, whether pho-
tographs of nude children constitute child pornography unpro-
tected by the first amendment. If photographs of nude children are
child pornography, then the collateral act of permitting &child to
pose for such photographs is also unprotected. Second, if photo-
graphs of nude children are protected speech, whether the conduct
of obtaining a model to pose for the photographs is inextricably
intertwined with taking and disseminating the photographs. If the
latter activities are dependent on the former, then a prohibition on
the use of nude children as models constitutes an unconstitutional
restriction of the photographer's freedom of expression. Third,
whether the scope of the conduct prohibited by the statute in Oakes
extends substantially beyond a state's interest in prohibiting at least
some nude photography of children.
Photographs of nude children, absent some element of lewd
exhibition or commercial exploitation, probably do not constitute
Id. at 607, 518 N.F.2d at 839 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
' 8 Id.
29 Id. at 608, 518 N.E.2d at 839-40 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
s'i Id, at 609-10, 518 N.E.2d at 840 (0:Conner, dissenting).
51 Id. at 610, 518 N.E.2d at 841 (O'Connor, j., dissenting).
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child pornography. Thus, the photography of nude children is
entitled to some first amendment protection. In defining child por-
nography, the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber
failed to indicate whether nudity is included within the category of
sexual conduct whose depiction the first amendment does not pro-
tect. 32
 The conduct proscribed by the statute upheld in Ferber did
include, however, the "lewd exhibition of the genitals."" Although
this suggests that the state may constitutionally proscribe lewd or
sexually suggestive photographs of nude children, it provides little
guidance in determining whether the state may constitutionally clas-
sify all nude photographs of children as child pornography."
In deciding that states may constitutionally regulate child por-
nography, the Ferber Court relied heavily on the emotional and
physical harm suffered by children that engage in sexual conduct
for the production of pornographic materials." If the same type
and degree of harm can be attributed to, for example, a child's
exposure of her breasts, then simple nudity should logically be
included in the category of unprotected child pornography. Al-
though a definitive resolution will require empirical evidence, it is
at least arguable that the harm attributable to the exposure of one's
genitals or breasts would not be as severe as that attributable to
coerced sexual intercourse. This does not imply that emotional or
psychological harm could not result where, for example, children
are coerced into displaying themselves in a lewd or highly suggestive
way, or where children are required to expose themselves repeat-
edly. Sithilarly, dile would expect such harm to occur where com-
mercial ekploitatioii of the photographs is intended. In sum, al-
though sittiatiofis may arise Where nude photography of children
may sink to the level of child pornography, a generalization that all
photographs of nude children fall within this category seems un-
warranted.
Assuming that some photographs of nude children are entitled
to first amendment protection, the question becomes whether the
protection extends to the act of obtaining a model to pose for the
photographs. The Constitution mandates such protection if the act
of obtaining a model is essential to the expressive process of taking
" New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1981).
3, N.Y. PENAI, LAW § 263 (McKinney 1980). For the full text of the relevant portions of
the statute, see supra note 3.
' Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
"Id. at 756-58.
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and disseminating photographs. On one end of the spectrum cer-
tain types of conduct, such as the distribution of leaflets, have
traditionally been regarded as so integral to a speaker's ability to
communicate that they are protected by the first amendment in the
absence of an extremely compelling justification for their regula-
tion." On the other end of the spectrum, in contrast, activities that
are neither necessary to a speaker's ability to communicate, nor
traditionally associated with expressive activity, may be regulated
without offending the first amendment, regardless of any incidental
negative effect on the speaker's ability to deliver his or her mes-
sage. 37 In - Clark v. Community for Creative Non - Violence, the United
States Supreme Court held that the government could constitution-
ally prohibit protestors from camping on the Mall in Washington,
D.C. to protest the plight of the homeless." The activity regulated
by the statute in the present case, causing or permitting children to
pose nude or partially nude, is essential to the taking of photographs
of nude children. In the child pornography context, the Supreme
Court has suggested that persons over the statutory age that appear
younger could be substituted for children where necessary." Al-
though the same technique could be used when photographs of
older nude children are desired, an eighteen year-old adult could
hardly serve as a replacement. where a parent wishes to take pictures
of his or her two year-old infant.
Given the close relationship between the conduct that the state
seeks to prohibit and the expressive activity at issue, the state must
demonstrate both a compelling justification for prohibiting the use
of nude child models, and that the prohibition is the least restrictive
alternative for achieving its end.4 ° The state's interest in protecting
its children, while not sufficient to thrust nude photography outside
the first amendment and into the category of child pornography, is
nonetheless compelling. One could hardly qttestion that photo-
graphing nude children does contain the potential for exploitation
and abuse.4 '
The statute at issue in Oakes is hi:A, however, the least restrictive
alternative for preventing the exploitation and abuse of children
' 6 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (distribution of leaflets accorded first
amendment_ protection). See. L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 829-30 (2d ed. 1988).
" See L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 831.
"8 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984).
"" Ferber, 958 U.S. at 763,
`"' See Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
" Oakes, 401 Mass. at 606, 518 N.E.2d at 838 (O'Contier, j:, dissenting).
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involved in nude photography. The legislature could have limited
the statute to, for example, lewd photographs of nude children, or
to photographing nude children for sexual or commercial exploi-
tation. Either of these alternatives would have been more closely
tailored to the prevention of exploitation and abuse.
. Whether the statute is substantially overbroad is related to
whether the statute represents the least restrictive alternative for
achieving the state's goal. 42 If the statute is not the least restrictive
alternative, then by definition it infringes upon some protected
activity.43
 Where the amount of infringed constitutionally protected
activity is substantial, the statute is constitutionally overbroad.'"
In Oakes, as the Supreme Judicial Court found, the statute
extended to a substantial amount of protected activity. 45 For ex-
ample, any photograph, film, or painting that depicted a naked
infant involved a violation of the statute, regardless of whether the
photograph formed part of a family album, or part of a collection
of pornographic stills. Similarly, the Oakes statute criminalized the
relatively mild act of photographing a seventeen year-old female
model who is nude from the waist up. Although such conduct may
be open to moral criticism, the assertion that the evil feared of is at
all related to the harm suffered by, for example, an eight year old
child forced to perform sexual intercourse is hardly credible. In
sum, the Supreme Judicial Court correctly held that the statute at
issue in Oakes was substantially overbroad in violation of the first
amendment, and was therefore facially invalid.
C. *Proving Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Burden of Sisyphus
Under the Commonwealth v. Saferian Standards
The Supreme Judicial Court promulgated the Massachusetts
ineffective assistance of counsel standard in 1974 in Commonwealth
v. Saferian.' In Saferian, the Supreme Judicial Court held that:
what is required in the actual process of decision of claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel ... is a discerning ex-
amination and appraisal of the specific circumstances of
the given case to see whether there has been serious in-
42 See Broderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
45 See id.
" Id. at 616.
45 Oakes, 401 Mass. at 604-05, 518 N.E.2d at 837-38.
* Charles D. Gill, Jr., Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
Commonwealth v. Sakrian, 366 Mass. 89, 315 N.E.2d 878 (1974).
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competency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel — be-
havior of counsel falling measurably below that which
might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer —
and, if that is found, then,. typically, whether it has likely
deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substan-
tial ground of defence. 2
In effect, Saferian established a two-prong test that a defendant
must satisfy to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsels First,
the defendant must show that his lawyer's efforts deviated from
those expected from the "ordinary fallible lawyer." 4 When deter-
mining this question, the Supreme Judicial Court will not "second
guess competent lawyers working hard for defendants who turn on
them when the jury happens to find their clients guilty." 5 Rather,
the Court requires that the defendant show that his or her lawyer's
tactical or strategic judgment was "manifestly unreasonable." Sec-
ond, once the defendant has shown that his or her lawyer's efforts
failed to meet the "ordinary fallible lawyer" standard, the defendant
must then demonstrate that his or her lawyer's deficient efforts
deprived him or her of "an otherwise available, substantial ground
of defence"' — in other words, that "better work [by his or her
lawyer] might have accomplished something material for the de-
fense." 8 In short, the defendant must show that his or her defense
incurred actual harm as a result of his or her lawyer's sub-standard
efforts.
Id. at 96, 315 N.E.2d at 883. The Supreme judicial Court has held that if the Saferian
test is met, then the federal standard has necessarily been met, Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394
Mass. 251, 256 n.3, 475 N.E.2d 381, 383 n.3 (1985). The United States Supreme Court set
forth the federal standard in Strickland v. Washington, holding:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First,
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This re-
quires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not func-
tioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
" Commonwealth v. Rondeau, 378 Mass, 408, 412, '392 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (1979); Saf-
erian, 366 Mass. at 90, 315 N.E.2d at 883.
Saferian, 360 Mass. at 96, 315 N.E.2d at 883,
Commonwealth v, Stone, 366 Mass. 506, 517, 320 N.E.2d 888, 896 (1974).
"Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728, 375 N,E,2d 681, 685 (1978).
7 Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96, 315 N.E.2d 'at 883.
"Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115, 304 N.F..,2d 1260, 1264 (1977).
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During the Selected Developments year, the Supreme Judicial
Court and the Appeals Court have decided a number of cases in
which the defendant had raised the issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel. 9
 Throughout each of these cases, the Supreme Judicial
Court and the Appeals Court consistently applied the standard set
forth in Saferian. Furthermore, these cases clearly illustrated the
difficulty of proving ineffective assistance of counsel under this
standard.
In Commonwealth v. Haggerty, the Supreme Judicial Court found
ineffective assistance of counsel when the defendant's attorney
failed to pursue the only defense available to the defendant.i° The
defendant assaulted and robbed an eighty-two year old woman on
June 16, 1982. 11
 The woman was hospitalized as a result of the
assault and remained hospitalized until August 11, 1982 when she
died of a heart attack.' 2
 The jury convicted the defendant of first
degree murder. The defendant thereafter appealed from his con-
viction and from his motion for a new trial, claiming that at trial he
was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed
to pursue the issue of causation in regard to the victim's death.' 3
At the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial, the
defendant's lawyer acknowledged that he believed that the period
between the two traumas was sufficiently distant so that "someone
could conclude something else ... intervene[d]," to cause the vic-
tim's death. 14
 The defendant's attorney then sought funds for a
medical expert, but decided not to pursue the strategy of asserting
that the defendant had not proximately caused the victim's death.L 5
He reasoned that if the expert's opinions adversely affected his
client, the Commonwealth could gain access to them and use them
against his client at trial.l€ The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the
defense attorney's reasoning, stating that he had misread the Corn-
s See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Callahan, 401 Mass. 627, 519 N.E.2d 245 (1988); Common-
wealth v. Reid, 400 Mass. 534, 511 N.E2d 331 (1987); Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 400
Mass. 437, 509 N.E.2d 1163 (1987); Commonwealth v. Doherty, 399 Mass. 193, 503 N.E.2d
644 (1987); Commonwealth v, Thomas, 399 Mass. 165, 303 N.E.2d 456 (1987); Common-
wealth v. Silva, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 220, 517 N.E.2d 182 (1987); Commonwealth v. Williams,
25 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 517 N.E.2d 176 (1987).
LO Haggerty, 400 Mass. at 438, 442, 509 N.E.2d 1163-64, 1166 (1987).
" Id. at 438-39, 509 N.E.2d at 1164-65.
Id. at 459-40, 509 N.E.2d at 1164-65.
13 Id. at 437-38, 509 N.E.2d at 1163-64.
14
 Id. at 440, 509 N.E.2d at 1165.
15 Id.
16
 Id. at 440-41, 509 N.E.2d at 1165.
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monwealth's reciprocal discovery rule.' 7 The Court asserted that
Rule 14(a)(3)(A) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure
allows reciprocal discovery only of material which the defendant
intends to use at tria1. 18 Thus, if the expert's opinions weakened the
defendant's case, the Commonwealth could not have gained access
to them so long as the defendant did not use them at trial.
The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that this case was not
one where an attorney made "arguably reasoned tactical or strategic
judgments."' Rather, the Court stated that the defense counsel
Failed to investigate the only "realistic defense" which the defendant
had to the charge of first degree murder, and thus, the defense
counsel's actions were analogous to "leav[ing] the defendant without
any defense at all."24) In sum, the Supreme Judicial Court held that
the defense attorney's efforts fell below those which would be ex-
pected from an "ordinary fallible lawyer," and that such conduct
deprived the defendant of not only a "substantial ground of def-
ence," but of his only "realistic defense," and therefore constituted
ineffective assistance of counse1. 21
In Commonwealth v. Doherty22 and Commonwealth v. Reid, 25 the
Supreme Judicial Court found that the defense counsels' efforts in
both cases fell below the "ordinary fallible lawyer" standard; the
Court, however, did not find ineffective assistance of counsel be-
cause the second prong of the Saferian test had not been met. The
Court ruled that although the defense attorneys' efforts were sub-
standard, they did not actually harm or prejudice the defendants,
and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Doherty, the defendant appealed from his conviction on two
counts of rape, claiming that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel because his lawyer failed to object to the admission of a
Roman Catholic priest's testimony which fell within the ambit of
Id. at 441, 509 N.E.2d at 1165.
1, Id. at 441, 442 n.10, 509 N.E.2d at 1165, 1166 rt. 10. Counsel also argued that the
prosecution would discover the identity of his experts as a result or his having to submit his
expert's bill to the Commonwealth. The Court chastised counsel for imputing unethical
conduct on the part of the Commonwealth and asserted that counsel's reasoning was no
More than mere conjecture and did not absolve him from his failure to investigate fully the
question of proximate cause. Id. at 441, 509 N.E.2d at 1165-66.
19 /d. at 441, 509 N.E.2d at 1166 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rondeau, 378 Mass. 408,
413, 392 N.E,2d 1001, 1003-04 (1979)).
2" Id. at 441-42, 509 N.E.2c1 at 1166,
21 Id. at 438, 442, 509 N.E.2d at 1164, 1166.
22 399 Mass. 193, 193-94, 200, 503 N.E,2d 644, 644-45, 648 (1987).
23 400 Mass. 534, 535-37, 511 N.E.2d 331, 332-33 (1987).
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privilege provided in Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 233,
section 20A. 24 The defendant had confessed his crimes to the priest
while seeking the priest's advice, and the priest testified as to his
confession at trial. 25 The clay after the priest testified, the defen-
dant's attorney moved for a mistrial and conceded that he should
not have allowed the priest to testify and placed "99 per cent of the
blame" upon himself, stating that he failed to object to the priest's
testimony because of his failure to focus on the pertinent part of
the statute. 26
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, refused to find ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel because the defense attorney's actions did
not meet the second prong of the Saferian test. 27 The Court stated
that, although the defense attorney's efforts were sub-standard, no
ineffective assistance of counsel occurred because the Common-
wealth presented a strong case even without the priest's testimony,
and because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the exclusion
of the priest's testimony would have "accomplished something ma-
terial for the delense." 28 In short, the defendant simply failed to
demonstrate that his lawyer's incompetence clearly harmed his de-
fense.
In Reid, the jury convicted the defendant of rape of a child
without force. 29 The defendant claimed on appeal that he was de-
nied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to move
in limine or at trial to exclude certain prior convictions or to request
limiting instructions." The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that
"no apparent reason" existed for counsel's failure to at least object
to the introduction of the defendant's prior convictions and that
such a failure "constitute[d] behavior which fell measurably below
that of an ordinary fallible lawyer."3 i The Court ruled, however,
that the defense counsel's failures did not prejudice the defendant
21 Doherty, 399 Mass. at 19'3-94, 503 N.E.2d at 644-45. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233. § 20 A
(1984) states in pertinent part that no "priest, rabbi or ordained or licensed minister of any
church or an accredited Christian Science practitioner shall testify as to any communication
made to him by any person in seeking religious or spiritual advice or comfort ... without
the consent of such person," Id.
2.5
	
399 Mass. at 196-97, 503 N.E.2d at 646-47.
26 Id. at 198, 503 N.E.2d at 647.
27 Id.
2" Id. at 194, 200, 503 N.E.2d at 644-45, 648 (quoting Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373
Mass. 109, 115, 364 N.E.2(1 1260, 1264 (1977)).
22 400 Mass. at 535, 511 N.E.2d at 332.
" Id.
I Id. at 537, 511 N.E.2d at 333.
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because the prior convictions were not similar to rape of a child
without force, so that "under any hypothesis" his convictions would
have been admitted even if' his attorney had objected. 32
The Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Callahan" and
Commonwealth v. Thomas.'" and the Appeals Court in Commonwealth
v. Silva" and Commonwealth v. Williams" refused to find ineffective
assistance of' counsel because the defendant. in each case failed to
satisfy the first prong of the Saferian test — that their attorney's
conduct fell below the "ordinary fallible lawyer" standard. In Cal-
lahan, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and
appealed, claiming that his attorney failed to argue adequately the
Mthoul defense because he failed to mention the specific language
of that defense. 57 The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the
defendant's attorney clearly presented the facts supporting the
Mc/lout defense to the jury" 8 and that simply presenting the evi-
dence which supports that defense and leaving the discussion of its
specifics to the judge was not "manifestly unreasonable," did not
"denude" the defendant of a defense, and thus did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel."
In Thomas, the defendant was convicted of rape and abuse of
a child without force and appealed, arguing that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer had been sus-
pended from the practice of law in the Commonwealth for failure
to register with the Board of Overseers, and because his counsel's
"2 hi. at 537-40, 511 N.E.2d at 333-34.
" 401 Mass. 627, 634-36, 510 N.E.2d 245, 250-51 (1988).
:" 399 Mass. 165, 166, 168-69, 503 N.E.2d 456, 458-59 - (1087),
5 " 25 Mass. App. Ct. 220, 226, 517 N.E.2d 182, 185-8ti (1987).
" 25 Mass. App. Ct.. 210, 214, 517 N.E.2d 176, 179 (1987).
33 Callahan, 40l Mass. at 628, 634-36, 519 N.E.2d . at 250-5I. The Mcfloul defense states:
"[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Com-
monwealth v. Nit:Hoof, 352 Mass. 544, 546-47, 226 N.E.2c1 556, 557-58 (1967).
38 Callahan, 401 Mass. at 635, 519 N.E.2d at 251. The Court stated:
Trial counsel in this case lOrcefully presented the theory that the defendant.
was unable to control his conduct on the night of the killing and thus was not.
responsible for his actions. Counsel recounted the evidence of the defendant's
long history of manic-depressive mental illness, ltis medication, his consumption
of alcohol which exacerbates his condition, the stress he was under, his history
of suicide attempts, and the fact that he neither fled nor tried to conceal the
killing. Counsel marshalled the facts in favor of the defense of lack of substantial
capacity and conveyed clearly to the jury the essential factors to be considered
under McHoul. Id.
'9 Id, at 636, 519 N.E.2d at 251.
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representation was sub-standard.° The defendant argued that rep-
resentation by a suspended attorney constituted per se ineffective
assistance of counsel and thus did not require a showing of preju-
dice resulting from his attorney's incompetence." The Supreme
Judicial Court refused outright to adopt a rule which stated that
representation by unregistered counsel constituted per se ineffective
assistance of counsel. 42
The defendant argued further that even if the Court refused
to adopt a per se rule, such representation by his counsel in this
particular case was ineffective.° The defendant asserted that his
attorney's suspension for failure to register with the bar was "indic-
ative of a certain cavalier attitude with respect to the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney," and thus it was "entirely possible,
and perhaps even likely" that his counsel failed to prepare ade-
quately his defense." The Court rejected the defendant's argument,
stating that ineffective assistance of counsel must be demonstrated
by "specific instances of attorney incompetence, not by mere spec-
ulation."45
In Silva, the jury convicted the defendant of second degree
murder, kidnapping, and one count of larceny of a motor vehicle°
The defendant filed a motion for a new trial claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to object to the judge's
charge regarding the Commonwealth's standard for felony-mur-
der.47 The Appeals Court ruled that although the present felony-
murder standard in the Commonwealth differed from the standard
the trial judge enunciated, at the time of the trial the judge ex-
pressed the correct felony-murder standard in the Common-
wealth.° The defendant, however, argued that he was deprived of
40 Thomas, 399 Mass. at 165-66, 503 N.E.2d at 457 (1987).
'' Id. at 168, 503 N.E.2d at 458-59.
412 Id.
' 3 Id. at 168-69, 503 N.E.2d at 459.
44 ./d. at 169, 503 N.E.2d at 459.
45 Id.
"Silva, 25 Mass. App. Ct. at 220, 517 N.E.2d at 183 (1987).
47 Id. at 222, 517 N.E,2c1 at 184.
" Id. at 225-26, 517 N.E,2d at 185-86. Three years after the defendant's trial, the
Supreme Judicial Court enunciated a new felony-murder standard, holding that:
where the underlying crime is not inherently dangerous to human life the judge
must instruct the jury that it cannot find the accused guilty of felony-murder
unless it finds 'that the [crime] involved circumstances demonstrating the de-
fendant's conscious disregard of the risk to human life.'
Id. at 225, 517 N.E.2d at 185 (footnote omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386
Mass. 492, 508, 436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (1982)).
March 1989]	 SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS 	 627
a substantial defense because his lawyer lacked the foresight to
object to the former felony-murder standard. 49 The court held that
the "ordinary fallible lawyer" could not be expected to object to jury
instructions which, when given, were free from error, and thus the
defendant did not suffer from ineffective assistance of counse1. 5°
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of both assault with
intent to murder, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon. 51 The defendant appealed, claiming that defense counsel's
failure to ask certain questions of one of the Commonwealth's wit-
nesses on cross-examination amounted to ineffective assistance of
counsel. 52 During cross-examination of the witness, the defendant
told his attorney that he wanted him to question the witness re-
garding the witness' previous conversation with the defendant. 53
The defendant's attorney refused to ask the questions, and the
Appeals Court refused to find ineffective assistance of counsel,
stating, "we do not believe that, in order to prevent a charge of
ineffective assistance of counsel, trial counsel must ask questions to
which he does not know the answers." 54
In sum, in recent cases, the Supreme Judicial Court and the
Appeals Court have continued to apply the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel which the Supreme Judicial Court promul-
gated in 1974 in Commonwealth v. Saferian. These recent cases un-
derscore the difficulty a defendant confronts in trying to show
ineffective assistance of counsel under this standard. Even if a de-
fendant successfully demonstrates that his or her attorney's efforts
fell below the "ordinary fallible lawyer" standard, the defendant
must still show that' his or her attorney's sub-standard efforts ac-
tually harmed his or her defense. Furthermore, recent cases have
clearly demonstrated that when determining whether the defen-
dant's defense was actually harmed, the Supreme Judicial Court
and the Appeals Court use broad discretionary authority and as a
result do not readily Find actual harm. Thus, although the first
prong of the Saferian test is objective in nature, the second prong
is clearly subjective and affords courts virtually unchecked veto
power over an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In short, in
order for a defendant to prevail on an ineffective assistance of
49 Id. at 226,517 N.E.2d at 185-86.
Id.
t" Williams, 25 Mass, App. Ct.. at 211, 517 N.E.2d at 177 (1987),
' 2 Id. at 215,517 N.E.2d at 179-80.
53 Id.
94 Id.
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counsel claim, he or she must present a clearly egregious case in
which his or her attorney not only performed incompetently; but
clearly harmed his or her defense, such as in Commonwealth v. Hag-
gerty where the defendant's attorney failed to pursue the defen-
dant's only "realistic defense."
D. *Developments in Drunken Driving Laws
Under Section 24(1)(A) of the Massachusetts General Laws, the
offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors
requires the state to prove not only the defendant's intoxication,
but also that he or she "operated" a vehicle on a "public way."' In
attempting to prove intoxication the state may, under Section
24(1)(e), introduce evidence of the percentage of alcohol in the
defendant's blood as adduced by chemical tests. 2 Five one-hun-
dredths percent or less triggers a presumption of sobriety while
fifteen one-hundredths percent triggers a presumption of intoxi-
cation, leaving a gray area between five one-hundredths and fifteen
one-hundredths percent in which no presumption exists. 3 If the
state proves the necessary elements and obtains a conviction, the
registrar may immediately revoke the defendant's license to drive.'
During the Selected Developments year, Massachusetts appellate
courts handed down several decisions affecting the law on drunk
driving in the Commonwealth. The Supreme Judicial Court, for
example, upheld a new statute imposing a mandatory sentence of
one year on those convicted of committing vehicular homicide while
intoxicated. 5 Interpreting existing statutes in other cases, the courts
shed light on what constitutes a "public way" and "operation" of a
motor vehicle. 6 In another group of cases the courts ruled on the
validity of various methods of testing for intoxication.' Thus, the
courts not only clarified existing law but also ruled on new inno-
vations in the war against drunk driving.
* Larry Holland, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 90, § 24(1 )(a) (1986).
2 Id. § 24(1)(c).
3 Id.
▪Id. § 24(1)(b).
'Commonwealth v. Therriault, 401 Mass. 237, 242-43, 515 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (1987).
"Commonwealth v. Ginnetti, 400 Mass. 181, 508 N.E.2d 603 (1987); Commonwealth v.
Colby, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 1008, 505 N.E.2d 218 (1987).
▪See Commonwealth v. Sargent, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 512 N.E.2d 285, review denied,
401 Mass. 1101, 517 N.E.2d 1289 (1987); Commonwealth v. Smythe, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 348,
502 N.E.2d 162 (1987); Commonwealth v. Cochran, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 517 N.E.2d 498
(1988).
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I. Upholding the Mandatory Sentencing Statute
In Commonwealth v. Therriault, the Supreme Judicial Court up-
held a statute imposing a minimum one-year mandatory sentence
on a defendant convicted of committing vehicular homicide while
intoxicated. 8 In Therriault, the, defendant claimed that the statute
violated the federal and state constitutional provisions against cruel
and unusual punishment. 9 The Court applied a three-part test to
determine whether the statute ran afoul of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause.m Conceding that the punishment in question
satisfied the first prong's consideration of the nature of the offense
and the offender in fight of the degree of harm to society," the
defendant based his challenge on the second and third prongs. 12
These prongs compare the challenged punishment with the pun-
ishments imposed for similar crimes within the state and with the
punishments for the same or similar crimes in other jurisdictions.'s
Noting the defendant's contention that a comparison of the
punishments for similar crimes within the Commonwealth shows
that some felonies do not have a mandatory. minimum sentence,
the Court placed more weight on a comparison of the challenged
statute's range with the ranges of other felony statutes." According
to the Court, the felonies the defendant cited as lacking a mandatory
minimum sentence have a maximum punishment of life imprison-
ment.'' Because the maximum punishment for vehicular homicide
while driving under the influence is only ten years, 16 the Court
Commonwealth v. Therriault, 401 Mass. 237, 242-43, 515 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (1987).
Section 240(a) of chapter 90 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides that
Whoever ... shall he guilty of homicide by motor vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicating substance 	 shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison for not less than two and one-half years or more than ten
years and a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in
a jail or house of correction for not less than one year nor more than two and
one-half years and a fine of not more than five thousand dollars.
Id. at 239 ti.2, 515 N.E.2d at 1200 n,2 (quoting MASS. GEN. L. ch. 90. 240(a) (1984)).
9 Id, at 239, 515 N.E.2d at 1200. The defendant also argued that the statute violated his
right to due process and the doctrine of separation of powers under article 30 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. See id. at 241-42, 515 N.E.2d 1201-02.
'° hl. at 239. The court adopted this test in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904,
344 N.E.2d 106 (1970).
Therrimilt, 401 Mass. at 240, 515 N.E.2d at 1200.
1.1
	 at 240-41, 515 N.E.2d at 1201.
" Id. at 240, 515 N.E.2d at 1200.
14 /d, at 241, 515 N.E.2d at 1201.
15 Id.
16 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 90, * 240(a) (1980).
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concluded that the challenged statute's range is comparable to the
range of sentences for other felonies within the Commonwealth."
The Court also observed that the range of sentences in other juris-
dictions for vehicular homicide were comparable.' 8
 Thus, conclud-
ing that the mandatory sentencing provision of Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws chapter 90, section 24G(a) passed all three prongs of the
test, the Court upheld the statute against eighth amendment at-
tack.' 9
2. Allowing Admittance of Videotape Evidence in Drunken
Driving Prosecutions
Addressing a different constitutional question in Commonwealth
v. Mahoney, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the admission of a
videotape of the booking procedure into evidence in a drunk driv-
ing case. 2° The defendant contended that the use of the videotape
as evidence violated the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments to the
U.S. Constitution as well as his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. 2 '
The Court rejected the fourth amendment argument outright, con-
cluding that videotaping the defendant involved no search or sei-
zure.22
 The Court likewise dismissed the fifth amendment claim
because a defendant's right to be free from compelled self-incrim-
ination excludes only "testimonial" or "communicative" evidence
and therefore does not apply to photographic or video recordings. 2'
Because the sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach at
' 7
 Therriault, 401 Mass. at 241, 515 N.E.2d at 1201.
'e Id.
' 9 See id. at 240-41, 515 N.E.2d 1200-01.
" See Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 400 Mass. 524, 526-30, 510 N.E.2d 759, 761-63
(1987).
2 ' Id. at 526, 510 N.E.2d at 761.
Id. at 527, 510 N.E.2d at 761-62. The court concluded that since the observations of'
the police officers during the booking process did not constitute a search, the mere taping
of these observations likewise did not constitute a search. Id. at 527, 510 N.E.2d at 762 (citing
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750-51 (1979)).
" Id. at 527, 510 N.E.2d at 762 (citing Schmerber v. California, 348 U.S. 757, 764
(1966)). The court relied on the Schmerber Court's conclusion that the fifth amendment "offers
no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measure-
ments, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance,
to walk, or to make a particular gesture." Id. at 527-28, 51(} N.E.2d at 762.
The court refused to conclude that the fact that the videotape included the defendant's
responses to police questioning during the booking process made the videotape "testimonial"
evidence. Id. at 528, 510 N.E.2d at 762. Relying on Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass.
772, 483 N.E.2d 60 (1982), the court ruled that the videotape did not contain testimonial
evidence because it did'not force the defendant "to reveal knowledge or thoughts concerning
some fact." Id.
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the time of an arrest, the Court also found no merit to the defen-
dant's sixth amendment challenge. 2 ' Finally, the Court concluded
that the admissibility of the videotape did not violate Miranda v.
Arizona because the taped interrogation did not resemble a "custo-
dial interrogation," essential to a Miranda challenge. 25 Thus, the
Court rejected each of the defendant's constitutional challenges to
the videotape of the booking procedure's admission into evidence. 2"
3. Rulings on Admissibility of Intoxication Tests
Massachusetts appellate courts ruled recently on three cases
involving admission of intoxication tests into evidence. In Common-
wealth v. Sargent the defendant challenged the admission into evi-
dence of a blood alcohol reading because the test was neither re-
quested by the attending physician nor used in treating the
defendant but rather was conducted as "normal procedure" on
every "trauma patient." 27 According to the defendant the test there-
fore did not come under the medical records exception to the rule
against hearsay evidence providing that "[r]ccords kept by hospitals
... under [C.L. c. 111, § 70] shall be admissible ... as evidence ...
so far as such records relate to the treatment and medical history
of such cases ... but nothing therein contained shall be admissible
as evidence which has reference to the question of liability." 28 The
Appeals Court, however, ruled that the statute's express language
requires only that the "records relate to the treatment" and there-
fore held the blood alcohol test admissible. 2" Although the defen-
dant further argued that the Commonwealth should not be allowed
to satisfy the burden of proof with mere hearsay evidence, the court
also rejected this argument." Finding the hearsay evidence in the
present case to be reliable, the court noted that even if the blood
alcohol test provided the only evidence of intoxication presented
2 '1 Id. at 528-29, 510 N.E.2d at 762 (citing Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 386 Mass. 393,
436 N.E.2c1 912 (1982); Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 379 Mass. 878, 401 N.E.2d 802 (1980)).
25 Id. at 529, 510 N.E.2d at 762-63. The court relied on the Supreme Court's conclusion
in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980), that Tribe term 'interrogation' under
Miranda refers not only in express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part
of the police (other than thme normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know arc reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. (emphasis
in original).
2" id. at 526-30, 510 N.E.2d at 761-63.
2' Commonwealth v. Sargent, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 658, 512 N.E.2d 285, 286 (1987),
28 Id. at 660, 512 N.E.2c1 at 287.
22 Id. at 660-61, 512 N.E.2d at 287.
Id. at 661, 512 N.E.2d at 287.
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by the Commonwealth, the case would have nonetheless gone to
the jury."'
In Commonwealth v. Smythe, the Appeals Court affirmed the
validity of the "Intoxilyzer 5000" as a method of testing for blood
alcohol level." The defendant claimed the "Intoxilyzer 5000" did
not. perform a "chemical test or analysis of his breath" within the
meaning of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 90, section
24(1)(e)." Noting that the legislature could not have intended to
limit the methods of testing by the technology available at the time
of the statute's adoption in 1961, the court refused to construe the
statute narrowly. 34 Thus, because the "Intoxilyzer 5000" analyzes
the suspect's breath for a chemical compound and measures con-
centration of that compound by means of a test "routinely used by
chemists," the court held the test results admissible."' At the same
time, however, the court did grant the defendant a new trial due
to the trial court's refusal to allow expert testimony regarding the
reliability and accuracy of the breath test results."
In Commonwealth v. Cochran, the Appeals Court held that ad-
mission of breathalyzer results from a Smith and Wesson model
2000, which failed to pass an accuracy check after the defendant's
test," could not be discounted as harmless error." Two separate
samples of the defendant's breath registered alcohol readings of .24
and .25 respectively." After these tests, however, the operator con-
ducted a "simulator test" for accuracy on the machine and obtained
a reading outside the acceptable level of error. 4" Because the Corn-
3 ' Id, at 661, 512 N.E.2d at 287-88.
" Commonwealth v. Smythe, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 349, 502 N.E.2d 162, 163 0984
"See id. Section 29(1)(e) provides that, so lung as certain conditions are met, including
the consent of the defendant to the test.
[i]n any prosecution for [operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicating liquo•], evidence of the percentage, by weight, of alcohol in the
defendant's blood at the time of the alleged offense, as shown by chemical test
or analysis of his blood or as indicated by chemical test or analysis of his breath,
shall be admissible and deemed relevant to the determination of the question
of whether such defendant was at such time under the influence of intoxicating
liquor ... .
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 90, § 24(1)(e) (1986), quoted in Smythe, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 349-50, 502
N.E.2d at 163.	 •
"See id. at 351, 502 N.E.2d at 164.
" Id.
36 id, at 349, 502 N.E.2d 162, 163.
" Commonwealth v. Cochran, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 264, 517 N.E.2d 998, 501 (1988).
" Id. at '265, 517 N.E.2d at 502.
"Id. at 261, 517 N. E.2d at 500.
ri Id. at 262, 517 N.E.2d at 500.
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monwealth carries the burden of showing the accuracy of the breath
tests, the court concluded that the trial court should have excluded
the breath test results:" Furthermore, because of the "scientific
approval" behind the results as submitted to the jury, the court held
that the admission of the breathalyzer results did not constitute
harmless error even though other strong evidence demonstrated
the defendant's intoxication . 42
4. Statutory Scope of "Operation of a Vehicle" and "Public Way"
Interpreting the language of existing drunk driving statutes,
Massachusetts appellate courts further clarified the meaning of
"public way" and "operation" of a motor vehicle. In Commonwealth
v. Ginetti, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that a
vehicle with a running engine satisfies the operation requirement
for purposes of the drunk driving statute, even though the vehicle
cannot be moved due to conditions "not involving the vehicle it-
self."` 3 In Ginetti, a police officer found the defendant in his car
with the engine running." The defendant was attempting to move
the car but, although the wheels spun, the car remained stationary."
Thus, although the vehicle never actually moved as the result of
the defendant's efforts, the Court ruled that the mere "setting in
motion of the operative machinery" sufficiently constituted opera-
tion of the vehicle."
. In Commonwealth, v. Colby, the Appeals Court relied on similar
reasoning in ruling that a sleeping defendant in a stationary vehicle
with the engine running "operated" the vehicle within the meaning
of the drunk driving statute." The police found the defendant
asleep in his -car with the engine running and headlights on." Two
of the vehicle's wheels rested on the road while the other two
remained on the shoulder." Although there was no evidence that
anybody saw the defendant drive or move the vehicle, 50 the court
l'See id. at 264-65, 517 N.E.2d at 501-02.
12 Id. at 265, 517 N.E.2d at 502.
Commonwealth v. Ginnetti, 400 Mass. 181, 184, 508 N.E.2d 603, 605 (1987) (citing
State v. Standish, 116 N.H. 483, 484 (1976)).




 See Commonwealth v. Colby, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 1008, 1010-11, 505 N.E.2d 218, 220-
21 (1987).
48 Id. at 1008-09, 505 N.E.2d at 218.
49 Id. at 1010, 505 N.E.2d at 220.
3 ( 1
 See id. at 1011, 505 N.E.2d at 220.
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concluded that the circumstantial evidence supported submission of
the case to the jury. 3 ' The court also ruled that the prosecution
presented enough evidence for the jury to find that the occupied
car was on a "public way" within the meaning of the statute even
though only two of the wheels actually rested on the road. 52
In Commonwealth v. Leonard, however, the Supreme Judicial
Court held that the defendant's uncorroborated admission that he
drove the vehicle provided insufficient evidence to send the case to
the jury. 53 The police found the defendant, with his wife on his lap,
seated in the vehicle on the side of the road attempting to place the
keys in the ignition." The defendant's wife struggled to stop the
defendant from starting the car. 55 Upon arriving, the police physi-
cally removed the defendant from the car." On the way to the
station, the defendant admitted to the police that he had picked his
wife up from work and thus had driven the car before the police
arrived." Relying on Commonwealth v. Forde, 58 the Supreme Judicial
Court refused to allow the case to go to the jury based solely upon
the uncorroborated confession.59
5. Granting Stays of License Revocation
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Yameen, the Supreme Judicial Court
held that a judge has discretion to grant a stay of a license revocation
pending the outcome of a defendant's appeal from a conviction of
operating under the inffuence. 60 The Commonwealth argued that
the language of the statute in question "specifically prohibits" courts
from granting stays of license revocations pursuant to a conviction
of driving under the influence. 9 ' The Court, however, ruled that
the language of the statute prohibited only automatic stays and
therefore did not preclude the possibility of allowing judges to grant
discretionary stays. 62
Because a defendant who was successful on appeal could not
be made whole for the license revocation in the interim between
"See id. at 1011, 505 N.E.2d at 221.
52 1d. at 1010, 505 N.E.2d at 220.
55 See Commonwealth v. Leonard, 401 Mass. 470, 473, 517 N.E.2d 157, 159 (1988).




55 Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 466 N.E.2d 510 (1985).
59 Leonard, 401 Mass. at 972-73, 517 N.E.2d at 158-59.
6° Commonwealth v. Yameen, 401 Mass. 331, 335, 516 N.E.2d 1149, 1151-52 (1987).
6 ' Id. at 333, 516 N.E.2d at 1151.
'2 Id. at 334, 516 N.E.2d at 1151-52.
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the initial judgment and the outcome of the appeal, the Court
concluded that the legislature could not have intended to prohibit
the granting of stays."' Thus, the Supreme judicial Court decided
that the only way to safeguard a meaningful opportunity to appeal
was to allow judges to grant stays. 64 Therefore, the Court held that
in future cases judges may grant stays of license revocations at their
discretion."
In sum, Massachusetts appellate courts have stiffened the
drunk driving laws within the Commonwealth. Upholding the man-
datory sentencing of one year upon conviction of vehicular homi-
cide while under the influence of alcohol, the Supreme Judicial
Court insured that persons who carelessly and needlessly take hu-
man lives will not escape punishment." In Commonwealth v. Sargent,
the Appeals Court liberally interpreted the medical records excep-
tion of the hearsay rule to allow the admission of a blood alcohol
test and noted that the blood alcohol evidence by itself sufficed to
get the case to the jury.° Moreover, the Supreme Judicial Court
upheld the admissibility of a videotape of the booking procedure
against constitutional attack and thus increased the means by which
intoxication can be proved. 68 Finally, the courts refused to allow
defendants to escape through use of technicalities such as the def-
inition of "public way" and "operation" of a motor vehicle.69 Thus,
Massachusetts appellate court decisions have reflected the increased
societal awareness of the danger of driving under the influence.
E. *Domestic Violence: Massachusetts Courts and the "Battered Woman's
Syndrome"
Domestic violence by men against women occurs frequently in
this country.' In fact, an estimated "one-third to one-half of all
"3 1(1. at 334-35, 516 N.E.2d at 1151.
ti4
0 Id. at 335, 516 N.E.2d at 1151-52.
"6 See Commonwealth v, Therriault, 401 Mass. 237, 242-43, 515 N.E.2d 1198, 1202
(1987).
Commonwealth v. Sargent, 24 Mass, App. Ct. 657, 660-61, 512 N.E.2d 285, 287
(1987).
'ie See Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 400 Mass. 524, 526-30, 510 N.E.2d 759, 761-63
(1987).
"9 See Commonwealth v. Ginnetti, 400 Mass. 181, 183-184, 508 N.E.2d 603, 604-05
(1987); Commonwealth v. Colby, 23 Mass. App, Ct. 1008, 1010-11, 505 N.E.2d 218, 219-
221 (1987).
* Paul E. Salamanca, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE. LAW REVIEW.
' See State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 191, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (1984); see also C.P. EWING,
RAll'ERED WOMEN WHO KILL 5 & n.20 (1987); Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex
Bias in the Law of Self-Deferne, 15 HARV. L. REV. 623, 624-25 (1980).
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women who live with male companions experience such forms of
brutality as threats of severe harm, degradation, beatings, or tor-
ture."2 In addition, cases of women killing the male figure in their
lives, although rare, occur with increasing frequency.' Many of these
women plead self-defense when prosecuted for taking the life of
their husband or boyfriend. 4 Their pleas often fail, however, be-
cause these women typically cannot adapt the law of self-defense to
their situations.' In recent years, many women facing prosecution
for killing their mates have offered evidence on the "battered wom-
an's syndrome" to broaden the scope of the law of self-defense.'
The battered woman's syndrome is a condition characterizing
many women caught in an abusive relationship and unable to leave.'
According to Dr. Lenore Walker, a leading expert in the area, the
syndrome consists of a three-stage cycle.' The first stage, which
Walker describes as the "tension-building" stage, is marked by es-
calating minor physical and verbal abuse by the man against the
woman. 9 The second stage involves an "acute battering incident,"
which occurs when the tension in the relationship becomes intol-
erable.'" In the third stage the male shows extreme contrition and
behaves lovingly toward his mate."
According to Dr. Walker, a woman who remains in an abusive
relationship after going through the cycle more than once suffers
from the battered woman's syndrome.' 2 Reasons that women re-
main in such relationships include lack of self-esteem, lack of in-
dependent resources, fear of reprisal by their mate, guilt that the
failure of the relationship is their fault, and fear of reaching out
toward friends, family, and the police." Ultimately, battered women
"sink into a state of psychological paralysis and become unable to
take any action at all to improve or alter the situation.""
WOmen who kill their batterers frequently offer expert testi-
mony on the battered woman's syndrome to buttress their claims
2 Schneider, supra note 1, at 624-25 & n.6.
3 C.P. EWING, supra note 1, at 5 & 11.21.
4 Id. at 5 & n.22.
5 /d. at 46-50; see also Schneider, supra note 1, at 632-36.
C.P. EWING, supra note I, at 51.
Kelly, 97 NJ, at 193, 478 A.2d at 371.
8 Id. (citing L. WALKER, THE BATTF,RED WOMAN 55-70 (1979)).
- 9 Kelly, 97 NJ. at 193, 478 A.2d at 371.
lo Id.
° Id. at 193-94, 478 A.2d at 371.
12 Id. at 193, 478 A.2d at 371 (citing L. WALKER, supra note 8, at xv).
13 Id. at 194-96, 478 A.2d at 371-72.




that they acted honestly and reasonably in self-defense. 15 Propo-
nents of such testimony, however, meet with mixed success in the
courts. Some jurisdictions admit the testimony, finding it relevant,
helpful to the jury, and reliable. 16
 Others refuse to admit the testi-
mony, on the grounds that it is unreliable, invasive of the province
of the jury, touching too closely on the ultimate issue at trial, or
likely to prejudice the jury. 17
 On the whole, however, the trend in
the courts seems to be toward admitting testimony on the battered
woman's syndrome. 18
Massachusetts courts have yet to rule on the admissibility of
testimony on the battered woman's syndrome. In the 1987 decision
Commonwealth v. Moore, however, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
upheld a trial court's exclusion of expert testimony on the syndrome
on the grounds that it was irrelevant to the defendant's case.'`' The
Moore court reasoned that testimony on the syndrome was not ger-
mane to the defendant's argument that she had not killed her
boyfriend in the first place. 29
Moore was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing
her former boyfriend. 2 ' According to the evidence adduced at trial,
the defendant arid her boyfriend had a stormy relationship, in
which the victim frequently harassed and struck the defendant. 22
The two had lived together for a few months, but the victim moved
out shortly after the defendant asked him to leave. 2' On the day of
the killing, the victim accosted the defendant outside a store, and
the two struggled. 24 The jury found that the defendant stabbed the
victim with a knife., causing his death. 25
 The defendant, however,
contended that she ran away from the victim, did not stab him, and
did not have a knife at the time. 26
' 5
 Commonwealth v. Moore, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 63, 66, 514 N.E.2d 1342, 1344 (1987).
'" See, e.g., People v. 'Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1985); State v. Kelly,
97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ci. App.
1982); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); Smith v. State, 247 Ca, 612, 277 S.E.2d 678
(1981).
17 See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (finding the
testimony irrelevant to whether the defendant actually and reasonably feared bodily harm,
not beyond the ken of the jury, unreliable, and overly prejudicial); Huhrle v. State, 627 P.2d
1374 (Wyo. 1981) (finding the testimony unreliable and invasive of the province of the jury),
C.P. EWING, SUPI'a mite 1, at 54.
" 25 Mass. App. Ct. 63, 68-69, 514 N.E.2d 1342, 1345 (1987).
2"
2 ' Id. at 63, 514 N,E.2d at 1342.
22 Id. at 67-68, 514 N.E.2d al 1344-45.
25 Id. at 67, 514 N.E.2d at 1344,
2 ' 1 Id. at 68, 514 N.E.2d at 1345.
25 Id. at 64, 514 N.E.2d at 1343.
2" Id. at 68, 514 N.E.2d at 1345.
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When the defendant called an expert on the battered woman's
syndrome, the trial judge qualified the witness, but excluded testi-
mony about the syndrome." The expert was prepared to speak
about the syndrome in general, as well as to testify that the defen-
dant exhibited some of the characteristics of a battered woman. 2°
The defendant appealed her conviction on the basis of the excluded
testimony. 29
Affirming the trial court, the Appeals Court noted that the
testimony on the battered woman's syndrome would be relevant
only if the defendant pled self-defense. 30 In passing, however, the
court briefly summarized the syndrome and noted its legal signifi-
cance. 3 ' The court also stated that a future proponent of testimony
on the syndrome would need to "produce evidence to a judge
whether the battered woman's syndrome possesses that degree of
reliability to have gained general acceptance by the community of
scientists involved."32 The court also observed that the defendant
did not appear to fit the stereotype of a battered woman."
Several jurisdictions have admitted testimony on the battered
woman's syndrome, including New York, New Jersey, Maine, Flor-
ida, and Georgia. 34 Although the law of self-defense varies some-
what from state to state, in general a killing in self-defense is justi-
fied if the defendant honestly and reasonably believes at the time
of the act that deadly force is necessary to avert death or serious
bodily injury at the hands of the victim. 35 Most states, including
Massachusetts, apply an objective standard to the reasonableness of
the defendant's belief." Thus, in most states, the jury compares the
27 Id. at 65, 514 N.E.2d at 1343.
28 Id. at 64-65, 514 N.E.2d at 1343.
29 Id. at 63, 514 N.E.2d at 1342.
3° Id. at 68-69, 514 N.E.2d at 1345.
3 ' Id. at 66-67, 514 N.E.2d at 1344.
32 Id. at 67 n.3 (citing Commonwealth v. Fatal°, 346 Mass. 266, 269 (1963)).
"Id. at 69 n.6. According to Elda James, of the Springfield, Massachusetts, Office of
the Committee for Public Counsel Services, plans to introduce expert testimony on the
battered woman's syndrome have enabled at least one defendant to plea bargain successfully.
Telephone interview with Elda James, Office of the Committee for Public Counsel Services
(May 6, 1988) [hereinafter cited as Interview]. In addition, as of May, 1988, a prosecution
for first-degree murder in which a woman plans to proffer testimony on the syndrome is
pending in Hampden Superior Court. Interview. This case, Commonwealth v. Grinuhaw, in-
volves a woman who solicited others to kill her batterer. Interview. According to James,
because the charge is murder in the first degree, a plea bargain is unlikely, and the court
may have to rule on the admissibility of the expert testimony. Interview.
' 4 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
" C.P. EwiNo, supra note 1, at 47.




defendant's actions to those of an ordinary prudent person in the
defendant's position.
Women who kill their batterers often have difficulty adapting
their cases to the law of self-defense, because that law tends to focus
on the traditional notion of a "fair fight" between men."' Thus, the
law generally requires the defendant not to resort to weapons
greater in kind than those used by the victim." This is often a
difficult standard for women to meet, however, because they are
often socialized to be weaker and less resourceful." The law of self-
defense also focuses narrowly on the situation in which the killing
occurs, requiring the woman to show an overt, immediate threat to
her safety and a physical impossibility of escape. 4 "
Defendants use testimony on the battered woman's syndrome
in the hope of broadening traditional notions of self-defense.'" This
testimony serves to explain "why a battered woman might reason-
ably perceive danger, use a deadly weapon, or fear bodily harm
under circumstances in which a man or non-battered woman might
not."42
 Several courts have held such testimony admissible.
In State v. Kelly, the New Jersey Supreme Court admitted tes-
timony on the syndrome, finding the testimony relevant, reliable,
and helpful to the jury. 4 " In Kelly, the defendant had suffered abuse
at the hands of her husband from the very beginning of their
marriage.44
 On the day of the killing, the defendant went to the
home of' a neighbor to find her husband and ask for food money. 45
After they left, a fight ensued, in which the victim, Mr. Kelly, hit
the defendant, Ms. Kelly, severely. 46
 At trial, Ms. Kelly testified that
after bystanders broke up the fight, Mr. Kelly ran at her with his
arms raised and that, fearing for her life, she tried to ward him
° See Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Ballered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 126-27 (1985); C.Y. Esvisici, supra note 1, at 47-50.
"" See Cracker, supra note 37, at 126.
Cracker, supra note 37, at 127.
4" Crocker, supra note 37, at 120; see also Commonwealth v. Epsom, 399 Mass. 254, 257-
58, 503 N.E.2d 954, 957 (1987) (noting that, to raise the issue of self-defense, the defendant
must show "evidence of an overt act against the defendant constituting an assault or threat
.... [and I evidence that the defendant availed himself of all proper means to avoid physical
combat before resorting to the use of deadly force").
4 ' Schneider, supra note 1, at 639-40; Crocker, supra note 37, at 129-30.
42 Crocker, supra note 37, at 130.
43
 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
" Id. at 189, 478 A.2d at 369.
4s Id.
46 Id.
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away with a pair of scissors, but stabbed him instead;17 The prose-
cution, by contrast, contended that Ms. Kelly was the aggressor in
the killing."
The Kelly Court admitted testimony I the battered woman's
syndrome on several grounds. First, the Court stated that the tes-
timony buttressed the defendant's claim thiat.she honestly believed
she was in imminent danger of great bodily harm." Second, the
Court reasoned that the testimony reinforcpd the defendant's claim
that she reasonably feared for her safetyl Thus, the Court noted
that testimony on the battered woman's syndrome countered the
jury's natural misconception that the relationship could not have
been life-threatening if the defendant did' not leave.`'' The Court
observed that the expert's opinion offered] an explanation for why
a battered woman would stay in an abusive relationship, despite
escalating violence. 52 Finding, in additionl, that the expert's testi-
mony was beyond the ken of the jury53 and sufficiently reliable, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held the proffered testimony admissi-
ble. 54
In a similar decision, People v. Torres, a New York court admitted
testimony on the battered woman's syndrome. 55 The defendant in
Torres had suffered frequent beatings at the hands of her common-
law husband. 58 According to the defendant, on the night of the
killing the victim accused her of having sexual relations with his son
by a previous marriage. 57 Screaming "this is going to be your last
night," the victim placed a pistol against the defendant's mouth. 58
The victim then placed the gun on a night table and left the room. 59
Convinced that this time the victim really meant to kill her, the
defendant grabbed the gun and shot him• 8°
The Torres court admitted testimony on the battered woman's
syndrome on similar grounds as the Kelly Court. The court observed
" Id. at 189-90, 478 A.2d at 369.
4" Id. at 190 ti.1, 478 A.2d at 369 n.l.
49 /d. at 201-02, 478 A.2d at 375.
19 Id. at 205, 478 A.2d at 377.
11 Id.
.52 Id .
." Id. at 209, 478 A.2d at 379.
r' 4 Id. at 211, 478 A.2d at 379-80.
51
 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
"Id. at 131, 488 N.Y.S.2c1 at 360.
" Id.
58 Id. at 131, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
59 Id.
6° Id. at 132, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
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that the testimony demonstrated that, as a battered woman, the
defendant could distinguish between "ordinary" violence and life-
threatening violence."' Moreover, the court reasoned that the ex-
pert's testimony tended to dispel lay misconceptions about the ability
of a battered woman to leave an abusive relationship."' Thus, the
court observed, the testimony enhanced the defendant's credibility
on the life-threatening nature of the relationship, and countered
the jury's notion that if the defendant did not leave, the situation
could not have been intolerable." Finding the testimony reliable
and beyond the ken of the jury, the Tories court held the proffered
evidence admissible."
Some courts, however, have excluded testimony on the battered
woman's syndrome. In State v. Thomas, for instance, the Ohio Su-
preme Court upheld a trial court's exclusion of testimony on the
grounds that it was irrelevant, Within the general understanding of
the jury, unreliable, and overly prejudicial.° In Thomas, the victim
had abused his common-law wife for a period of years." In the
course of an argument, the facts of which were disputed at trial,
the defendant shot her husband."' The defendant testified at trial
that she had shot the victim "because she feared for her life, that
he had made a move toward her, and that she knew he would take
the gun and kill her for daring to pick it up."" 8 At trial, the defen-
dant offered evidence on the battered woman's syndrome to but-
tress her claim of self-defense, but the trial court ruled the evidence
inadmissible.''`'
Upholding the trial court's ruling, the Ohio Supreme Court
reasoned that the jury did not need expert assistance in determining
whether the defendant "had a bona-fide belief that she was in
imminent danger ... and that the only means of escape was through
the use of deadly force."" The Court also held that the evidence
was unreliable and likely to prejudice the jury.?' Thus, the Ohio
Supreme Court joined other jurisdictions that have rejected the
"I Id. at 133, 488 N.Y.S.2(1 at 362.
62 Id.
"5 1d. at 134, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
" Id. at 134-35, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362-63.
65 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).




7" Id. at 520-21, 423 N.E.2d at 139.
71 Id. at 521-22, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
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utility of testimony on the battered woman's syndrome in homicide
trials.
Despite the general trend in the courts toward admitting tes-
timony on the battered woman's syndrome, such testimony does
not necessarily help battered women facing prosecution for killing
their batterers. 72
 Most of the women who have been able to intro-
duce evidence on the syndrome have nevertheless been convicted
of murder, manslaughter, or reckless hornicide. 73 Trial courts im-
pose such punishments because women who kill their batterers
generally do so after a battering incident, not to avert an impending
deadly blow, but, instead, to extricate themselves from a psycholog-
ical nightmare. 74
 Thus, for the majority of women who have killed
their batterers, expert testimony does little to adapt their actions to
the law of self-defense. 75
Some commentators argue that testimony on the battered wom-
an's syndrome actually undermines a defendant's contention that
she acted reasonably. 76
 These commentators contend that jurors
often construe the syndrome as a form of insanity, offered to excuse
irrational behavior, rather than to justify rational behavior." In ad-
dition, commentator Phyllis Crocker contends that in admitting
testimony on the syndrome, courts may be establishing a separate
standard for "reasonable" behavior by a battered woman. 78 This
approach, she argues, makes it impossible for a woman to convince
a jury that she acted reasonably and justifiably. 79 In addition,
Crocker also argues that the courts' use of a separate category for
battered women compels female defendants to fit their actions ei-
ther within traditional notions of self-defense, or squarely within a
"battered woman's defense." 8° Crocker contends that this approach
is misguided, because the issue at trial is not whether the defendant
is a battered woman, but whether her actions were justified.'"
Commentator Charles P. Ewing has proposed a new standard
of self-defense that he believes addresses the plight of women who
C,P. EWING, supra note I, at 55-59.
7 ' Id. at 55.
" Id. at 56,61-76.
75 1d. at 55-60.
79 1d. at 56.
77 Id, at 56-57.
7" See Crocker, supra note 37, at 144.
79 Id.
" Id. at 144-50.
81 /d. at 149.
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kill their batterers. 82 Describing the standard as one of "psycholog-
ical self-defense," Ewing argues that it should be justifiable to use
deadly force "where such force appear[s] reasonably necessary to
prevent the infliction of severe psychological injury." 88 Ewing de-
fines such injury as "gross and enduring impairment of one's psy-
chological functioning which significantly limits the meaning and
value of one's physical existence." Thus, Ewing argues, a battered
woman faced with the options of killing her batterer, killing herself,
or living a life utterly without meaning, should be justified in killing
her batterer. 85
Women who kill their batterers often attempt to introduce
evidence on the battered woman's syndrome in the hope of but-
tressing their claims of self-defense. Although some jurisdictions
have declined to admit such testimony, the trend seems to be toward
admission. Courts that admit testimony on the syndrome generally
cite its utility in enhancing the defendant's credibility, as well as its
reliability and helpfulness to the jury.
Nevertheless, most defendants who offer testimony on the bat-
tered woman's syndrome are convicted for killing their batterers
because of the strictures of the law of self-defense. In addition,
commentators also argue that testimony on the syndrome can ac-
tually undermine defendants' claims that they acted reasonably,
because jurors tend to interpret battered women's behavior as un-
derstandable but nonetheless unreasonable. One commentator,
Phyllis Crocker, contends that, instead of broadening the law of
self-defense, testimony on the syndrome may only be creating a
separate, narrowly defined category for "battered women." Finally,
commentator Charles Ewing has proposed a broader standard of
self-defense basëd on psychological self-defense. Under this de-
fense, a person may use deadly force to prevent the infliction of
serious psychological injury. Even if Massachusetts courts accept
testimony of the battered woman's syndrome to explain the actions
of an abused wife, the traditional law of self-defense might eviscer-
ate the utility of such evidence. Only if the law of self-defense
expands to accommodate the realities of domestic violence can such
testimony provide a truly sound defense for the actions of physically
and psychologically tormented women.
" See C.P. EWING, supra note 1, at 77-94.
" Id. at 79.
M Id.
85 Id, at 77-78.
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II. SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN DOMESTic RELATIONS LAW
During the Selected Developments year, both the Massachusetts
Legislature and the Massachusetts judiciary effected noteworthy
Changes in domestic relations law. The Massachusetts Legislature
promulgated child support guidelines that sought to reduce the
broad discretion of trial judges, resulting in forum shopping and
inconsistent child support awards, by creating standards for the
appropriate allocation of child support payments between the
spouses. In the judicial branch, the Supreme Judicial Court and the
Appeals Court, in the area of child custody, utilized the "best inter-
ests of the child" standard to reject challenges to Massachusetts
courts' jurisdiction to adjudicate cases involving paternity and child
custody issues. By applying this standard, the courts exercised broad
discretion to achieve result-oriented decisions in accordance with
the needs of the children at the center of these custody battles.
In other areas, the Supreme Judicial Court refused to recognize
the patient-psychotherapist privilege and the patient-social worker
privilege, and allowed parties to introduce the testimony of psycho-
therapists and social workers into evidence, in the context of judicial
proceedings to dispense with parental consent to a child's adoption.
In paternity cases, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the rule
that alleged fathers lack standing to sue when the child is conceived
while the mother is lawfully married to another man, in cases where
there is no "intact" family unit which can be disrupted by allowing
the paternity suit. Finally, in the area of alimony and property
settlements, the Supreme Judicial Court focused on the role of
speculation in determining whether certain types of future income
constituted property subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.
In one case, the Court allowed the inclusion of pension benefits that
accrued during the marriage in the category of property subject to
equitable division upon divorce. In another case, however, the Court
excluded the income earned from a medical degree from the cat-
egory of divisible marital property because such earnings were too
speculative to be treated as marital assets subject to permanent
assignment.
A. *Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines of 1988
In 1984, Congress amended Title IV of the Social Security Act
by enacting Federal Child Support Amendments.' Through these
*,john J. Powers, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW,






amendments, Congress required each state to establish guidelines
for child support by legislative, judicial, or administrative action. 2
The federal statute provided that the states' guidelines, due on
October 1, 1987, were to direct but not hind judges and other state
officials empowered to determine child support awards. 3 In addi-
tion, the amendments, as a prerequisite of state eligibility for federal
funding under Title IV of the Social Security Act, provided for
each Governor to appoint a State Commission on Child Support in
order to investigate and report its findings for improving that state's
child support system by December 1, 1984. 4
In response to the Federal Child Support Amendments of
1984, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis established a Com-
mission on Child Support by Executive Order on January 28, 1985.
Throughout the summer of 1985, the commission conducted hear-
ings, developed a set of principles, and recommended to the Gov-
ernor that the office of the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial
Court promulgate the child support guidelines. Consequently, on
July 22, 1986, the Massachusetts Legislature approved chapter 310
of the 1986 Regular Session Laws to improve the collection of child
support in the Commonwealth. 5
Chapter 310 amended the Massachusetts General Laws in two
very significant ways. First, the Act created a new chapter 119A
entitled "Child Support Enforcement." The new chapter 119A
transferred child support collection responsibility from the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare to the Department of Revenue (DOR) in
order to centralize collection.' The DOR established a division on
ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1320, 1321-22 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667 (1984)). The purpose of
the Act was to amend part D of Title 15/ of the Social Security Act in order to "assure,
through mandatory income withholding, incentive payments to states, and other improve-
ments in the child support enforcement program, that all children in the United States who
are in need of assistance in securing financial support from their parents will receive such
assistance regardless of their circumstances." Id.
2 Act of August 16, 1984, Pub, L. No. 98-378 § 18, 1984 U.S. Com CONG. & ADMIN.
News (98 Stat.) 1322.
3 Id.
'Act of August 16, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378 § 15(a), 1984 U.S. Com CONG. & ADMIN.
News (98 Stat.) 1320, 1321, The deadline for the reports of the State Commissions was
October 1, 1985. Congress directed the Commissions to pay particular attention to such areas
as: "visitation; the establishment of appropriate standards for support; the enforcement of
interstate obligations; the availability, cost, and effectiveness or services both to children who
are eligible for such aid and to children who are not; and the need for additional state or
federal legislation to obtain support for all children." Id. at section 15(c).
." 1986 Mass. Acts 310,
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 1 19A, § l (1986).
' Id. §§ 1-2 (1986) ("The department of revenue shall be the single slate agency within
the Commonwealth that is designated the IV-D agency pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social
Security Act").
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Child Support Enforcement (CSE) to perform child support collec-
tion' Additionally, section 1 of chapter 119A established a Child
Support Enforcement Commission (CSEC), within the executive
office of administration and finance, to advise DOR and other agen-
cies on improving the collection system. 9 The remaining sections of
chapter 119A specified the services of the agency," the enforcement
powers and methods," collection procedures," and disbursement
mechanisms."
Second, chapter 310 of the 1986 Session Laws amended chapter
211B of the Massachusetts General Laws, adding a new section 15
to comply with the Federal Child Support Enforcement Amend-
ments of 1984.' 4 The legislature, in creating section 15, established
a Committee on Child Support Guidelines to advise the Chief Ad-
ministrative Justice of the Trial Court.' 5 The Advisory Committee
was scheduled to file the guidelines on January 1, 1987 with the
clerks in the house of representatives and the senate." Within 90
days after filing, on April 1, 1987, the Chief Administrative Justice
was scheduled to promulgate these support guidelines for use by
other judges and hearing Officers.°
During the Selected Developments year, the Advisory Committee
developed and revised the guidelines. Prior to the April 1987 initial
deadline, the Committee published a draft guideline in Massachusetts
11 Id.
9 Id. The CSEC consists of six members: the Secretary of the Executive Office for
Administration and Finance as chairman, the Commissioner of Revenue, the Attorney Gen-
eral, the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court, the Commissioner of Public Welfare,
and a district attorney appointed by the Governor. Id.
I° MASS. GEN. L. ch. 1I9A, § 2 (1986) (location of absent parents, establishment of
paternity, establishment of child support orders, and collection and disbursement of pay-
ments).
u Id. § 3 (1986). DOR may file an action in either the name of the recipient of public
assistance or in the name of the department. Id.
12 Id, §§ 6-7 (wage assignment, demand letters, notification of obligor, state and federal
tax intercepts, contempt arid capias). On November 16,1987, the Massachusetts Legislature
passed chapter 490 of. the 1987 Regular Session, amending Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 119A, and broadened the collection powers of the CSE units in the DOR. Id. The
broader procedure allows CSE to use lien, seizure, and levy as powers to collect amounts in
arrears.
" MASS. GEN. L. ch. 1 19A, § 12 (1986).
U 1986 Mass. Acts 310, § 16A.
15 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 211B, § 15 (1986). The committee included fifteen members: seven
appointed by the Chief Administrative justice, six appointed by the Governor (five of whom
had served on the commission initially established by executive order in 1985), the Commis-
sioner of Revenue, and the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court as chairman. Id.
15 Id.
17 Id.
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Lawyer's Weekly in order to solicit practitioners' comments."' In re-
sponse to lawyers' concerns, the Committee revised the guidelines.'•
On May 1, 1987 the Chief Administrative Justice, Arthur M. Mason,
promulgated interim guidelines effective until December 31, 1987
to better assess their effect.'" Moreover, in November 1987, to elicit
further recommendations, Judge Mason's office mailed 700 ques-
tionnaires to judges, probation officers and child support workers."'
On January 1, 1988, Judge Mason promulgated the final draft
of the child support guidelines."' The guidelines focused on such
principles as minimizing the economic impact of family breakup on
the child, encouraging joint parental responsibility for child support
in proportion to income, providing the standards of living the child
would have enjoyed had the divorce not occurred, meeting the
child's survival needs and entitling the child to enjoy the standard
of living of the higher-income parent, protecting a subsistence level
of income for parents at the low end of the income scale, consid-
ering either parent's non-monetary contributions, minimizing prob-
lems of proof and administration, and allowing for adjustable or-
ders and wage assignments."
First, in examining the guidelines, the practitioner must note
that the guidelines only apply to current child support."' The guide-
lines seek to provide judges with a formula to use in setting tem-
porary, permanent, or final orders for current child support, in
deciding whether to approve private support agreements, and in
adjudicating cases where the parties seek modification of existing
agreement. 25 Therefore, under Massachusetts law which requires a
"sufficient change of circumstances" to provide an independent
"1 15 Mass. Law. W. 821, 832 (1987); see Ryan, An Overview of the Massachusetts Child
Supper! Guidelines, 5 MASS. FAM. J. I (May 1987).
1" 15 Mass. Law. W. 1217, 1256 (1987). This article presents the various revisions which
encompassed: income definition, the factors in setting orders, time-sharing, and health
insurance. id. The article notes that the Committee viewed the guidelines as "evolutionary."
Id.
2" The text and implications of the interim guidelines are presented in Ryan, supra note
18, at 7-10.
2 ' 16 Mass. Law. W. 669, 700 (1988).
22 Id.
"Id. These principles are enumerated ill MASS. GEN. L. ch. 2I1B,	 15 (1986), as
developed by the original Governor's Committee on Child Support in 1985.
21 16 Mass. Law. W. 689-90. The preamble of the guidelines notes that they do not apply
to: alimony. division of marital property. the payment of arrears, restitution or reimburse-
ment, and to situations where the parties have made a court-approved private agreement.
Id.
25 Id.
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claim for modification, the guidelines in and of themselves do not
constitute such a basis for modification. 2"
The Advisory Committee divided the guidelines into three ma-
jor sections. 27 The first section defines income in terms of gross
rather than net income. 23 The guidelines direct the judges to look
at gross income "from whatever source." 2" The guidelines, however,
do not apply where the combined income of the parents exceeds
$100,000 per year, or where the non-custodial parent's annual in-
come exceeds $75,000 per year. 3" The second section of the guide-
lines lists factors the judges should consider in setting child support
orders. The third section provides a worksheet and example of how
the formula actually works.
In addition, the subsections of the guidelines further assist
judges fashioning child support orders. In regard to the factors the
judges should consider in setting child support orders, subsections
A and B allow the court to classify an order in whole or in part as
either alimony or as a separate maintenance payment. 31 The court
may also decide the claims of personal exemptions for child depen-
dents between the parties."
Under subsection C, the guidelines set minimum and maximum
levels of deduction and support. If a custodial parent decides to
work, the guidelines allow the court to factor this income into the
support formula only if it exceeds $15,000 after deducting the costs
of day care." In addition to this "disregard formula," the guidelines
ensure a minimum subsiStence level for the non-custodial parent
whose income is less than $200 per week." In keeping with the
principle that parents should remain responsible for their children,
however, the guidelines require all non-custodial parents to con-
tribute a minimum of $50 per month."
2" Id. This provision prevents opening a floodgate of appeals for modification. Id.
27 Id.
2" Id. at 689.
29 Id. The section enumerates, not by limitation, twenty-five sources of gross income
ranging from salary to prizes and awards. Id.
" Id.
31 Id. The guidelines note that individual counsel are responsible for notifying their





	 minimum does not prevent the court from setting higher orders if appropriate.
Id.
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Subsection D of the guidelines outlines another set of factors
to guide the court in custody and visitation decisions." In order to
maximize the child's ability to "enjoy the society and companionship
of both parents," the court may consider how much time the parties
actually spend with the child." 7 The court. may factor into the sup-
port award any extraordinary travel-related expenses the non-cus-
todial parent incurs in the exercise of court-ordered visitation
rights."
Pursuant to subsection E, the guidelines note that child care
expenses do not constitute separate support items, and remain the
responsibility of the custodial parent." Day care, however, consti-
tutes a separate item which the non-custodial parent must share. 4 °
The guidelines direct the court to subtract the cost of day care from
the custodial parent's gross income before it applies the disregard
Ibrmula.`"
The guidelines also provide that the judge should consider the
children's age in setting the support orders. In subsection F, the
guidelines classify the children's age into four groups: 0-6, 7-12,
13-18, and over 18. 12 The guidelines call for a percentage increase
in the basic support order based on the age of the oldest child.'"
The guidelines leave the amount of support for an 18-21 year-old
to the court's discretion.'"
In determining support orders, the court should further con-
sider health insurance and medical costs. The court, pursuant to
subsection G, may oblige a non-custodial parent on an employee
"Id. The court is neither to apply the guidelines in cases of shared custody of one child
nor where each parent has custody of one or more children. Id.
37 Id.




•2 Id. The addition of the age group 18-21 is a new provision in response to concerns
of the costs of college education.
" Id. Where the age of the oldest child is 0-6, the basic order applies. Id. The order
then increases by the following schedule:
Age %
0-6 basic order
7-12 basic order + 10% of basic order
13-18 basic order + 15% of basic order
18-21 discretion of the court
Id.
1 " Id.
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group health insurance plan to exercise any options available to
include the child. 45
 The support order should reflect this coverage
by crediting the non-custodial parent with a deduction for the full
cost of the health insurance.46 Where the child has no insurance
and incurs routine medical expenses, the custodial parent must pay
the first $100, and the court must determine responsibilities for the
remaining expenses on a case-by-case basis. 47
 If the medical expen-
ses are extraordinary, the court shall similarly treat the matter on a
case-by-case basis."
The guidelines, in subsection H, allow the court to consider
potential earning capacity when the court determines that either or
both parties earn substantially less than he or she could "through
reasonable effort."4° Such situations occur when either parent is
fully employable, but chooses to remain unemployed or underem-
ployed. 5° The guidelines, however, limit the court's discretion to
consider potential earning capacity by excluding custodial parents
with children under age 6. 5 '
Finally, the guidelines direct the court on how to accommodate
prior and subsequent families. The guidelines recommend that the
court apply a first-in-time/first-in-right rule. First, if a non-custodial
parent is actually paying a prior order for spousal or child support,
the court should deduct those payments from the non-custodial
parent's gross income before determining the current support or-
der.52
 Moreover, if a non-custodial parent remarries and has chil-
dren by the second marriage, and subsequently the custodial parent
of the first marriage seeks support, the court may then consider the
non-custodial parent's obligations to the second family in determin-
ing the amount of the award. 55
In light of these factors, part III of the guidelines provides a
sample worksheet of a child support order. A judge calculates a
basic order by multiplying the non-custodial parent's gross weekly
income (less any prior support orders) by a set percentage corre-
46 Id.
46
 Id. This clarifies an ambiguity in the interim guidelines. Id. at 700.
" Id. at 689.
48 Id. In this case a deduction in the order may be considered.
49 ld. (The court should consider "education, training, and past employment history.").
88 Id.
61 Id. The interim guidelines included a clause also exempting a custodial parent "who
chooses to he home with the children when they are not at school." Id. at 700. The final
guidelines delete this clause. Id.
62 Id. at 690. This provision is consistent with the interim guidelines. Id. at 669.
63 Id. at 690.
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lated to his or her gross income." Recognizing that raising older
children involves greater expenditures than raising younger chil-
dren, the judge then increases the basic order according to a per-
centage schedule based on the age of the oldest child. 55 The judge
then reduces the amount by the percentage of the custodial parent's
calculated contribution. 50 The resulting figure equals the amount
of the appropriate support order. •
The final text of the guidelines promulgated by the Chief Ad-
ministrative Justice represents a well-reasoned attempt to direct
judges in determining child support awards. One may, however,
critique the effects of the guidelines on two levels: the general and
the specific. Generally, although the guidelines are not mandatory,
they represent an improvement from the prior, traditional case-by-
case judicial approach. At least two commentators have demon-
strated the positive aspects of a quantitative guideline approach. 57
First, a set of guidelines that focuses on quantitative standards can
correct dramatically the inadequacy of court-ordered support or-
ders to provide for sufficient child support awards." Studies dem-
onstrate that discretionary judicial awards should be two and one-
half times higher than they are presently." The average discretion-
54 Id. The guidelines provide the following chart:
Gross Weekly Income Number of Children
1	 2 3
0-200 Discretion of the court but not less than $50/mo.
201-500 25%(+/-2%) 28%(+1-2%) 31%(=/-2%)
500—max. 27%(+/-2%) 30%(+/-2%) 33%(=/-2%)
55 Id. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
56 Id.
57 See Williams ; auidefines Jr Setting Leath of Child Support Orders, FAM. L.Q., Volume
XXI, Number 3, 281-86 (Fall 1986); see also Goldfarb, A Model for Fair Allocation of Child
Support, FAM. L.Q., Volume XXI, Number 3, 325-27 (Fall 1987).
5 ' Williams, supra note 57, at 283-84. The author quotes a 1985 study by the U.S. Office
of Child Support Enforcement which estimated that $26.6 billion in child support "would
have been due in 1984 if child support was :set based on either of two alternative guidelines."
Id. In fact, the author points out that a Census Bureau study found that only $10.1 billion
was reported due in 1983 ($7.1 billion of which was actually collected)—an "adequacy gap"
or $15 billion. Id. (citing Haskins, Estimates of National Child Support Collection Potential and the
Income Security of Female-Headed Families, Report to Office of Child Support Enforcement,
Bush Institute for Child and Family Policy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
(1985)).
" Goldfarb, supra note 57, at 326; we also Williams, supra note 57, at 283. Both authors
note that a United States Census Bureau study of child support in 1983 estimated the mean
court-ordered obligation to be $191 per month. Williams, however, quotes a study that "an
order of $191 is equivalent to only 25% of the average expenditures on children in a middle
income household." Williams, supra note 57, at 283 (citing Epenshade, Inverting in Children:
The New Estimates of Parental Expenditures (1984)).
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ary child support order provided support twenty percent below the
poverty level, illustrating the need for quantitative guidelines. 60
Moreover, quantitative guidelines provide a needed consistency
in child support orders. 6 ' The Massachusetts guidelines will not
only close the disparity in court awards, but will also eliminate the
forum-shopping present in the less equitable discretionary system.
Moreover, consistency in awards will lead to a more predictable
system, and aid attorneys in counseling their clients. 62 This predict-
ability will improve the efficiency of the adjudication process. If
attorneys can calculate an accurate estimate of support, they will be
more willing to settle voluntarily rather than burden the courts.°
Although the Massachusetts guidelines would improve the gen-
eral defects inherent in a case-by-case approach, the Advisory Com-
mittee's specific approach offers both positive and negative qualities.
In regard to positive qualities, the Massachusetts guidelines repre-
sent a version of the support theory that focuses on parental income
rather than computing and allocating the actual costs of rearing a
child. 64 By rejecting a "cost-sharing" approach, the Advisory Com-
mittee avoided the subjective disputes that inherently arise in at-
tempting to determine such costs. 65
Rather than adopt cost-sharing, the Advisory Committee
decided to utilize a system based on a theory that calculates the
amount spent on children as a percentage of household
income. 66
 Prior to the Massachusetts guidelines, four variations
of support guidelines based on proportion of parental income
existed: the flat percentage guideline,67
 the income shares
m-r Williams, supra note 57, at 284 (citing 48 FED. REG. 7010-11 (1983)).
" Id. at 284-85. Williams quotes a Colorado study that demonstrates that a case-by-ease
approach resulted in orders ranging from 6% to 33% of the non-custodial parent's income.
Id. (citing Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study of Establishment
and Enforcement in the Denver District Court, 57 DEN. L.J. 21,38-42 (1979)).
62 Goldfarb, supra note 57, at 326-27.
62 Williams, supra note 57, at 286.
" Goldfarb, supra note 57, at 329 (the cost-sharing approach "aims to compute the costs
of rearing a child or children and then allocate those costs between the parents, usually in
proportion to the parents' income").
6' Id. No state has yet adopted a pure cost-sharing approach.
66 Williams, supra note 57, at 288-89 (quoting Epenshade, Investing in Children: New
Statistics of Parental Expenditures (1984)). From Epenshade's study, Williams notes that states
can develop estimates of the proportion of family consumption devoted to children. Id. at
289.
67
 Williams, supra note 57, at 290-309. The author presents an excellent overview of the
four models. The Hat percentage guidelines set child support as a percentage of the non-
custodial parent's gross or net income which varies according to the number of children. Id.
This formula ignores the income or custodial parents as well as extraordinary expenses. M.
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model," the Delaware-Melson formula," and the income equaliza-
tion (Cassetty) model." The four models present different levels of
support depending on various factors."
The Massachusetts model represents a new variation of the
income shares model. 72 Several of its features offer an improvement
over existing models. First, by focusing on gross income instead of
net income, the guidelines prevent parents from concealing income
through intricate deductions. In bypassing the danger of "concealed
income," the Advisory Committee intended to provide a list of
income definitions that would guide litigants prior to adjudication."
Second, the Massachusetts guidelines, unlike other income
shares models, graduate the percentages of parental contribution
upward as income levels increase. 74 "Graduated contribution" ap-
pears to be more equitable and comparable to graduated state and
federal income tax schemes." The Massachusetts guidelines attempt
to include equitably the majority of non-intact households by divid-
ing the gross weekly income of parents into three strata. 70
Moreover, the guidelines uniquely recognize that child rearing
costs increase as children get older. The guidelines represent a well-
planned policy by adjusting the formula to compensate for these
increasing costs." The Advisory Committee dealt with the added
costs of a college education by adding a new age group from 18-
21.
6"Id. at 291-95. The income shares model is a genera] framework based on the theory
"that the child should receive the same proportion of parental income that would have been
received if the parents lived together." Id. The model looks to the combined income of the
parents and then prorates the total obligation based on the proportionate shares of each
parent's income. Id. at 293.
"9 /ti, at 295-302. The Delaware-Melson formula is a three-step process that determines:
the minimum amounteach parent needs for their own self support, the minimum amount
required to maintain a child at subsistence level (which amount the court then prorates
between the parents), and a percentage of any remaining income which is allocated for
additional child support (15% for 1 child, 25% for 2 children, 35% for 3 children). Id.
7"Id, at 302-03. The income equalization (Cassetty) model is a complicated formula that
attempts to provide equivalent living standards For each parent's household. Id. This model
has yet to be adopted in any, jurisdiction. Id.
71 Id. at 303-09. Williams presents a comprehensive summary of the similarities and
differences of each model. Id.
72 Ryan, supra note 18, at 2. Ryan terms the guidelines as the "Massachusetts Modified
Income Shares Approach." Id.
75 Id. at 3.
74 Id. at 5.
75 Id.
7" See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
77 Ryan, supra note 18, at 4.
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Also, the guidelines represent a consistent policy of minimizing
the impact of divorce on the children by allowing the court to
consider any extraordinary expenses incurred by the custodial par-
ent. Whether this policy will actually increase the amount of time
the non-custodial parent spends with the child remains unanswered.
Underlying the extraordinary expense concept is the hope that the
parents themselves will act maturely after a divorce.
In regard to allowing the court to look to potential earning
capacity when either party chooses to remain unemployed or un-
deremployed, the guidelines represent a sound public policy mea-
sure to alleviate the pressure on public welfare. Whether the judge
should use this judicial discretion to penalize custodial parents who
take part-time positions in order to remain with their children
during after-school hours, however, remains an important question.
It may be in the best interests of the child to allow the custodial
parent to pursue an option of part-time employment.
The Massachusetts guidelines, however, have some negative
aspects. At least one author has noted that guidelines similar to
those in Massachusetts do not sufficiently differentiate between or-
dinary and extraordinary expenses:18
 While the court should treat
ordinary expenses as part of the basic formula for child support,
the commentator argues that a model guideline should mathemat-
ically prorate extraordinary expenses according to the parents' rel-
ative income." Thus, the commentator believes ideal guidelines
should specifically apportion these extraordinary expenses rather
than leave them to the discretion of the court." The Massachusetts
guidelines do not specifically provide such a formula for extraor-
dinary expenses. Rather, the court determines how to apportion
extraordinary expenses, such as educational costs of children be-
tween the ages of 18-21 and extraordinary medical expenses, absent
a guideline specifically providing a formula for the payment of such
extraordinary expenses.
Finally, the Massachusetts guidelines provide a "windfall" to
non-custodial parents who opt to include the child on their group
7 ' Goldfarb, supra note 57, at 330-49. The author notes that ordinary child care expenses
include: occasional babysitting, minor medical expenses, and ordinary educational expenses.
Id. at 330-31. Extraordinary expenses include full-time child care, major medical bills, and
private or college educational expenses. Id.
79 Id.
8" Id. at 336 (relying on judicial discretion would "undermine the goal of greater consis-
tency and certainty in support awards").
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insurance plans. 8 ' The guidelines overcompensate the non-custodial
parent by allowing the court to reduce a support order by the full
amount of the cost of the entire insurance. 82 To avoid this inequit-
able reduction of a support order, the guidelines should only reduce
a support order by subtracting the difference between the individ-
ual and family policy, rather than allowing a reduction for the costs
of the whole policy."
In sum, the guidelines promulgated by the Chief Administra-
tive Justice on January 1, 1988 provide a consistent approach to
child support awards. While one may criticize the guidelines on
certain enumerated provisions, the overall results are very favora-
ble. The guidelines strive to minimize the impact of divorce on
children by requiring the custodial and non-custodial parent to
contribute to the child's welfare. By providing a mathematical for-
mula, the Advisory Committee added a degree of predictability that
should alleviate the judicial role by promoting settlements. These
guidelines, coupled with a stronger enforcement policy, should re-
sult in an improved child support system.
B. *Result-Oriented Decisions in Child Custody Cases: Massachusetts
Courts and the "Best Interests of the Child" Standard
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, section 31 codifies
the historical rule governing parental rights in custody cases: "[the
rights of the parents shall, in the absence of misconduct, be held to
be equal, and the happiness and welfare of the children shall de-
termine their custody or possession."' In Jenkins v. Jenkins, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted section 31, and
stated that, although the judge should not disregard the parents'
feelings and wishes, the child's happiness and welfare constitute the
controlling consideration in determining custody of a minor child.'
The Jenkins court further stated that the judge has a duty to deter-
mine the custodial disposition that promotes the child's best inter-
ests.' Thus, the child's best interests constitute the controlling factor
in a judicial determination or parental custody.
• Id. at 342
KS Id.
• Id.
* Melissa M. Cooley, Stall' Member, BOSTONCULLEGE LAW REVIEW
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West 1982).
2 304 Mass. 248, 250, 23 N.E.2d 405, 406 (1939).
Id.
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Judges nonetheless enjoy considerable discretion in deciding
custody battles between divorcing parents.' In determining which
parent will be the custodial parent, Massachusetts courts have artic-
ulated several guiding factors. The courts may consider the expe-
rience, attitudes, and progress of the child while in the custody of
either parent, and the physiCal and economic capabilities of the
mother and father.' Courts may also consider the fears, desires,
and welfare of the child as affected by the outcome of the litigation."
Further, courts consider which parent primarily acts as the child's
caretaker or nurturer,' as well as which custodial arrangement less-
ens disruption and promotes a healthy environment for the child's
growth and development. 8 No set formula exists, however, for de-
termining the custodial arrangement that promotes the best inter-
ests of the child, and each case rests on its own facts.
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 210, section 3 governs
custody cases arising neither from divorce nor separation, but in-
stead from an allegation of parental unfitness and the child's need
for nonparental care and protection.'' Like the best interests stan-
dard for custody determinations after divorce, section 3 provides a
flexible standard that grants broad judicial discretion.'" The Mas-
sachusetts courts consider several factors diapositive. The emotional
shock of the child were he or she to be uprooted; the serious,
continuing emotional problems of the parents; and the parents'
realistic approach to problems." The state may not remove a child
from the parental home unless an affirmative reason exists for
doing so, such as a serious problem with a parent, or a long sepa-
The Massachusetts courts prefer that both parents participate in the childrearing
process.' See Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232, 234, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607 (1981). For joint
custody to work, however, both parties must be able to agree on decisions affecting their
children. Rolde v. Rolde, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 404, 425 N.E.2d 388, 392 (1981). When
the parties have undergone a particularly difficult divorce, joint custody may prove too
emotionally difficult for the parents, thereby jeopardizing the child's well-being. Id. Thus,
the courts usually award physical custody to one parent, and legal custody to both, with
visitation rights in the noncustodial parent. See Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704,
481 N.E.2d 1153 (1985).
5 Smith v. Smith, 361 Mass. 855, 855, 279 N.E.2d 693, 694 (1972).
Id
7 Rolde, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 405, 425 N.E.2d at 392.
8 Id. at 406, 425 N.E.2d at 392-93.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 210, § 3 (West 1982).
'° Petition of New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 644, 328 N.E.2d
854, 862 (1975).
n Id. at 641, 645, 328 N.E.2d at 857.
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ration that has allowed the child to develop strong bonds with
someone other than the custodial parents. 12
Custody cases arising from divorce and separation often involve
questions of jurisdiction, because deterioration of the marriage fre-
quently results in one parent moving to another state or even an-
other country.'" The general jurisdictional rule in Massachusetts
custody cases requires the child to be a resident of, or domiciled in,
the state in which the proceedings arc brought." The Massachusetts
courts, however, have stated that in personwn jurisdiction over the
child's parents is a sufficient basis for exercising jurisdiction in cus-
tody cases.'' The Supreme judicial Court in Green. v. Green stated
that the parents' presence before a judge will afford the court a
good chance to determine which party should prevail.'" The Mas-
sachusetts rule, furthermore, prevents a parent who secretly re-
moves a child from the Commonwealth from controlling jurisdic-
tional considerations. 17
During the Selected Developments year, the Massachusetts courts
adjudicated several cases involving questions of jurisdiction in pa-
ternity and custody disputes. 18 In the 1987 decision of R.L.H. v.
T.E.L., 1 " a mother, a Connecticut resident, attempted to file a pa-
ternity complaint pursuant. to Massachusetts General Laws chapter
209C against T.E.L., the putative father of her minor child. 2 ° The
complaint alleged that T.E.L. resided in Springfield, Massachu-
setts. 2 ' The register of the Probate and Family Court Department
refused to file the complaint. According to the Department, when
the mother and child reside outside Massachusetts, Massachusetts
courts lack jurisdiction. 22 R.L.1-1. filed a motion to compel the ac-
12 id. at 642, 328 N.E.2d at 861.
' 3 See flak v. Bak, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 511 N.E.2d 625 (1987).
14 Green v. Green, 351 Mass. 466, 469, 221 N.E.2d 857, 859 (1966).
15 Id. at 471, 221 N.E.2d at 860.
I' Id. The court stated that the ideal situation in determining custody is one in which
both the child's parents are in the presence or the court. Id. Such a situation, however, may
not be feasible. Id.
17 See id.
13 11.1-1•1. v. T.E.L., 401 Mass. 101, 514 N.E.2d 855 (1987); Vertices v. Vertrees, 24 Mass.
App. Ct. 918, 508 N.E.2d 868 (1987); Bak v, Bak, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 511 N.E.2d 625
(1987).
1i 401 Mass. 101, 514 N.E.2d 855 (1987).
20 Id. at 101, 514 N.E.2d at 855.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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ceptance of the complaint. 23
 The probate judge allowed R.L.H. to
file the complaint, but then dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction thus
triggering R.L.H.'s appeal. 24
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed the pro-
bate court's dismissal. The Court held that a nonresident mother
and child may establish the paternity of a Massachusetts defendant
in a Massachusetts court under chapter 209C. 2 '3 The court reasoned
that although the first two sentences of chapter 209C, section 4 do
not provide for the establishment of paternity where the child lives
with a nonresident parent, 26
 the plain meaning of the third sentence
of section four did provide for the establishment of such paternity
suits.27 Further, the Court noted that the statute's purpose and
precedent supported allowing R.L.H. to file the complaint. 28
In 1987, the Massachusetts Appeals Court adjudicated another
custody dispute involving jurisdiction in Vertrees v. Vertrees. 29 In Ver-
trees, a divorced father appealed from a modification of a custody
award allowing the custodial mother to move to Illinois with their
two children. 30 In affirming the modification, the Appeals Court
reaffirmed its decision in Yannas v. Frondistau-Yannas, and applied
the "real advantage" standard to the case. 3 ' The real advantage
standard recognizes that after a divorce, a minor child's quality of
life becomes "interwoven with the well-being of the custodial par-
ent." 32 Thus, in determining whether the move serves the minor's
best interests, courts consider whether a good reason, or a "real
advantage," exists for the move. 33
The court in Vertrees stated that moving to Illinois would benefit
the mother emotionally, socially, and possibly financially. 34 The
25 Id.
24 Id. at 102, 514 N.E.2d at 855.
25 Id.
28 The First sentence of chapter 209C, section 4, of the Massachusetts General Laws
Annotated states that a paternity complaint "[s]hall be filed in the judicial district or county
in which the child and one of the parents lives." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 4 (West
1982),
27 The third sentence of section 4 states that "[t]he fact that the child was conceived, was
born, or lives outside the Commonwealth does not bar a proceeding to establish paternity
pursuant to this chapter." Id. § 4.
2 " 401 Mass. 101, 102, 514 N.E.2d 855, 856 (1987).
29 24 Mass. App. Ct. 918, 508 N.E.2d 868 (1987).
'° Id. at 918, 508 N.E.2d at 869.
3 ' Id. at 919, 508 N.E.2d at 869.
52 Id,
"Id. (citing Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 710-12, 481 N.E.2d 1153,
1157-58 (1985)).
"24 Mass. App. Ct. at 919, 508 N.E.2d at 869-70. The court stated that the mother
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court balanced these benefits to the mother against the detriments
that the move might impose on the children." Although the move
would remove the children from their school and friends, and
would reduce contact with their father, the court noted that they
would be moving to an area that offered a strong school system and
a network of relatives." Thus, according to the court, the benefits
of the move outweighed any detrimental effects that might flow
from reduced contact with their father."
In Bak v. Bak, 38 another custody case raising jurisdiction issues,
a divorced father appealed from a judgment awarding the mother
custody of two of their three minor children. The Appeals Court
affirmed the judgment, stating that the award promoted the best
interests of the children." In Bak, the parties, Anthony and Sonja,
were married in 1967. The couple and their two children moved
to Bielefeld, West Germany, where a third child was born." After
Anthony engaged in an extramarital affair, Sonja moved to Mas-
sachusetts with the three children. 4 ' Soon after moving back to the
Commonwealth, she applied to the Massachusetts Probate Court for
a divorce and seeking custody of the children. 42
Anthony frequently visited the children in Massachusetts. 43 As
the parties redeveloped trust and confidence, Sonja agreed to allow
the youngest, Tony, to go to Bielefeld for the school year." Anthony
never allowed Tony to return to Massachusetts, and thereafter filed
a petition for custody in the Bielefeld Family Court. 45 Anthony
failed to inform the Bielefeld court that custody proceedings were
already in progress in Massachusetts." The Bielefeld court sent
had good reasons to move 10 Illinois. Id. She was born and raised in Illinois, and most of
her relatives still lived there. Id. at 919, 508 N.E.2d at 869. According to the court, she would
benefit from her relatives' support. Id. at 919, 508 N.E.2d at 870. Furthermore, Illinois
offered more opportunities for career advancement. Id.
" Id. at 920, 508 N.E.2d at 570.
36 Id
37 Id.
55 24 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 511 N.E.2d 625 (1987).
59 Id. at 618, 5 11 N.E.2d at 631-32.
40 Id. at 609-10, 511 N.E.2d at 626-27. Anthony had secured a tenured faculty position
at the University of Bielefeld. Id. at 610, 511 N.E.2d at 627.
" Id. at 611, 511 N.E.2d al 627. Anthony told Sonja that he would no longer live with
her, /d...at 610, 51 1 N.E.2d at 627.
42 Id. at 1311, 511 N.E.2d at 627.
45 Id.
" Id. at G 11, 511 N.E.2d at 627. The eldest daughter had visited Anthony the previous
summer. That visit went without incident. Id.
"Id. at 611, 51 l N.E.2d at 628.
"
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notice of the proceedings to Sonja." Thereafter, Sonja obtained
orders from the Massachusetts Probate Court instructing Anthony
to send Tony back to Massachusetts.° Anthony not only ignored
this order, but also took Linnea, the eldest, to Germany. 49
On August 24, 1984, the Bielefeld court granted Anthony cus-
tody of Tony. 5° By coincidence, Sonja's attorney sent a letter to the
Bielefeld court on August 25, stating that the Massachusetts Probate
Court action was pending, and that Anthony was in violation of
several court orders.`'' The Bielefeld court treated this letter as an
appeal from its custody order, and remanded the case. 52 The Bie-
lefeld court has yet to reach a decision, although it has granted
Anthony temporary custody of Linnea and Tony. 53
In 1985, the Hampshire County Probate Court held four days
of hearings, which Anthony failed to attend." Anthony subse-
quently returned to Massachusetts and moved to reopen the Probate
Court hearings.55 The Probate Court granted the motion and placed
Rosemary, the middle child, and Tony, the youngest child, in Sonja's
custody. 5" •
Anthony asserted that the Massachusetts courts lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the question of Tony's custody." In re-
sponse to this assertion, the Appeals Court cited Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 209B, which states that a Probate Court has
jurisdiction to make a custody determination if Massachusetts is the
child's home state. 58 Because the children had resided in Massachu-
" Id. at 612, 511 N.E.2d at 628. The notice was in German, and Sonja apparently did
not understand it. Id.







54 Id. at 613, 511 N.E.2d at•628.
" Id., 511 N.E.2d at 628-29.
5" Id., 511 N.E.2d at 629.
57 Apart from the jurisdictional issue, Anthony also stated that the probate court's deci-
sion to grant custody of Rosemary and Tony to Sonja was wrong. Id. at 616, 511 N.E.2d at
630. The Appeals Court disagreed, and stated that a court must consider the best interests
of the child when making custody determinations. Id. at 616, 511 N.E.2d at 630. The record,
the court noted, contained substantial evidence indicating that the mother's custody would
further Rosemary's and Tony's best interests. Id. at 617-18, 511 N.E.2d at 631. Furthermore,
although Sonja's finances were more limited than Tony's, the court noted that Itniaterial
advantage alone should not be determinative of custody." Id. at 618, 511 N.E.2d at 631.
5" See Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 20913 (West 1982).
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setts for thirteen months prior to institution of the divorce pro-
ceedings, the Appeals Court stated that Massachusetts was the home
state of the children, and that the Probate Court had subject matter
jurisdiction to place the children in Sonja's custody."
These custody cases involving jurisdiction impact Massachusetts
law in varying degrees. The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in
R.L.H. v. T.E.L. is an important one because it clarifies the ambiguity
surrounding the statute. This decision also strengthens the rights
of children born out of wedlock, by recognizing a means through
which such children may seek their parents' acknowledgment and
support." The court further reconciled the interpretation of Mas-
sachusetts General Laws, chapter 209C, section 4, with established
jurisdictional principles in questions of support and custody that do
not require that the plaintiff-parent reside in the Commonwealth. 6 '
Vertrees, the Appeals Court's reaffirmation of the "real ad-
vantage" standard, originally adopted in Yannas v. Frandistou - Yannas,
emphasized the Massachusetts judiciary's view that the child's well-
being becomes intertwined with the custodial parent's well-being. 62
The Vertrees court's recognition that children , might suffer if their
custodial parent is unhappy living in a particular jurisdiction takes
into account a child's perception and sensitivity towards parental
happiness. The court's adoption of the real advantage standard also
balances the noncustodial parent's visitation rights with the best
interests of the children.
The Appeals Court's holding in Bak, that Massachusetts courts
have jurisdiction in custody disputes pursuant to Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 20911 if the child lives in the state for at least
six consecutive months before the commencement of the custody
proceeding, clarifies the breadth of this chapter." The Bak court
adhered to a literal interpretation of chapter 209B by granting
jurisdiction over the custody proceedings because the children had
5" Bak, 24 Mass. App. Ct. at 613-14, 511 N.E.2d at 629. Anthony also argued that if the
probaie court had jurisdiction over the question of Tony's custody, then the Court should
have deferred to the Bielefeld Family Court. Id. at 615 511 N.E.2d at 630. The Appeals
Court stated that, because die Probate Court had jurisdiction, the judge had discretion to
deckle whether to defer. Id. According to the court, the judge's decision nut to defer was
nut an abuse of his discretion. Id. at 615-16, 511 N.E.2d at 630.
" The purpose of chapter 209C is to grant children born out of wedlock "the same
rights and protections of the law as all other children." 401 Mass. 101, 102, 514 N.E.2d 855,
866 (1987) (quoting MASS. CEN. L. ch. 209C, I (1982)).
"I Id. at 103, 514 N.E.2d at 856,
"2 Sep supra note 32 and accompanying text.
" 5 24 Mass. App. Ct.. 608, 614,.51 I N.E.2d 625, 629 (1987).
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lived in Massachusetts for thirteen months." By refusing to enter-
tain an exception to the law, the Appeals Court contributed to the
stability of Massachusetts custody law.
The year 1987 brought with it no major changes in the area of
Massachusetts custody law. Probably the most significant develop-
ment occurred in R.L.H. v. T.E.L.,65 in which the Supreme Judicial
Court interpreted Massachusetts General Laws chapter 209C, sec-
tion 4, the statute that governs jurisdiction in paternity suits. The
court's interpretation of the statute changes Massachusetts law so
that the Massachusetts courts now have jurisdiction over a nonres-
ident child and mother who files a paternity complaint.
In 1987 the Massachusetts courts also reaffirmed some general
principles of child custody law. In Vertrees v. Vertrees, 66 the Appeals
Court applied the "real advantage" standard first articulated in
Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas. 67 In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that
a child's quality of life is affected by and interwoven with the cus-
todial parent's well-being. In Bak v. Bak, 68 the Appeals Court applied
the best interests standard to the particular fact situation and once
again affirmed the principle that the courts have considerable dis-
cretion in determining what constitutes a child's best interests. Thus,
using the "best interests of the child standard," Massachusetts courts
exercised judicial discretion to achieve result-oriented decisions fur-
thering the needs of the children trapped at the center of custody
battles.
rw In determining which parent to award custody to, the Bak court also looked to the
best interests of the children. Id. at 616, 511 N.E.2d at 630. The court's determination that
the mother should retain custody of Rosemary, the middle child, fully comports with the
best interests standard. It was clearly in the best interests of Rosemary to reside with her
mother. She had lived with her mother since her parents' separation; maintained a good
relationship with her grandmother, who lived near her mother; and had developed bonds
with the community. Id. at 617, 511 N.E.2d at 630.
The Bak court had a more difficult time determining who should be Tony's custodial
parent. Id. at 617, 511 N.E.2d at 631. Because the father apparently had imbued Tony with
bad feelings toward his mother, Tony expressed a desire to remain with his father. Id. Many
of the same factors that indicated that Rosemary's best interests would be served by staying
with her mother applied to Tony's case as well. The court thus balanced Tony's preference
to stay with his father against the court's perception that it would be in Tony's best interests
to remain with his mother, and determined that it would be in Tony's best interests to remain
with his mother. Id. at 618, 511 N.E.2d at 631.
85 4 0 1 Mass. 101, 514 N.E.2d 855 (1987).
°6 24 Mass. App. Ct. 918, 508 N.E.2d 868 (1987).
"7
 395 Mass. App. Ct. 704, 481 N.E.2d 1153 (1985).
58 24 Mass. App. Ct. 241, 608 N.E.2d 511 (1987).
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C. *Limits on Privileged Commnnications . in Proceedings to Dispense
with Parental Consent to Adoption
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the
fourteenth amendment concept of "liberty" includes the freedom
to marry, establish a [ionic and to raise children.' The Supreme
Court holds that, absent a compelling interest, the State cannot
interfere with these freedoms. 2 According to the parens patriae
doctrine, under which the State can intervene to protect its citizens'
health, safety and welfare,'' the State has a compelling interest in
protecting the health and life of children. 4
In actions to terminate parental rights, the United States Su-
preme Court recognizes that parents' fundamental right to raise
their children cannot be undermined simply by their failure to act
as ideal parents.' To satisfy fourteenth amendment due process
requirements,'' the Court has held, the State must show specific
examples of the parent's unfitness, and not merely demonstrate that
removal is in the child's best interests.' A court cannot justify a
* Martha Jean Zackin, Stair Member, BosToN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (parents have "the liberty to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"). See also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("Without doubt, [the liberty guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment] denotes ... the right ... to marry, establish a home and bring up
children").
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 534-35 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice
Goldberg states that:
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie
its specific guarantees demonstrate that the right]] to ... raise a family [is]
of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically pro-
tected ....
The fact that no particular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids
the State from disrupting the traditional relation of the family — a relation as
old and as fundamental as our entire civilization — surely does not show that
the Government was meant to have the power to do so.
Id. See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 439 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.")
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
BLACK'S LAW DicrioNAnv 579 (5th ed. 1983).
4 Developments in the Lame- The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1317
(1980) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 905 U.S. 645, 652 (1972)). Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
150 (1973).
Saritosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (clear and convincing evidence must he
shown to terminate parental rights).
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI V, 1.
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255. ("We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be
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child's removal from the parent's home unless the court either
provides the parents with an opportunity to eliminate the harm,
and the parents subsequently fail, or a delay in placement. threatens
the child with permanent harm. 8
Massachusetts law usually requires a child's natural or lawful
parent's" consent before a court enters an adoption decree.'° In
accordance with Supreme Court standards, however, this consent
requirement is not absolute." Pursuant to Massachusetts General
Laws chapter 210, section 3, if the court finds the parent or lawful
guardian unfit and unable to assume parental responsibility, the
court will grant the adoption decree without parental consent if the
adoption will serve the child's best interests.]] Massachusetts courts
will grant a petition to dispense with consent to adoption where it
finds that the parent or parents are guilty of neglect, abandonment,
or abuse, or where the adoption would substantially protect the
child's welfare."
When examining parental fitness, under Massachusetts General
Law chapter 210, section 3, courts must assess the adults' present
offended	 a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family 	 the
sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest.") (quoting Smith
v. Organization or Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart. J., concurring)).
B Developments, supra note 4, at 13'22 (citing Alsagar v. District Court, 406 F.Supp. 10, 22
(S.D. Iowa 1977), afrd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976)).
Lt this section, the term "parent" is used to designate the natural or lawful parent or
guardian.
1 " MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 2 (1986) provides in relevant part that "[al decree of adoption
shall not be made „ . without the written consent of ... the lawful parents	 " Id.
H See id. at § 3.
12 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 3 provides in relevant part that the consent of a natural or
lawful parent is not required if the "best interests of the child ... will be served by said
[adoption] decree." Id. at § 3(b).
In determining whether the "best interests of the child" would he served
by granting an adoption without parental consent, section 3 authorizes the court
to consider the ability, capacity, fitness and readiness of the child's parents or
other [statutorily designated] person ... to assume parental responsibility and
shall also consider the ability, capacity, fitness and readiness of the [person
having care and custody] ... to assume such responsibilities.... The court shall
.. also consider the plan proposed by the department or other agency initiating
the petition.
Id. at § 3(c).
Furthermore, courts recognize that the child's interest in a stable, perma-
nent homelife is best served by prompt departmental action. Adoption of How-
ard, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 911, 912, 506 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (1987) (citing Custody
of a Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 764 (1983); Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. 610,
61l n.2 (1986)).
Cf, I MASS. PRACTICE DIGEST, § 71 (1967 and Stipp. 1987) (citing Purinton v. Jamrock,
195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907); Commonwealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E.2d 644
(1948); Adoption of a Minor, 343 Mass. 292, 178 N.E.2d 264 (1961)).
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fitness as a parent." The court may, however, examine the parents'
past or ongoing behavior patterns or characteristics in evaluating
the child's prognosis within the parents' home.'' Thus, in assessing
present parental fitness, the court may consider past inappropriate
behaviors, and is not limited to present parental conduct.'"
The Massachusetts Legislature has created a patient-psycho-
therapist and a patient-social worker privilege, both of which pro-
hibit a professional from disclosing patient confidences.' 7 These
privileges, however, are not absolute. Stating that the child's welfare
is more important than the therapeutic relationship, the Massachu-
setts Legislature created an exception providing that these privileges
do not extend to information pertaining to parental fitness if sought
in the context of child custody proceedings.' 8
 Thus, in determining
whether a petition to dispense with consent to adoption will serve
tr Petitions of die Dep't of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 20
Mass. App. Ct. 689. 694, 482 N.E.2d 535. 539 (1985). See also supra note 12 for the relevant
text of MAss. GEN. L. ch. 211), § 3 (1986).
' 5 /d. at 694-95, 482 N.E.2d at 539.
"' See, e.g., id.
17
 Avis. GEN. L. ch. 112, § 135 (1986); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, §20B (1986).
IS MASS GEN. L, Ch. 233, § 20R provides:
[I In any court proceeding and in any proceeding preliminary thereto and in
legislative and administrative proceedings, a patient shall have the privilege of
refusing to disclose, and of preventing a witness from disclosing any commu-
nication, wherever tirade, between said patient. and a psychotherapist relative to
the diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental or emotional condition ....
The privilege granted hereunder shall not apply ....
(e) In any child custody in which ... the judge ... determines that the psycho-
therapist has evidence bearing significantly on the patient's ability to provide
suitable custody, and that u is more important to the welfare of the child turn
the communication be disclosed than that the relationship between psychother-
apist he protecte(1.
Id.
The statute defines "psychotherapist" as:
a person licensed to practice medicine who devotes a substantial portion of his
time to the practice of psychiatry or a person who is licensed as a psychologist
... provided, however, that such person has a doctoral degree in. the field of
psychology or a registered nurse licensed ... as a psychiatric nurse mental
health clinical specialist ....
Id.
In relevant part. MASS GEN. L. ch. 112, § 135 (1986) provides that:
No social worker in any licensed category ... shall disclose any information he
may have acquired from a person consulting him in his professional capacity
or whom he has served in his professional capacity except:
(d) to initiate a proceeding ... Ito dispense with consent to adoption] and give
testimony in copinccdrin therewith.
Id.
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the child's best interests, the court may examine information per-
taining to either the child's or the parents' psychiatric health.'°
During the Selected Developments year, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court clarified the patient-psychotherapist privilege,
as it relates to proceedings to dispense with consent to adoption. 2°
In the 1987 decision of Petitions of the Department of Social Services to
Dispense with Consent to Adoption, the Court held that conversations
between a social worker and family members do not constitute
privileged communications for the purpose of proceedings to dis-
pense with consent to adoption. 21 Furthermore, in the 1987 decision
of Adoption of Diane, the Supreme Judicial Court refused to limit
the exception to patient-social worker privilege to communications
made solely in connection to child protection hearings. 22 Moreover,
in both cases the Court affirmed its earlier holdings that a court
may consider a parent's ongoing and past patterns of behavior when
determining current parental fitness."
In Petitions of the Department of Social Services to Dispense with
Consent to Adoption, 24 the Supreme Judicial Court held that only
notes written by a psychotherapist about patient communications
constituted privileged communications. 25 Notes written in the hos-
pital records by medical staff, other than psychotherapists, exceeded
the scope of priveleged communications even if the notes contained
psychiatric observations." Refusing to extend the scope of the priv-
ilege to include psychiatric information communicated by non-psy-
chiatric doctors and nurses, the Court reversed the trial court's
decision. that the patient-psychotherapist privilege prevented con-
sideration of' all information contained in hospital records. 27 The
Court held that although the patient-psychotherapist privilege is
1"Adoption of Diane, 100 Mass. 196, 508 N.E.2d 837 (1987); Petitions of Dept of Social
Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 399 Mass. 279, 503 N.E.2d 1275 (1987).
2"Petitions to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 399 Mass. 279, 503 N.E.2d 1275.
"Adoption of Diane, 400 Mass. at 200, 508 N.E.2d at 837.
22 Adoption of Diane, 400 Mass. at 199-200, 508 N.E.2d at 839.
" Id. at 2{)4, 508 N.E.2d at 841; Petition to Dispense with Consent, 399 Mass. at 289, 503
N.E.2d at 1281-82.
2 ' 399 Mass. 279, 503 N.E.2d 1275.
25
 Petition to Dispense with Consent, 399 Mass. at 286, 503 N.E.2d at 1280.
26 1d. at 287, 503 N.E.2d at 1280-81. The court found that the Middlesex Division of
the Probate and Family Court Department had improperly construed the patient-psycho-
therapist privilege, embodied in MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20B. See supra note 18 for a
discussion of Mass. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20B (1986).
27 Petition to Dispense with Consent, 399 Mass. at 288, 503 N.E.2d at 1281.
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broad, it does not preclude the admissibility of notations made by
non-psychiatric hospital personnel which contain some psychiatric
information. 28 Thus, the Court held, the trial judge could assess all
relevant information contained within the hospital records, except
the notations made by psychotherapists concerning privileged corn-
intin ica non s. 2"
In Adoption of Diane, 3° the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court clarified the exception to the patient-social worker privilege
for proceedings to dispense with consent to adoption pursuant to
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 210, section 3." Diane's
mother contended that the exception applies only to client-social
worker communications made in connection with either care and
protection proceedings or a petition to dispense with consent to
adoption, but not to confidences made during the course of an
ongoing relationship. 32 Thus, she argued, the testimony of the social
worker, who had a continuing relationship with the family, was
inadmissible."
Reasoning that the legislature intended the priveleged-com-
munication exception to protect the child's welfare at the expense
of confidential, therapeutic relationships, the Court found that a
narrow application of the exception, limited only to statements
made in the context of a child protection hearing, would undermine
the statutory goal." The Court reasoned, furthermore, that grant-
ing a petition to dispense with consent to adoption is such a "drastic
intervention in family life" that a detailed and complete evaluation
of the entire family relationship must be available to the judge."
Because social worker involvement in protective service families is
typically ongoing and extensive, the Court stated, their testimony
provides the judge with invaluable assist;ince.st' Thus, the Supreme
judicial Court held that testimony of a social worker who has an
2H id.
29 Id. at 280, 503 N.E.2d at 1276.
"400 Mass. 196, 508 N.E.2d 837 (1987).
" See supra note 12 and accompanying text for a discussion of Moss, GEN. L. ch. 210,
§ 3 and exception (d).
52 Adoption of Diane, 400 Mass. at 197-08, 508 N.E.2d at 837-38. A care and protection
proceeding is to determine whether, to protect the child's welfare, he or she should be
removed from the parent's custody. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 119, § 24 (198(3).
33 Id. at 198, 508 N.E.2d 838.
Y' Id. at 198-99, 508 N.E.2d at 838-39.
35 Id. at 190, 508 N.E.2d at 838.
5" Id. at 200, 508 N.E.2d 839.
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ongoing relationship with the family did not constitute an inadmis-
sible privileged communication for the purpose of a petition to
dispense with consent to adoption."
In addition, Diane's mother challenged the testimony of three
other witnesses regarding conversations with Diane, alleging that
the patient-psychotherapist privilege had been breached when three
witnesses offered testimony concerning the mother's impact on Di-
ane's emotional health." The Court held that the first witness did
not fall within the statutory definition of "psychotherapist," and
thus her patient communications were not privileged." Although
the other two witnesses satisfied the statutory definition of "psycho-
therapist," the Court noted that the statute allows only the patient
to assert the privilege. 4° Because Diane enjoyed the privelege as the
patient, her mother lacked standing to allege that the patient-psy-
chotherapist privilege had been breached.'"
In making a determination whether a petition to dispense with
consent to adoption would serve the child's best interests, a court
must assess the parent's ability to care for and protect the child. 42
Patterns of inability or unwillingness to follow through on Depart-
ment of Social Service plans, 43
 or a history of past abuse, neglect or
threats to the child's safety can support a finding of current parental
unfitness." In Petitions of the Department of Social Services to Dispense
with Consent to Adoption, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the
Department's contention that the weight of the evidence supported
a finding of parental unfitness, even absent a consideration of the
57 Id. at 199-200, 508 N.E.2d at 839.
55 Id. at 200, 508 N.E.2d at 839.
5" Id. at 201, 508 N.E.2d at 840. See supra note 18 for the statutory definition of
"psychotherapist."
4" See supra note 18 for MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 2013.
41 Adoption of Diane, 400 Mass. at 201, 508 N.E:.2d at 840.
42 See supra note 12 for MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 3.
" See, e.g., Petition of the Dept of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption,
397 Mass. 659, 669, 493 N.E.2d 197, 203 (1986) (adequate DSS service plans failed to unify
the family because of the "parents' unwillingness, poor motivation. lack of capacity, unavail-
ability, lack of parental personal qualities and their inability to correct deficiencies in the
home environment.."); Petition of the Del* of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to
Adoption, 389 Mass. 793, 802, 452 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1983) (the department failed to reunite
the family because the mother was "unable to carry through on any of the [service] plans"
or to "maintain a positive relationship with the department's employees.").
" See. e.g., Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. 610, 621, 487 N.E.2d 1358, 1366 (1986)
("The court_ is permitted to assess prognostic evidence derived from prior patterns of
. parental
neglect or misconduct in determining future fitness and the likelihood of harm to the child.").
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hospital records."' As evidence of parental unfitness, the Court
outlined the trial judge's findings of fact," which demonstrated the
mother's lifelong pattern of disturbed behavior, including psychi-
atric hospitalization, 47 threats to kill herself and her baby,48
abandonment4  and lack of cooperation with the Department. 5°
Although the Court found these facts sufficient to support a deter-
mination of current parental unfitness,51 they remanded the case to
the trial court, stating that only the judge who sees and hears the
witness can make such a finding."
Similarly, in Adoption of Diane, the Supreme Judicial Court
found clear and convincing evidence of current parental unfitness,
despite the fact that the Department's witnesses had no direct con-
tact with Diane's mother for at least one and one-half years before
the trial." Stating that Diane's mother contested only the sufficiency
of the evidence but not its veracity, the Court described her history
of alcoholism and physical and sexual abuse of Diane." The Court
found, furthermore, that Diane's mother exhibited a propensity for
violence, evidenced by frequent involvement in fistfights" and hos-
tility towards social workers and hospital staff. 5° Moreover, the Su-
preme judicial Court noted that Diane's mother never followed
through on parental skills training or treatment designed to remedy
her violent and abusive behavior.`'? Concluding that Diane's mother
showed a severe lack of parenting skills and an unwillingness to
change, the Supreme judicial Court held that the lower court
properly based its finding of current parental unfitness on past
behavior patterns."
The Supreme judicial Court's decisions in Petitions to Dispense
with Consent to Adoption and Adoption of Diane were well - reasoned,
-0 Petitions lo Dispense with Consent', 399 Mass. at 289 11.18, 503 N.E.2d at 1281 n.18.
16 Id. at 280-84, 503 N,E.2d at 1276-79.
47 Id, at 282, 503 N.E,2d 1278.
4"Id,
0  Id. at 281,503 N.E.2d at 1277.
5"Id. at 284, 503 N.E.2d at 1278.
51 Id. at 285 11.18, 503 N.E.2d at 1281 n.18.
52 Id. at 290, 503 N.E.2d at 1282.
" Adoption of Diane, 400 Mass. 196. 202, 204, 508 N.E.2d 837, 840, 841 (1987).
M Id. at 202-03. 508 N.E.2d at 840-41.
" hl. at 204, 508 N.E.2d at 841.
hi ' Id,
h7 Id. at 203, 508 N.E.2d at 841.
im Id, at 204, 508 N.E.2d at 841.
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sound decisions. Termination of parental rights is a drastic step,
but nonetheless appropriate when required to safeguard the child's
health and safety." Because the child's sense of security depends
on a stable and permanent home life, once the court decides to
terminate parental rights, it must free the child for adoption."
The court must decide to remove the child from the home
before the parent seriously injures the child. Thus, courts must
assess the child's prognosis if returned to the home before deter-
mining whether the child's best interests mandate the child's re-
moval.6 ' An examination of each parent's current behavior, without
reference to past or ongoing behavior patterns or characteristics,
provides insufficient evidence to assess the child's future risk. 62
Many factors should influence the court's decision. The court
must consider the parents' efforts to remedy inappropriate parent-
ing, their attempts to understand and meet their child's needs, and
their willingness to cooperate with the Department of Social Ser-
vices.° Because social worker involvement in protective service fam-
ilies is typically ongoing and extensive, their testimony provides
invaluable assistance to the judge who must weigh all information
before taking the drastic step of granting a petition to adopt without
parental consent." Thus, for the purpose of determining whether
the child's need for protection outweighs the parents' fundamental
right to raise their child, the court must be allowed to consider social
worker's testimony.
Petitions to Dispense with Consent to Adoption and Adoption of Diane
clarified the scope of patient-psychotherapist and patient-social
worker privilege in the context of child protection hearings. More-
over, with these cases the Supreme judicial Court affirmed its earlier
holdings that courts may examine past behavior patterns to deter-
mine current parental unfitness. Furthermore, the Court reiterated
and emphasized children's rights to protection, stability and per-
manence. These decisions correctly ensure that courts will have
access to all relevant admissible information in determining how to
safeguard the best interests of the child.
w See supra notes 5-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of parental rights'
termination.
Adoption of Howard, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 911, 912. 506 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (1987).
6j
 Petitions of the Department of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption,
397 Mass. 659, 671, 493 N.E.2d 197, 205 (1986) (citing Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass.
610, 621 (1986); Custody of a Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 876, 883 (1979)).
" Cf. Adoption of Diane, 400 Mass. at 204, 508 N.E.2d at 841.
"' Petitions to Dispense with Consent, 399 Mass. at 289-90, 503 N.F..2d at 1282.
" Adoption of Diane, 400 Mass. at 199, 508 N.E.2d at 838-39.
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D. *Paternity: Standing to Sue and Presumptions of Legitimacy
Massachusetts courts presume that children conceived during
a lawful marriage are the offspring of the husband and wife. This
presumption of legitimacy holds even if the mother gives birth to a
child after a divorce decree becomes final.' Because this presump-
tion of legitimacy may preclude interested parties, indeed actual
fathers, from asserting claims to a child, courts faced with putative,
or alleged, fathers' claims have carefully examined what state inter-
est the presumption of legitimacy protects.' According to the pre-
vailing view here and elsewhere, the state has a compelling interest
in promoting family life." Courts looking at this issue have reasoned
that preventing putative fathers from bringing paternity suits 'pro-
tects the family by preserving the child's stability and the child's
status as a legitimate child. 4 Hence, although the presumption of
legitimacy at times prevents an actual father from claiming parent-
hood, the Supreme fJudicial Court has held that preservation of the
family outweighs his right."' In other words, Massachusetts courts
view the avoidance of family disruption as a reasonable justification
for refusing to grant alleged fathers standing to sue for paternity
in most instances.
The fact that preservation of the family underlies the pre-
sumption of legitimacy has logically led to different results when
paternity suits arise in situations where either there is no legitimacy
to preserve,'' or where there is no 'family unit' to protect from
disruption.' The Massachusetts Legislature, for example, grants
* 1)cirdre A. Mallon, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAw REVIEW
PBC v. DH, 396 Mass. 68, 71, 483 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1286 (1986) (citing Commonwealth v. Leary, 345 Mass. 59, 60, 185 N.E.2d 641 (1962)).
2 See PBC, 396 Mass. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097; Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 67, 80
N.E.2d 21, 22 (1948).
3 See, e.g., PBC, 396 Mass. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097; A, v. X.,Y., and Z., 641 l'.2d 1222,
1226-27 (Wyo. 1982) cert. denied sub nom A. v. X, 459 U.S. 1021 (and superseded by statute
1983); Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 624-27, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12-14 (1981);
Petitioner F. v. Respondent R„ 430 A.2d 1075, 1078-79 (Del. 1981). But see R, McG.
200 Colo. 345, 351-52, 615 1).2d 666, 671 (Colo. 1980).
4 PBC, 396 Mass. at 73, 483 N.E.2d at 1097,
Id.
"See generally, J. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, 1 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES, § 641 (West 1967 &
Supp. 1987).
According to John Lombard, a legitimate child is "one who is burn in lawful wedlock,
or within a [sic] competent time thereafter," FAMILY LAw, I MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 454
(West 1967 & Supp. 1987). Lombard describes an illegitimate child as "one burn of an
unmarried woman or of a married woman whose husband is not the father of the child." Id.
RRK v. SGP, 400 Mass. 12, 507 N.E.2d 736 (1987).
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putative fathers of illegitimate children the right to establish pa-
ternity.8 Unlike the relative ease with which courts can observe a
child's legitimacy or lack thereof, the determination of what consti-
tutes a family poses problems and may be the subject of disagree-
ment.
A party bringing a suit to establish or challenge paternity may
overcome the presumption of legitimacy in three ways." The first
two methods of overcoming the presumption depend on a showing
that the husband and wife did not have sexual relations during the
probable time of conception. I f the party challenging legitimacy can
demonstrate either the lack of contact or impotence at the probable
time of conception, he or she may successfully rebut the presump-
tion that the child was the offspring of the legally married couple.'"
The third method of overcoming the ,presumption relies on blood
tests — blood grouping tests,''the human leukocyte antigen (HLA)
test, 12
 or a combination of both — to demonstrate that the child
could not be the child of the husband and wife.
Until recently, courts and legislatures viewed paternity testing
primarily as a means of conclusively establishing that a particular
man did not father the child." Because of the HLA's improved!
8 In Massachusetts, this statutory right is embodied in MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C.
§ 5 (West 1987), which provides in pertinent part:
Complaints under this chapter [Children Born Out of Wedlock' u) establish
paternity, support, visitation, or custody of a child may be commenced, ... by
a person presumed to be or alleging himself to be the father ....
ld.
Under all three methods of overcoming the presumption of legitimacy, the demon-
stration that the mother had an adulterous relationship while living with her husband is not
enough. J. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, I MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 641 (West 1967 & Supp. 1987).
til See generally J. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, 1 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES ** 641-44 (West 1967
& Supp. 1987).
" See generally Lee, Current Status of Paternity Testing. 9 FASt. L.Q. 615, 616, 617, 621
(1975); Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Straits of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed
Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 257-59 (1976).
12 See generally Peterson, A Few Things You Should Know About Paternity Tests (But Were
Afraid to Ask), 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 667 (1982); Terasaki, Resolution By HLA Testing of
1000 Paternity Cases Nat Excluded By ABC? Yeasting, 161 FAst. L. 543 (1978).
The Supreme judicial Court recognized the value of HLA test results in Commonwealth
v. Beausoleil when it held that the exclusionary blood test statute, Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 273, section I 2A, did not prohibit the admission of inculpatory HLA test results.
397 Mass. 206, 213-14, 490 N.E.2d 788, 793 (1986). The Court reasoned that the statute
did not address the HLA test both because the II LA is a tissue lest and not a blood test, and
because the statute was written before scientists developed the 11 LA test, and therefore the
legislators could not have meant to exclude it. Id. at 213-14, 490 N.E.2d at 793. For a
discussion of this case's significance and of H LA testing generally, sec 1986 ANNUAL SURVEY
or MASSACHUSETTS LAW, § 4.4.
"See, e.g., Symonds v. Symonds, 385 Mass. 540, 542, 432 N.E.2c1 700, 702 (1982);
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technical precision, however, the Supreme judicial Court. has per-
mitted HLA test results to be used in the demonstration of the
probability of paternity."
As a corollary to the presumption of legitimacy, Massachusetts
courts and the legislature have limited the classes of persons who
can bring suit to establish paternity.' 5 Until 1987, courts limited
standing to challenge the presumption of legitimacy to the mother
of the child,'" to the husband of the child's mother," and to men
seeking to establish paternity of an illegitimate child.'" Before 1987,
no clear answer existed to determine whether a mail claiming that
he Eithered a child presumed legitimate would ever have the op-
portunity to establish paternity.'"
During the Selected Developments year, in the 1987 decision of
R.R.K. v. S.G.P., the Supreme judicial Court made an exception to
the general rule that alleged fathers have no standing to sue to
establish paternity for a child conceived while the mother was law-
fully wed to another. 2 " The RRK Court held that a putative father
of a child conceived while the mother was lawfully wed to another
should have standing to sue when the mother and child were not a
part. of a family unit. 21 Because the state interest in preserving the
family clearly cannot exist in the absence of a family, the RRK Court
reasoned, the rights of a woman and her child to be left alone and
the right of a man to claim his paternity should be treated differ-
ently than when an intact family exists.
In the spring of 1984, RRK filed a complaint in the Berkshire
Probate Court requesting visitation rights to a child he had allegedly
Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642. 645, 162 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1959); Commonwealth
v. Stappen, 336 Mass. 174, 175, 143 	 221. 222-23 (1957).
" See, Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 397 Mass. 206. 214, 490 N.E.2d 788, 793 (1980).
L" See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWN ANN., ch. 209C. § 5 (1987); l'BC v. DK 396 Mass. 68, 483
N.E.2d 1094 (1985).
"l Symonds, 385 Mass. at 544, 432 N.E.2d at 703 (Court examined MASS GEN. L, ch. 273,
§ 7 in resolving dispute between divorcing parties about who fathered child).
' 7 Id.
Normand v. Barkei, 385 Mass. 851, 853, 434 N.E.2d 651, 633 (1982) (suit by man for
visitation rights to two illegitimate children he claimed were his).
The burden of proof to establish paternity of an illegitimate child is by "clear and
convincing" evidence. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. '209C, § 7 (1987).
"' See 1985 ANNUAL. SURVEY OF MASSACIIUSE'rl'S LAW, § 4.5.
10 '100 Mass. 12, 507 N.E.2d 736 (1987).
21 Id. at 14, 507 N,E,2d at 738.
The RRK until also addressed the issue of the admissibility of inconclusive H LA test results.
Id. The court held that such results could be admissible only if presented in conjunction with
evidence showing a sexual alliance between the appropriate parties. Id. (citing Commonwealth
v. Beausoleil, 397 Mass. 206, 220 n.18, 490 N.E.2d 788, 797 11,18 (1986)).
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fathered three years earlier. 22
 The child had been conceived while
the mother, SGP, was lawfully married to her former husband. 23
SGP answered by denying RRK's paternity. She affirmatively as-
serted that because the child was conceived during her marriage to
another man, the husband was presumptively the child's father,
thus barring RRK's suit. 24
 In June, the probate judge allowed RRK's
motion to order RRK, SGP, and the child to submit to a blood test
and to undergo psychological evaluation.25 In January of the fol-
lowing year, the judge ruled that RRK could visit the child once a
month and ordered RRK to pay $25 a month child support. 26
During the course of this litigation the Supreme Judicial Court
decided another paternity suit, PBC v. DH. 27 In this paternity suit,
the Supreme Judicial Court held that children conceived during a
lawful marriage, even if born after a final divorce decree, are pre-
sumptively the offspring of the once married couple. 28 This holding
extended the presumption of legitimacy. Because this holding fa-
vored the mother in the Berkshire case, SGP, she filed a motion to
dismiss on the basis that RRK lacked standing to sue to establish
paternity. 29
 The trial court dismissed the putative father's complaint,
and RRK appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court took the case on
its own motion."
The Supreme Judicial Court evaluated the RRK case in light
of Massachusetts courts' rationale that both the denial of standing
to establish paternity and the presumption of legitimacy further the
valid state interest in preserving family stability." The Court noted
the absence of an "intact family" in'this particular case and reasoned
that the absence of a family unit meant that a putative father could
seek to establish paternity." To distinguish this case from the PBC
case, in which the Court extended the presumption of legitimacy,
22 Id. at 12, 507 N.E.2d at 737.
23 Id. at 13, 507 N.E.2d at 737. 'file mother asserted that because the child was conceived
during her marriage to another man, the husband was presumptively the child's father, thus
barring RRK's suit. Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. On the basis of the test results, the trial judge granted RRK visitation rights during




 PBC v. DH, 396 Mass. 68, 71, 483 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (1985).
22 RRK, 400 Mass. at 13, 507 N.E.2d at 737.
39
 Id.
St Id. at 14, 507 N.E.2d at 738.
22 Id.
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the Court compared the family relationships each situation in-
volved."
In the PBC paternity case, although the husband and wife
divorced, they subsequently remarried." At the time the alleged
father instituted paternity proceedings, the husband, wife and child
lived together." Furthermore, in the earlier case, the husband's
name appeared on the child's birth certificate.'"
The Court stated that no comparable ties existed between the
original family unit in RRK. The husband and wife in RRK re-
mained separated after their divorce. The ex-husband in RRK had
neither acknowledged the child by his conduct nor did the birth
certificate list his name." Additionally, the Court noted that the
putative father in the Berkshire case, RRK, had frequently visited
the child he alleged to be his own."
The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, making men-
tion of the fact that the results of the HLA white blood cell test
would not be admissible without additional evidence tending to
show a sexual alliance between RRK and SGP around the time of
conception." After articulating the presumption of legitimacy, the
Court concluded by stating that the proof needed to overcome the
presumption must be beyond a reasonable doubt.'" The Court did
not evaluate the standards of evidence in the lower court proceed-
ings.
In sum, the Court made exception to two rules about paternity.
By granting RRK the opportunity to be heard at all, the Court made
an exception to the rule that putative fathers of legitimate children
generally do not have standing to challenge paternity. Second, the
Court indicated that the presumption of legitimacy that applies to
children conceived during legal marriage did not protect children
living with a single mother.'"
In an opinion concurring with the result of the Court, Justice
Liacos questioned the wisdom of remanding the case without offer-
53 Id.
396 Mass. 68, 70, 483 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (1985).
35 Id.
3" RRK, 400 Mass. at 14, 507 N.E.2d at 738.
37 Id. at 14, 507 N.E.2d at 738. The Court also noted that the child called RRK "Daddy."
Id.
3" Id,
3"Id, at 15, 507 N.E.2(1 at 738.
4"Id, at 14, 507 N.E.2d at 738.
11 Id. at 15, 507 N.E.2d at 738 (Liacos, J., concurring).
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ing more guidance to the trial court.42 Justice Liacos stated that the
Court's holding in the 1985 PBC case should apply to the instant
case.because RRK had not offered sufficient evidence to overcome
the presumption of legitimacy." Consistent with this view, Justice
Liacos took the position that even though no family unit existed in
RRK, the public policy concerns which motivated the PBC Court
should nonetheless control. The absence of an intact family unit;
according to justice Liacos, did not warrant dispensing with the
presumption that a child conceived during a lawful marriage is
legitimate."
Justice Liacos criticized the Court's unquestioning acceptance
of the lower court's proceedings. He expressed concern about the
decision to compel the parties to submit to psychological evaluation
and an HLA test without a sufficiently developed trial record.'"
According to Justice Liacos, RRK did not produce adequate infor-
mation to support his motion. 4" The potentially invasive nature of
psychological and tissue testing, according to justice Liacos, war-
ranted a more detailed motion:['
' 2 Id. at 18, 507 N.E.2d at 740 (Liacos. J., concurring). Justice Liacos stated that the
standard of review was "'beyond all reasonable doubt'" and that RRK had not offered enough
evidence for the Dial court to make that determination. Id.
"Id. at 18, n.3, 507 N.E.2d at 740, 11.3 (Liacos J., concurring) (quoting Estate of Car-
nelious, 35 Ca1.3d 461, 465, 108 Cal. Rptr. 543, 674 P.2d 245 (1984) app. dismd. sub nom Hall
v. Taylor, 466 U.S. 967 (1980. Justice Liacos pointed out that the presumption of legitimacy,
in addition to protecting children and preserving families, served to keep children off welfare,
and insured the stability of property transfers. Id. (Liacos, J., concurring).
41 Id. (Liacos, J., concurring).
" Id. at 18, 507 N.E.2d at 790. (Liacos, J., concurring).
1" Id. at 18-19, 507 N.E.2d at 740 (Liacos. J., concurring). The concurrence stated that
"it was improper in the extreme for the motion judge to have ordered [the tests] on the basis
of what was then before him." Id. at 18-10, 507 N.E.2d at 740. Justice Liacos emphasized
that the only information that RRK had produced in support of his motion to compel testing
consisted of an unsworn and uoverified statement. N. at 18-19, 507 N.E.2d at 740.
" The justice referred to MASS. R. Cm. P. 35, which provides in part:
(a) ORDER FOR EXAMINATION. When the mental or physical condition (in-
cluding the blood group) of a party. is in controversy. the court in which the
action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental exam-
ination The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and
upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties ....
Id.
In evaluating the propriety of ordering a blood test, Justice Laws cited a United States
Supreme Court case which held that probable cause for arrest must exist before the state
can compel a nonconsenting defendant to undergo alcohol blood testing. Id. at 19. 507
N.E.2d at 740 (Liacos, J., concurring) (citing Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757, 768, 771
(1966). The Schmerber Court held that the privilege against sell-incrimination did not preclude
using the results of a blood test to convict a drunk driver because the arresting officer had
probable cause to arrest. Justice Liacos did nut explicitly demand probable cause lbr the
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At greater length than the Court, Justice Liacos discussed the
constitutional implications of granting RRK's request for visitation."
The concurring opinion first emphasized that the presumption of
legitimacy in RRK made this case different from a 1982 case in
which the Court had granted an alleged father visitation rights."
Next, the opinion referred to the fact that other jurisdictions dis-
agree about whether to grant men who challenge the paternity of
a child presumed legitimate visitation rights. 5° In concluding, Justice
Liacos pointed out that visitation cases by putative fathers should
be resolved on a factual, case-by-case basis. 5 '
In sum, then, in justice Liacos's view the inadequacy of the
record in this case precluded a reasoned determination of the con-
stitutionality of the putative father's claim. 52 He repeatedly ex-
pressed concern about using such an underdeveloped record to
overcome the presumption of legitimacy. Without more facts to
deliberate on, justice Liacos concluded that the PBC Court's holding
should control and hence would not have inferred on the basis of
the record that RRK should have standing to make out a claim for
visitation."
The Supreme judicial Court has in two ways indicated a will-
ingness to circumscribe the recently expanded presumption of le-
gitimacy. First, the Court made no comment about the motion judge
compelling a blood test on the basis of the alleged father's unsworn
affidavit. 54 Second, the Court distinguished the instant case from
the PBC situation, where the woman had remarried her former
spouse, thus limiting its prior holding." It appears as though the
presumption that a child conceived during a lawful marriage is
fathered by a woman's husband may not apply if the woman is
single at the time the alleged father institutes paternity proceedings.
instant case. 14e did, however, assert that bel'ore compelling a blood test to determine
paternity, a judge hearing the motio n should require more than an unverified complaint. Id.
at 19, 507 N,E.2d at 740 (Liacos, j., concurring).
Id. at 20, 507 N,E.2d at 741 (Liacos. J., concurring).
Id, at 20, 507 N,E.2d at 741 (Liacos, J., concurring). The concurrence mentioned
Normand v. liarkei, 385 Mass. 851. 853, 434 N.E.2d 631, 632 (1982), in which the Supreme
j udicial Court held that a man alleging paternity of an illegitimate child had the right to visit
that child if he was the father and if it was in the best interests of the child. Id.
5" Id. at 20-21, 507 N.E.2d at 741 (Liacos, J., concurring).
51 hi. ai 21, 507 N.E.2d at 741-42 (Liacos, J., concurring).
52 hi. at 18, 507 N.E.2d at 740 (Liacos. J., concurring).
as hi. at 18, 507 N.E.2d at 740 (Liacos, J.. concurring).
hi. at 12-15, 507 N.E.24 at 736-38,
55 Id. at 14, 507 N.E.2d at 738.
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In limiting the PBC holding to its fact, it appears that the Court is
liberalizing its earlier restrictions concerning when putative fathers
have standing to sue to establish paternity.
By avoiding a discussion of the proceedings that resulted in
psychological evaluation and blood testing, the Court implicitly ac-
cepts the lower judge's decision to grant the alleged father's motion
to compel on the basis of his unsworn and unverified affidavit. As
the concurrence pointed out, the RRK Court may be setting too low
a threshold of proof for the man alleging paternity to be consistent
with the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. 56
Additionally, the requirement that a woman be married for a pre-
sumption of legitimacy to apply confuses the parameters of the
presumption and loses sight of one of the original goals of the
presumption — that is, protecting the child from the stigma of
illegitimacy.
By limiting the 1985 case to its facts, 57 the RRK Court estab-
lished that putative fathers' standing to bring paternity suits may
depend upon the marital status of the woman involved. 58 In ex-
amining the relationships before it, the RRK Court reasoned that
courts may justify denying a man standing to establish paternity
only if they seek to protect an existing, traditionally-defined, family
unit. 59 Before RRK, a man alleging paternity of a child conceived
during the mother's lawful marriage to another would have had
little hope of even being heard by a court. 6° Since RRK, when a
putative father alleges paternity to a child being mothered by a
single woman, he has a greater chance in convincing a court that
his claim should be heard.'"
RRK, therefore, shifts the parameters of the presumption of
legitimacy. The RRK case establishes that under some circumstances
56 Id. at 19, 507 N.E.2d at 740-41 (Liacos, .1., concurring).
When a defendant is being sued under the criminal statute for determining paternity,
the judge must grant a motion for a blood test. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 12A (West
1987).
In an action to establish paternity for an illegitimate child, Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209C, § 17 (West 1987) grants courts the discretion to decide whether to compel blood testing
or not.
Statutes chi not govern suits brought by putative fathers of children conceived during a
lawful marriage.
57 See PBC v. 1)11, 396 Mass. 68, 483 N.E.2d 1094 (1985).
" RRK, 400 Mass. at 14, 507 N.E.2d at 738.
59 Id. See also, 1986 ANNUAL. SURVEY or MASSACHUSETTS LAW, § 4.5.
6° See PBC v. MI, '396 Mass. 68, 483 N.E.2d 1094 (1985).
SL RRK, 400 Mass. at 14, 507 N.E.2d at 738.
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a man who was not married to a woman when she conceived a
legitimate child will have the right to adjudicate the child's paternity.
RRK suggests that the permissible circumstances for granting a
putative father standing to establish paternity are those in which
there is no family unit to protect. After RRK, the presumption that
a child conceived during a lawful marriage is the husband's may
only apply to those situations in which the mother remarries prior
to the institution of paternity proceedings.
E. *The Role of Speculation in the Equitable Distribution of Property
Upon Divorce
The financial consequences of divorce are an aspect of domestic
relations law that have undergone great changes in recent years.'
Divorce litigation reflects a decline in the significance of alimony
payments and a rise in the importance of final property reallocations
between divorced spouses. 2 Traditional principles, emanating from
the Married Women's Separate Property Acts of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, restricted the court's role in property
division to discerning which spouse held title to each asset, restoring
the spouses to their proper ownership, and dividing jointly held
property.' By 1980, however, most jurisdictions had adopted sys-
tems which gave courts broad discretion to consider all the circum-
stances surrounding the divorce in order to distribute assets ac-
cording to principles of fairness."
Massachusetts courts have broad discretion to award alimony
and to divide assets equitably upon termination of a marriage.'
Massachusetts' equitable distribution statute mandates that the trial
court consider certain factors when determining alimony awards or
property settlements." Courts may also consider other. statutorily
* Michael A. Raffanti, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
M. GLENDON, THE NEw FAsure AND '1'11E.: NEW ! P ROPERTY 51 (1981),
See irl. at 57. Professor Glendon states that the development of new ways to address
the economic aspects of divorce has accelerated because of lawmakers' recognition that the
amount of money transferred upon divorce now rivals the amounts passing by will or intestate
succession.
3 Id. al Q.
Id.
See MASS. GEN. I.,. ch. 208, § ii4 (1986).
" MASS. 6EN. L. ch. '208, § 34 (1986) provides in pertinent part:
In determining the amount of alimony, Wally, to he paid, or in fixing the nature
and value of the property, if any, to be so assigned, the court, after hearing the
witnesses, if any, of each party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the
conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation,
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enumerated factors.' A trial court's findings must indicate that it
weighed each of the statutory factors. 8
In applying equitable distribution principles, courts in Massa-
chusetts and elsewhere have entertained arguments for an ex-
panded category of "property" which courts may divide upon di-
vorce. 9
 Characterizing an asset as property has significant
repercussions because, unlike alimony, a property settlement is not
subject to modification.'" Whether professional degrees and pension
benefits can be treated as property for purposes of equitable distri-
bution remains a controversial issue in American courts." During
the Selected Developments year, the Massachusetts Supreme judicial
Court decided two significant cases dealing with the equitable divi-
sion of future income from medical degrees and retirement plans. 12
In the 1987 decision of Drapek v. Drapek, the Court held that
neither a professional degree nor the increased earning potential it
represents constituted property for purposes of equitable distribu-
tion.' 3
 Conversely, in the 1987 decision of Dewan v. Dewan, the Court
maintained that pension benefits constituted property subject to
equitable division upon divorce, and that a present assignment of
future benefits was the preferred method of allocation." The Drapek
amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employabil it y, estate, liabilities
and needs or each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acqui-
sition of capital assets and income.
Id.
7 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 34 (1986) provides in pertinent part that "the court may also
consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation
in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker
to the ra rn ily unit." Id.
" Loud v. Loud, 386 Mass. 473, 474, 436 N.E.2d 164, 165 (1982). In a case decided
during the Recent Developments year, the Supreme Judicial Court described a two-step analysis
for review of judgments pursuant to the equitable distribution statute. In Bowring v. Reid.
399 Mass. 265, 503 N.E.2d 966 (1987), the Court asserted that, first, a reviewing court should
examine the judge's findings to determine whether all relevant factors were considered.
Then, the Court stated, the reviewing court must determine whether the reasons for the
judge's conclusions are apparent in his or her findings or rulings. Id. at 268, 503 N.E.2d at
968.
" See GLENDON, supra note I, at 67.
L° See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 34 (1986).
" See Note, The Supporting Spouse's Rights in the Other's Professional Degree Upon Divorce,
35 U. FLA. L. REV. 130 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Suppling Spouse's Rights]; see also Freed &
Foster, Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension Benefits, 161 FAA/. L. 187 (1978) I hereinafter
Retirement and Pension Benefits'.
12
 Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 503 N.E.2d 946 (1987); Dewan v. Dewar], 399 Mass.
754, 506 N.E.2d 879 (1987).
' 3 See 399 Mass. at 244, 503 N.E.2d at 947.
" See 399 Mass. at 755, 757, 506 N.E.2d at 880, 881.
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and Dewau decisions manifest the Court's reluctance to permit ex-
cessive speculation in determining property settlements.
Drapek illustrates the distribution problems that arise when a
marriage breaks down shortly after one spouse completes his or her
education and before the couple reaps the monetary benefits of the
spouse's degree: 5 In Drapek, the parties were married for approx-
imately eight. years, during which time the husband earned his
medical degree:" His wife worked to support: the household and
also provided most of the homemaking services during the mar-
riage: 7 The couple used its joint Funds to pay the husband's tui-
tion. 18 At the time of the divorce, the twenty-eight year-old husband
practiced internal medicine as a senior resident.'" His wife, twenty-
seven years old, worked as a service representative for a telephone
company. 2"
At a settlement hearing following the divorce, the probate
judge entitled the wife to participate in her husband's earning ca-
pacity until she became rehabilitated. 2 ' The judge then ordered the
husband to pay his wife $42,024.50, representing the value of her
homemaking services plus the amount by which the wife's financial
contributions exceeded her husband's. 22 The court also awarded
the wife 9.35% of her husband's gross income over five years, or
$60,000, whichever figure was greater. 23 The judge refrained from
deciding whether the medical degree constituted property, but
nonetheless found it amenable to equitable assignment:2 'i
Although recognizing that. Massachusetts law accords a trial
judge the discretion to assign one spouse's property to the other
spouse, the Drapek Court held that the present value of future
earned income is not subject to equitable distribution. 25 The Drapek.
Court asserted that future earnings were too speculative to char-
acterize them as marital assets capable of permanent assignment. 26
15 See generally Note, Supporting-Spouse's 11 ibrlals , supra note 11.





21 Id, at 242, 503 N.E.2d at 947.
22 Id, The GAIN noted that the trial judge did not err in assigning a monetary value to
the wife's homemaking services based on expert testimony. /d. at 247, 503 N.E.2d at 050.
23 Id, at 241, 503 N.E.2d at 947.
24 Id. at 211-42, 503 N.E.2d at 947.
25 Id. at 244, 503 N.E.2d at 949.
2" See a.
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The Court noted that, because of' illness, death, or market factors,
a spouse might never realize potential earnings.° Because assigning
a present value to a medical degree necessitates evaluating the
earning potential the degree creates, the Drapek Court declined to
categorize professional degrees or licenses as marital property sub-
ject to division.28 The Court, however, maintained that a trial judge
may consider the earning capacities of both parties in determining
an alimony award or assigning parties' estates. 2" The Court stressed,
however, that a medical degree is not to be considered as part of
the estate that can be presently divided. 30
In holding that a medical degree failed to constitute property
in a spouse's estate for purposes of equitable distribution, the Drapek
Court brought Massachusetts in line with other jurisdictions that
have addressed the issue." New York, in O'Brien v. O'Brien, is the
only jurisdiction thus far to diverge from the prevailing view." In
O'Brien, the New York Court of Appeals interpreted a state statute
to include an interest in a spouse's medical degree as property for
purposes of equitable distribution." The Drapek Court distinguished
O'Brien by pointing out that the New York statute explicitly enu-
merates an interest in a profession as marital. property," while
Massachusetts legislation contains no such mandate."
In addition to its discussion of O'Brien, the Drapek Court cited
a number of jurisdictions that provide restitution to the supporting
spouse in cases where one spouse enables the other to pursue an
education.3" The Court, however, did not comment upon whether
Massachusetts courts might employ such a remedy in future cases.
Instead, the Cotirt reversed the trial court's alimony and property
division order, and remanded those issues for further consideration





3° Id. at 246, 503 N.E.2d at 950.
31 For an extensive list of cases iri which various jurisdictions Have considered the question
of whether a degree is marital property, see Arciiet' v. Archei% 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074
(1985).
32 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
"/d. at 580-81, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
31 See N.Y. Dom. RFi.. LAW § 236(1i)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney's Stipp. 1986).
35 Drapek, 399 Mass. at 245, 503 N.E.2d at 949.
"Id. at 245, 503 N.E.2d at 949-50.
37 See id, at 246, 503 N.E.2d at 950.
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Although the Drapek decision reflects the Supreme Judicial
Court's unwillingness to recognize a professional degree as prop-
erty, the Court's decision in Dewan v. Dewan demonstrates that it
will recognize as marital assets certain other interests that courts did
not traditionally regard as property." In Dewan, the Court included
pension benefits as part of the husband's estate." The Court held
that presently assigning a percentage of the present value of the
future pension benefits is preferable to using the "if and when"
approach. 41) In the latter approach, a court allocates to the payee
spouse a percentage of the pensi9n : ,benefits attributable to the
marriage period if and when the paying spouse receives the
money:"
The Dewan. Court conceded that, in some circumstances, prac-
tical difficulties dictate that a court utilize the "if and when" ap-
proach.42 The Court noted tfi .at•one such difficulty might involve
the degree of speculation necessary in assigning a present value to
a pension: 13 Another problem which might warrant assignment on
an if and when basis arises when an employee spouse lacks sufficient
liquid assets to pay the present value award." The Court, however,
found that these factors did not control the situation in Dewan.45
The Court asserted that present value assignment would henceforth
be the favored approach in Massachusens. 4 "
The Dewan Court reasoned that the approach provides a clean
break between partners and provides the employee with an unen-
cumbered pension plan."' In addition, the Dewan Court stated that
the present value method would relieve the courts of further su-
pervision and relieve retirement agencies of having to pay benefits
to former spouses." 8 Also, the Court noted, the if and when ap-
proach unfairly allows the employee spouse to decide when benefits
will commence by control over his or her retirement date. 49
as See 399 Mass. 754, 506 N.E.2d 879 (1987).
" Id. at 755, 506 N.E.2d at 880.
4" Id. at 757, 506 N.E.2d al 881.
41 Id. at 755, 506 N.E.2d at 881.
42 Id. at 757, 506 N.E.2d at 881.
-18 See id, at 756, 506 N.E.2d at 881.
44 Id.
See id.
46 Id. at 757, 506 N.E.2d at 882.
" Id.
Id. at 757-58, 506 N.E.2d at 882.
49 See id.
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Drapek and Dewan represent important developments in Mas-
sachusetts law because the decisions reflect the degree of speculation
the Supreme Judicial Court will permit in the equitable assignment
of assets. The Drapek Court found that when determining a per-
manent property settlement, courts would be unwise to characterize
potential earnings as property because such income might never
materialize. Speculation as to the value of a medical degree, the
Court aptly noted, can be dangerous in a property division because
the earnings might not be realized, thus granting a windfall to the
spouse seeking a property interest in the degree.
The role of speculation is critical to understanding why the
Dewan Court found a property interest in a divorced spouse's future
retirement benefits, while the Drapek Court refused to treat future
income from a professional degree as property. The Court did not
state its rationale for defining pension benefits as property. The
Court may simply have believed the determination of future pen-
sion benefits to be less speculative than the future earning potential
from a medical degree. This is a fair appraisal for the Court to
make. While potential earnings from a degree are only an "expec-
tancy," pension benefits are earned during the marriage. Thus, in
assigning property interests in pension benefits, courts need only
speculate as to the parties' respective contributions to those earn-
ings. Courts would not be faced with speculating as to whether such
benefits will ever be earned. In the case of medical degrees as
property for equitable distribution, courts would have to speculate
as to whether the earnings would accrue, how much would be
earned, and the parties' contributions:
Interestingly, the Dewan Court's favoring of the "assignment of
present value" approach over the "if and when" approach repre-
sents a choice of the more speculative alternatives for distributing
pension benefits. This indicates that the Court is willing to allow
for increased speculation when the dangers of doing so are out-
weighed by benefits such as a clean break between spouses after
divorce. In Dewan, the balance favored a present assignment of
pension benefits, while in Drapek, the high degree of speculation
probably outweighed possible benefits of assigning future income
as property. The Drapek approach is fair, however, for the Court
still allows for a high degree of speculation by permitting courts to
consider potential earnings as a factor in determining property
division and in awarding alimony.
In an area of law where judges have enjoyed broad discretion
in fashioning equitable remedies, both Dewan and Drapek signifi-
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candy limit a trial court's discretion to equitably assign assets upon
divorce. Drapek mandates that a 'court cannot include professional
degrees in the category of property for purposes of equitable dis-
tribution. Dewan restricts a trial court's discretion in selecting a
method of allocating pension benefits upon divorce. The limiting
effects of these decisions indicate that the Supreme Judicial Court
may favor setting guidelines for trial judge's to follow in adminis-
tering the Massachusetts divorce, statute.
SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN TORT LAW
During the Selected Developments year, Massachusetts courts ad-
dressed a broad array of torts issues ranging from the duty of care
in medical malpractice cases to standards of proof in products lia-
bility actions. In the medical malpractice field, Massachusetts courts
rendered a decision requiring physicians to inform patients not only
of the -risk of injury, but also of the consequences of such injury on
the patient. In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court, addressing
the informed consent doctrine, held that physicians must inform
patients about the risks of alternative or additional surgical proce-
dures. The Supreme Judicial Court also delivered an opinion facil-
itating the use of medical expert witnesses by holding that an expert
witness need not be a specialist in the field in which the witness is
testifying. Finally, the Appeals Court - decided a case delineating a
physician's standards of care when dealing with a patient whose
pregnancy is at risk.
In addition to medical malpractice developments, Massachu-
setts courts probed other areas of tort law. The Supreme Judicial
Court limited the scope of negligent infliction of emotional distress
by affirming a lowèr court's grant of summary judgment dismissing
a plaintiff's claim when the plaintiff did not see the body of the
accident victim, her son, until at least twenty-four hours after the
accident. In the area of immunities, the Supreme Judicial Court
refused to apply the fading doctrine of interspousal immunity to
claims of fraudulent conveyancing, breach of fiduciary duties, and
conversion. The Supreme Judicial Court, in two cases decided dur-
ing the Selected Developments year, also clarified defamation law by
laying down clearer guidelines for the use of summary judgment
motions and conditional privileges in defamation cases.
Finally, Massachusetts courts have clarified and extended the
law in strict/products liability actions. The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit clarified the standards of proof for
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plaintiffs seeking to demonstrate a design defect in products liability
actions by sustaining a plaintiff's cause of action notwithstanding
the plaintiff's failure to introduce evidence on the feasibility of safer
alternatives. In the area of defective design, the Appeals Court
applied causation principles and the Restatement (Second) ap-
proach to deny a plaintiff recovery when the design defect failed
to create a condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer. In addition to products liability developments, the Supreme
Judicial Court examined strict liability issues and affirmed a verdict
against a landlord for violating a statute requiring landlords to
remove lead paint from the premises, despite the fact that the
landlord lacked knowledge of the dangerous condition.
A. *Developments in Medical Malpractice
In the controversial area of medical malpractice, Massachusetts
courts decided four cases dealing with both a physician's duty of
care and causation for medical malpractice during the Selected De-
velopments year. In the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, Kissinger v. Lofgren addressed the scope of a physician's duty
to inform a patient regarding the risks of a surgical procedure.'
The Supreme Judicial Court held in Martin v. Lowney that a waived
claim to a non-consensual surgical procedure broke the chain of
causation for a surgically caused injury. 2 In Letch v. Daniels, the
Supreme Judicial Court stated that an expert witness, testifying as
to a physician's duty of care, does not have to be in the same field
as the defendant. 3 Finally, in Coughlin v. Bixon, the Massachusetts
Appeals Court elucidated some of the standards for an obstetrician
in dealing with a high-risk pregnancy.4
In Kissinger v. Lofgren, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit dealt with a physician's duty to inform a patient. 5
The patient suffered mild discomfort in his upper left gum since
the early 1970s, caused by a benign tumor covering much of his
sinus.° The otolaryngologists who diagnosed the tumor recom-
mended a "Caldwell-Luc" operation to remove the tumor, warning
*Marc T. Jefferson, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
836 F.2d 678 (1st Cir. 1988).
2 401 Mass. 1006, 517 N.E.2d 162 (1988).
401 Mass. 65, 514 N.E.2d 674 (1987).
4 23 Mass. App. Ct. 639, 504 N.E.2d 1069 (1987).
5
 836 F.2d 678 (1st Cir. 1988).
Id, at 679-80.
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that there was a risk of damaging the infraorbital nerve, a nerve in
the sinus area.? The admitting physician, one of the two defendants,
repeated this warning. 8 The specialist who performed the opera-
tion, the other defendant, only mentioned a risk of temporary
numbness.`-' No one informed the patient that the surgery could
result in chronic pain from a nerve injury, nor was he told about
an alternative procedure, which had less risk of causing the injury.'"
The patient agreed to the Caldwell-Luc operation, and the
specialist, assisted by the admitting physician, performed the op-
eration." The next day, the patient complained of numbness and
pain in the area of the infraorbital nerve.' 2 The patient continued
suffering chronic, excruciating pain through the time of trial.' 3
The case was tried in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts under Massachusetts tort law." The jury
found that the physicians had failed to inform the patient of the
risks of the operation, and awarded him $275,000. 13 The defen-
dants . appealed.'"
The informed consent doctrine in Massachusetts, the court
explained, required that the patient show, first, that the physician
has breached a duty to inform the patient about significant risks,
and second, that the breach caused the harm to the patient.' 7 The
court continued that the duty of care, in turn, has four elements.'"
First, there must be a "sufficiently close" doctor-patient relation-
ship.'`' Second, the physician knows or should reasonably know the
information regarding the risk. 2" Third, the physician should rea-
sonably recognize that the information is material to the patient's
decision to undergo or forego treatment. 21 Finally, the physician









17 Id. (citing l'recourt v, Frederick, 395 Mass. 689, 481 N.E,2d 1144 (1985) and Harnish
v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152, 439 N.E.2d 240 (1982)).




688	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:601
must fail to disclose this material information, thereby breaching
the duty to inform the patient. 22	•
The crux of this case, the court noted, was the third component
of the above duty of care analysis focusing on whether the infor-
mation was material. 23
 Under Massachusetts law, the court ex-
plained, information is "material" when "a physician reasonably
should recognize it as necessary for his [or her] patient to make an
informed decision whether to forego treatment."24 "Material" risks,
however, according to the court, do not include risks inherent in
any operation, and of which every patient should know, such as
infections, or those which are possible but only remotely probable. 25
In this case, the court held that the evidence was such that the
risk of injury was substantial and known to the physicians, thus
requiring a warning to the patient.. 26 An injury to the infraorbital
nerve, the court noted, could have effects ranging from numbness
to severe pain. 27 There was evidence in the record that the risk of
severe pain was not remote. 2  Finally, the court held that the evi-
dence did not show chronic pain to be an obvious consequence of
a nerve injury. 2" Therefore, the court concluded, information that
severe and chronic pain could result from a nerve injury was ma-
terial, and thus, the physician had a duty to inform the patient of
this particular risk."
The court also held that the breach of the duty caused the
harm to the patient. 3 ' In general, the court noted, a physician's
breaching of the duty to inform a patient is actionable only if the
patient, knowing the risk, would not have consented to the treat-
ment, and the undisclosed risk materializes. 32 Here, although the
evidence was in dispute, the court held that there was sufficient
22
 Id.
23 Id. at 681. The court found that the ,jury had sufficient evidence to find a doctor-
patient relationship for both the admitting physician and the surgeon. Id. at 680. 1n addition,
expert testimony showed that chronic pain was a consequence of the nerve injury, alxnu
which the defendants knew or reasonably should have known. Id. at 680-81.





2" Id. at 682.
'" Id. The court ibund that the patient was not informed of the material information,
and therefore, the fourth prong of the duty of care test was fulfilled.
Id. at 68'2-83.
32 id,
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evidence that the injury was caused by damage to the infraorbital
nerve.""
The court also noted that the patient's testimony that he would
not have consented to the operation had he known the risk of
serious, chronic pain resulting from a nerve injury alone was not
sufficient."' The evidence, the court reasoned ., showed that the pa-
tient had suffered mild pain for eight years, and was being treated
for pain."• Therefore, the court concluded, there was enough evi-
dence For the jury to find that the patient would not have consented
had he been informed properly of the risks from the Operation.'"
Thus; the court concluded, the physician's failure to inform the
patient of the risks of the operation caused the harm to the patient.
In sum, in Kissinger v. Lofgren, the First Circuit decided that to
fulfill his or her duty to inform a patient about risks from an
operation, a physician must provide patients with more information
than merely telling them that a nerve injury may possibly occur.
The physician must also be sure to tell the patient what conse-
quences a nerve injury may have. In addition, although the patient's
testimony that he or she would not have consented had he or she
been fully informed of the risks is insufficient evidence for the jury
to conclude that the patient would not have consented, the jury
may look to the other evidence to support the patient's testimony
in reaching its conclusion.
In addition to fully informing a patient about the nature of the
risks in a surgical procedure, physicians must also advise a patient
about the alternative surgical procedures. In Martin v. Lowney, the
Supreme Judicial Court reiterated that a physician has a duty to
inform a patient about the risks of treatment and about alternatives
to that procedure: 37 In Martin, the patient claimed that her doctors,
an osteopath and a surgeon, failed to inform her about the risks of,
and options for, removing an intrauterine device and having a tubal
ligation performed."' Her physicians told her that the operation
would leave no more than a one-inch scar.'"
During the surgical procedure, the physicians performed an





401 Mass, 1006, 517 N.E.2d 162 (1988).
''" Id. tit 1006, 517 N.E.2c1 at 163.
"Id. at 1006-07, 517 N.E.2d at 163.
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consented.4° The operation required a' six-inch incision.'" In addi-
tion, the patient apparently suffered a wound abscess when bacter-
iodes fragilis from the appendectomy were released into the nor-
mally sterile abdominal cavity. 42
At trial, the patient waived her claims concerning the non-
consensual appendectomy.43 The issue before the jury, then, was
whether the doctor-defendants acted negligently in failing to inform
the patient properly about the risks of the particular procedure.'"
The jury found for the defendant-surgeon, but could not reach a
verdict as to the defendant-osteopath.. 45 The trial court, upon the
defendant-osteopath's motion, granted a directed verdict for that
defendant. 4"
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court decision.47
The Court looked to its decision in Harnish v. Children's Hospital
Medical Center, in which it set out the standard for a physician's duty
to inform a patient. 48 The Court, however, held that even if the
defendant-osteopath had failed to inform the patient of the risks
of the procedure, the patient did not prove that the injury was
caused by the physician's alleged breach of that duty. 49 The Court
held that the injury was caused by the appendectomy. 5° Since the
patient had waived her claim relating to the non-consensual appen-
dectomy, the Court found no causal relationship between the neg-
ligence of the doctor, if any, and the injury. 51
In sum, the Supreme Judicial Court restated its standard for a
physician's duty to inform a patient. In this case, the patient lost
her case because she could not prove a causal connection between
the physician's alleged breach and her injury. It is unclear, however,
how the Court would have ruled if the patient had not waived her
claim relating to the appendectomy.
.0 Id. at 1007, 517 N.E.2d at 163.
41 Id.







48 Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152, 439 N.E.2d 240 (1982).
See notes 10-15 and accompanying text for a fuller exposition of the standard found in
Harnish.
49 401 Mass, at 1008, 517 N.E.2d at 164.
"Id. at 1007-08, 517 N.E.2d at 164.
5 1
 Id. at 1008, 517 N.E.2d at 164.
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In Letch v. Daniels, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a
medical expert does not have to be a specialist or practitioner in
the same field as the defendant. 52 In Letch a minor, in an action
brought by her mother, claimed that a pedodontist performing
orthodontia, by his negligent treatment, caused root resorption in
several teeth. i 5 At trial, the patient attempted to elicit opinion tes-
timony from an expert witness, an orthodontist, as to the doctor's
standard of care for the plaintiff's treatment. 54 The judge refused
to hear this testimony from the expert because the witness was not
a pedodontist. 55 As a result, the patient was unable to enter evidence
as to the doctor's standard of care, and the trial court entered a
directed verdict for the doctor. 56
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial court erred in
refusing to hear the expert witness's testimony. The Court ex-
plained that a medical expert does not have to be a specialist in the
area in question, nor does the witness have to practice in the same
field as the defendant to testify as to the defendant's standard of
care." To so testify, the Court indicated, the witness instead must
have sufficient "education, training, experience and familiarity with
the testimony's subject matter." 58
In sum, Letch v. Daniels facilitates the use of expert witnesses in
medical malpractice cases. By allowing an expert to testify as to a
physician's standard of care without practicing in the same specialty,
the Court: has increased the flexibility of the use of expert witnesses.
Parties need not find an expert in the identical field with the de-
fendant. Thus, the Court's holding in Letch allows a greater number
of witnesses to qualify as experts when testifying as to a physician's
standard of care.
In Coughlin v. Bixon, the Appeals Court clarified the duty of
care owed by an obstetrician to a patient whose pregnancy is at
risk.59 The patient-mother [hereinafter "the mother"] was substan-
tially overweight, smoked two packs of cigarettes per day, and would
52 401 Mass. 65, 68, 514 N.E.2d 675, 677 (1987).
55 Id. at 65-66, 514 N.E.2d at 675.
54 Id.
n 5 Id. at 66, 67-68 & no. 2-3, 514 N.E.2d at 675, 676-77 & no. 2-3.
56 Id. at 66, 514 N.E.2d at 675-76.
37 Id. at 68, 514 N.E.2d at 676.
• 8 Id., 514 N.E.2d at 676 (quoting Gill v. North Shore Radiological Assocs,, 10 Mass.
App. Ct. 885, 886, 408 N,E.2d 248, 250 (1980)).
59 23 Mass. App. Ct. 639, 504 N.E.2d i969 (1987). The patients whose pregnancy is at
risk are, naturally, the mother and the child.
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be older than thirty-five years old at the expected date of delivery."
The plaintiff's experts testified that these factors put the pregnancy
at risk from the outset."' Furthermore, during the pregnancy, the
mother did not gain weight appropriately, and, in the last two
months of her very short pregnancy, 62 she suffered cramps and
episodes of vaginal bleeding and passing of fluid. 63 Three clays
before her premature delivery, the mother experienced a "gush of
fluid.""4 The passing of fluid, and especially the "gush," indicated
that fetal membranes were rupturing."" The initial risk was in-
creased by the uterine bleeding and the rupturing fetal mem-
branes.""
The clay of the delivery, the mother visited the physician and
described the incident of the gushing fluid to him. 67 The physician
prescribed bed rest." That night, the mother went into labor, and
was admitted to Malden Hospital." She demanded that the physi-
cian transfer her to a hospital with a better-equipped neonatal unit,
but the physician failed to act on her request." When the patient-
child [hereinafter "the child"] was delivered, there was no pediatri-
cian in the delivery room or immediately available." The physicians
present were unable to treat the child. 72 Treatment, though inade-
quate, could not commence until the child was admitted to the
hospital nursery." The next day, the child was transferred to Chil-
dren's Hospital Medical Center, but it was too late; the child died
eleven clays later following surgery to try to correct heart abnor-
malities."
The plaintiff instituted the action before a medical Malpractice
tribunal which dismissed the complaint following the plaintiff's of-
"' Id. at 640, 504 N.E.2d at 1070.
m Id.
62 The patient was expected to deliver on March 30, 1982, but delivered on January 25,
1982. 1d, at 640-41, 504 N.E.2d at 1070.
"" Id, at 640, 504 N.E.2d at 1070.
iu
65 Id. at 641, 504 N. E.2d at 1070.
Id.
" Id, at 640, 5114 N.E.2d at 1070.
rx Id.
"" id. at 641, 504 N.E.2d at 1070.
7u Id.
7 ' Id.
Id. The physicians could not start an intravenous or administer bicarbonate, and the
delivery room was not equipped to administer oxygen to the child. Id.
" Id.
74 Id,
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fer of proof. 75 The Massachusetts Appeals Court vacated the dis-
missal, holding that the offer of proof showed that a doctor-patient
relationship existed, the physician failed to conform to good medical
practice, and the physician's negligence probably contributed to the
child's death. 7° The court set out eight respects in which the phys-
ician failed to conform to acceptable standards." First, the physician
failed to monitor the mother's uterine contractions." Second, the
physician failed to administer tocolytics." Third, the physician
failed to assess the seriousness of the ruptured membranes by doing
a sonograph.8° Fourth, the physician failed to hospitalize the mother
after the "gush of fluid" showed that the fetal membranes were
ruptured.' Fifth, the physician failed to administer antibiotics in
response to the fetal membrane rupture.'' Sixth, the physician
Failed to have a pediatrician in the delivery room, or close at. hand.'"
Seventh, the physician Failed to administer cortisone to treat the
child's respiratory distress.'' Finally, the physician failed to transfer
the mother to a hospital with a neonatal unit better equipped to
handle a high-risk pregnancy. 85 Thus, by laying out these standards,
the Appeals Court enumerated some of the elements in a physician's
duty of care to a patient whose pregnancy is at risk.
The four medical malpractice cases decided in Massachusetts
during the Survey year are a mixed bag. In two, Kissinger v. Lofgren
and Letch v. Daniels, the courts took a common-sense approach to
the problems before them. In Kissinger, the First Circuit held that
not only must a surgeon warn that a certain operation may result
in nerve damage, he or she must. also warn the patient what the
results of such nerve damage may be. In Letch, the Supremejudicial
Court, reversing an incorrect evidentiary ruling by the trial judge,
held that a medical expert witness did not have to practice in the
"Id. at 630-40, 504 N.E.2d at 1069-70.
7 " Id. at 040, 504 N.E.2d at 1069.






"5 Id. at 641-,42, 504 N.E.2d at 1070.
"4 Id. at (142, 504 N.E.2d al 1070.
" 5 Id. In addition, the court held that a patient's offer of proof before a medical mal-
practice tribunal did not necessarily have to include the words "to a reasonable medical
certainty - in expert testimony to make proof of causation legally sufficient. Id. at 044-45,
504 N.E.2d at 1072.
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exact same field as the defendant in a malpractice case in order to
testify as to the defendant's standard of care. While the federal case
may be stretching the standard a bit, in holding that chronic pain
is not an obvious result of nerve damage, the Supreme Judicial
Court's ruling regarding expert witnesses makes perfect sense. The
reasoning behind the rule of evidence regarding expert witnesses
is that the witness have sufficient background knowledge on which
to base his or her expert opinion. The Court's ruling in Leech only
restates that common-sense rule.
In Coughlin v. 13ixon, the Appeals Court responded to an ob-
viously egregious incident of malpractice by an obstetrician. In va-
cating the decision of the medical malpractice tribunal, 86 the Ap-
peals Court, in an opinion written by the only woman on the court,
found eight aspects in which the doctor had not conformed to good
medical practice. 87 The facts of the case were such that the court
was almost forced to decide as it did. 88
Martin v. Lowney, however, is a disgraceful throwback to legal
formalism. The Supreme Judicial Court disposes of the issue before
it by resorting to a questionable waiver. In the facts as related by
the Court, there is no indication of what injury, if any, the patient
suffered. The size and extent of her injuries may only be surmised
from the mentioning that the operation as performed required a
six-inch incision, and that the wound abscessed.
Marlin. appears flawed, or at least questionable, in three re-
spects. First, the Court does not show that it considered the patient's
alleged waiver of her claim regarding the appendectomy. Second,
the Court did not look to whether the extension of the operation,
and the resulting lengthened incision and wound abscess, was a
" material" risk, or whether the patient was informed of this risk.
Finally, the Court did not deal correctly with the causation question
before it.
The Martin Court dealt summarily with the patient's waiver of
her appendectomy claim. The Court, in its opinion, gave no thought
as to what exactly the patient thought she was waiving. While she
may have truly been waiving any and all claims with any relation to
the non-consensual appendectomy, such a waiver, one would hope,.
" The egregiousness or the doctor's malpractice, coupled with the tribunal's treatment
of the case, would seem to cast doubt on the efficacy and neutrality of the tribunal.
i n addition, the court got rid of a bit or legal formalism, holding that the magic words
"to a reasonable medical certainty" did not have to be invoked by an expert witness to show
causation in a medical malpractice case. 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 643-45,504 N.E.2d at 1072.
w One wonders what the effect of the doctor's suggesting bed rest to the mother when
she visited the doctor was on the court's decision in this case.
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would have to be relatively explicit. It very well may be that the
patient thought she was waiving only a battery claim for the non-
consensual appendectomy, a claim which would be worth less in
damages, and would be largely duplicative of the failure to inform
claim. To have dealt with such a complicated issue so summarily,
and to have made the issue decisive of the case, is mistaken.
Second, under the Court's own criteria, the information that
the operation may be extended while the patient is under anaes-
thesia could very well be material information which the doctor has
a duty to disclose to the patient. The surgeon presumably felt
compelled by what he believed constituted good medical practice to
extend the requested operation, removing the intrauterine device
and performing a tubal ligation to include removing the patient's
appendix. The risk that such a procedure may have to be extended
may well be a known risk. The Court did not address whether such
a risk was either so well known by patients to not require a warning,
or whether it was so remote as to not be material. The patient,
however, indicated that, had she known that she could have her
appendix removed, she would not have consented to the operation.
What the root of this lack of consent would have been is not clear,
but if it had to do with the amount of scarring, this risk may have
been material to this patient.
If the risk, defined here as the risk that the surgery be extended
and the incision be lengthened, was a material one, then the patient
should have received an appropriate warning. The risk of a wound
abscess from an infection is, according to the Court, an obvious
one, about which the patient need not be warned. Presumably, the
risk that there may be scarring from an incision may well be obvious
as well. However, the information as to the length of the necessary
incision may well have been material to the patient, as it could have
directed her as to whether she wanted the operation at all, or wanted
to be sure that the surgeon did not extend the operation.
Finally, the Court was cavalier in its treatment of the causation
question. The Court. claimed that the injury was caused by the
appendectomy, and the appendectomy claim was waived, so the
patient had no case. The Court, by this syllogism, ignored or glossed
over many of the metaphysical questions of causation raised by the
facts of the case. Through the technicality of a waiver, and without
dealing with the circumstances of that waiver, the Court did the
patient an injustice.
In conclusion, duty and causation in medical malpractice tort
law continues to thrive. In three of the cases during the Selected
Developments year, the courts have expanded these elements to pro-
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tect injured plaintiffs. In Kissinger v. Lofgren, 8" the First Circuit
clarified the law of informed consent to include the risk of pain
from a nerve injury as material information which must be dis-
closed. In Letch v. Daniels,"" the Supreme Judicial Court facilitated
the use of medical expert witnesses by not requiring a medical
expert to be in the exact same practice field as the defendant. In
Coughlin v. Bixon, 91 the Appeals Court listed a number of the ele-
ments present in a physician's duty of care to a patient whose
pregnancy is at risk. In these three cases, the courts did justice to
the individual injured plaintiffs. In Martin v. Lowney,"2 however, the
Supreme Judicial Court did an injustice to a woman through its
summary treatment of her case. By failing to realize that there was
a real person with real injuries suffering real pain, the Court failed
to come to a decision that can stand up to critical observation.
Perhaps the Court will atone for this lapse of judgment in the years
to come.
B. *Recent Limitations on Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Claims
In 1978 the Supreme Judicial Court effected a change in Mas-
sachusetts negligent infliction of emotional distress law. In the case
of Dziokonski v. Babineau, the Court expressly overruled the long-
standing "impact" rule which had denied plaintiffs recovery for
physical injury resulting solely from negligently inflicted psycholog-
ical distress.' In a potentially far reaching decision, the Supreme
Judicial Court not only recognized a cause of action for the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress absent. a physical "impact," but
also extended recovery for physical injuries which resulted from
the plaintiff's concern over harm to a third party. 2 Although initially
this ruling indicated a new receptiveness to recovery under the
"" 836 l',2d 678 (1st Cir. 1988).
1") 401 Mass. ti5, 514 N.E.2d 675 (1987).
yr 23 Mass. App. Ct. 639, 504 N.E.2d 1069 (1987).
22 401 Mass, 1006, 517 N.E.2d 162 (1988).
* Daniel C. Sweeney, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
' Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 556, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1296 (1978). In moving
away from the impact rule regarding negligent inffictiim of Motional distress the Supreme
Judicial Court overruled its decision in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E.
88 (1897). Dziohmtki, 375 Mass, at 556, 380 N.E.2d at 1296. Although the impact formula
had been modified by the Court over the years, the Spade decision had been the controlling
case in the area since the 19th Century. Id. at 558, 47 N.E.2d at 1297.
2
 Dziokonski. 375 Mass. at 562, 380 N.E.2d at 1299.
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doctrine of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the Court has
in more recent years taken great efThrt to limit its scope.
In Dziokonski the estates of a husband and wife brought, claims
for negligent infliction of emotional distress alleging that the plain-
tiffs died from shock caused by an auto accident involving their
daughter and the clefenclant.3 The facts alleged stated that Mrs.
Dziokonski arrived shortly after the accident and witnessed her
injured daughter lying at the scene.' As a result of the trauma
caused by this sight, Mrs. DziokOnski died in the ambulance while
accompanying her daughter to the hospital`' Mr. Dziokonski, who
apparently never reached the accident scene nor witnessed the
death of his wife, was so physically and emotionally overcome by
this chain of events that he died.['
In ruling that both plaintiff's stated a cause of action,' the
Supreme Judicial Court rejected such traditional theories as "im-
pact" and "zone of danger." 8
 In their place the Court determined
that a test which evaluated whether the plaintiffs' injuries were a
reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence effected
the proper analysis.• The ,threshold requirement: in this analysis
involves a showing that a substantial physical injury occurred as a
result of the defendant's negligence." Once this is established, the
question of recovery becomes dependent on a balancing of several
factors." These factors include the manner, time and place where
the plaintiff became aware of the injury to the third party as well
as the type of relationship which existed between the two parties.' 2
The Court noted that generally such questions require resolution
by the factfinder, but indicated that in some cases the facts may
preclude liability as a matter of law.I•
3 Id. at 550-57, 380 N.E.2d at 1296.
4 /d. at 557, 380 N.E.2d at 1290,
5 Id,
Id,
7 Id. at 569, 380 N.E.2d at 1303. While the Court did stale that both complaints could
withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state it claim, it noted that while theelaint of Mr.
Dziokonski was f'ar inure indefinite, it could not. he found insufficient as a matter of law, Id.
8 Id. at 550, 503, 380 N.E.2d at 1296, 1300. According to the zone of danger approach,
a plaintiff is denied recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of
concern For a third party unless the defendant's actions posed an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 563, 380 N.E.2d at 1300.
Id. at 567, 380 N.E.2d at 1302.
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Applying these considerations to the case before it, the Su-
preme Judicial Court concluded that a parent who incurs physical
injuries, induced by the emotional trauma over an injury to their
child caused by the defendant's negligence, states a cause of action.'`'
This rule applies whether the parent witnesses the injury or comes
upon the scene shortly thereafter. 15 Thus, the plaintiffs in this case
stated a cause of action sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss
and the judge properly submitted the question of liability to the
trier of fact."'
Two years later the Supreme Judicial Court in Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc. extended the scope of the Dziokonski decision
when it allowed a cause of action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress for a plaintiff who was not present at the scene of
the accident but first viewed the injured loved one in the hospital
shortly thereafter.° In Ferriter, the plaintiffs were the wife and two
children of a man injured while in the defendant's employ.'s As a
result of the accident, the husband required hospitalization and
suffered paralysis from the neck down.' 9 The plaintiffs did not
witness the accident, but instead first came upon their injured loved
one in the hospita1. 2°
In overturning the lower court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendant, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the facts
before it fell within the scope of the principles set forth in their
Dziokonski decision• 21 Provided that the plaintiffs could demonstrate
the existence of a physical injury resulting from the defendant's
negligence, the Court ruled that they had stated a cause of action
upon which relief could be granted. 22 Although the facts did not
allege the time lapse between the accident and the arrival of the
plaintiffs at the hospital, the Court concluded that a jury could find
a short time lapse sufficient for the defendant to incur liability
under the Dziokonski theory of reasonable foreseeability. 23 The Court
reasoned that no logical reason exists to justify granting recovery
" Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 569, 380 N.E.2d at 1303.
12 Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 518-19, 413 N.E.2d 690, 697
(1980).
"3 Id. at 508, 413 N.E.2d at 691.
19 Id. at 509, 413 N.E.2d at 691.
2" Id.
2 ' Id. at 518-19, 413 N.E.2d at 697.
" Id.
2] Id.
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to a plaintiff who rushes to the scene of the accident and witnesses
an injured loved one, while denying it to a plaintiff who learns of
the accident and instead rushes to the hospital." As long as the
plaintiffs' injuries follow closely in time to the accident, they are
both equally foreseeable in terms of the proximity limits found in
Dziokonski. 25
The willingness of the Supreme Judicial Court to expand the
Dziokonski doctrine proved shori-lived. The 1982 case of Miles v.
Edward 0. Taber, M.D., Inc. involved a claim for the negligent infl-
iction of emotional distress brought by a plaintiff who witnessed the
defendant's negligence in the birth of her child which resulted in
the death of the infant two months later. 2& Although the jury ren-
dered a verdict in her favor, the trial judge entered a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. 27 In affirming the lower court, the
Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff failed to produce
sufficient evidence of emotional distress at the time of the negligent
act to support her claim." Despite a psychiatrist's testimony attri-
buting the plaintiff's deteriorating mental and physical condition
to her witnessing the defendant's negligence, the Court found that
the manifestation of this injury did not occur until two months later
and thus did not follow "closely on the heels" of the negligent act
as required by Dziokonski and Ferriter. 29
The Supreme Judicial Court again refused to expand the scope
of recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress in the
24 14. at 518, 413 N.E.2d at 697.
25 Id. at 518-19, 413 N.E.2d at 697.
2" 387 Mass. 783, 784-85, 443 N.E.2d• 1302, 1303-04 (1982). The doctor's alleged
negligence began when he discharged the plaintiff from a hospital stay informing her she
was only seven months pregnant. Id. at 784, 443 N.E.2d at 1303. One week later she was
readmitted to the hospital and gave birth to a full-term baby, despite the defendant's repeated
contention that she was only in her seventh Month. Id,
The Court elaborated on the facts of the defendant's alleged negligence during the birth
of the child. The plaintiff saw her child soon after birth:
His body was a gray-blue color. [The plaintiff] watched Dr. Tabor hand [the
child] to a nurse and instruct her to "snap" the baby's feet and to give it oxygen.
The mother saw - Dr. Tabor listen to the baby's heartbeat with a stethoscope and
then walk away. He said to [the plaintiff], it doesn't look good, 1 can't hear a
heartbeat." Dr. Tabor then stayed on the opposite side of the delivery room
from the baby for about ten minutes.
Id. at 784-85, 443 N.E.2d at 1303.
Expert testimony was offered indicating that the defendant's procedures were not in
accordance with proper medical standards. Id. at 785, 443 N.E.2d at 1303. After undergoing
extensive treatment, the baby died two months later, [4.
27 Id. at 787-88, 443 .N.E.2d at 1305.
2" Id. at 788, 443 N.E.2d at 1305.
a Id. at 788-89, 443 'N.E.2d at 1305-06.
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1983 decision of Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 3° In Cohen, a
mother learned of the death of one of her sons in an airplane
accident through a telephone call from her other son seven hours
after the accident occurred. 3 ' This news so shocked her that she
died two days later of a heart attack. 32 Her estate brought a suit
alleging that the woman's emotional distress and subsequent death
directly resulted from the defendant's negligence." The Court
found that, because the plaintiff failed to discover her son's death
until seven hours after it occurred, her injuries did not result from
an actual sensory impression of her son's injuries. 34 Applying the
Dziokonski principles, the Court precluded liability as a matter of
law."
During the Selected Developments year, the Supreme Judicial
Court again narrowed the possible scope of liability for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress. In the 1987 case of Stockdale v. Bird
& Son, Inc. the plaintiff brought an action against her son's em-
ployer for emotional distress that resulted from her son's death in
a work-related industrial accident. 36 The plaintiff first became aware
of her son's death when the police called her four hours after the
accident occurred. 37 Following the telephone call, the first physical
manifestations of her emotional distress began to appear." The
following day, approximately twenty-four hours later, the plaintiff
viewed the body of her son at a funeral home and became physically
ill at the sight. 39 Thereafter, the plaintiff suffered from a variety of
mental and physical ailments for some time. 4°
3° 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983).
3, Id. at 329-30, 450 N.E.2d at 583.
"2 Id. at 330, 450 N.E.2d at 583.
93 Id. at 328, 450 N.E.2d at 582.
"Id. at 341-43, 450 N.E.2d at 589-90.
' 5 Id. The Court stated:
We are aware of no case where a court has imposed liability where the
plaintiff was located a substantial distance from the scene of the accident and
did not observe either the scene of the accident or the injuries inflicted on the
victim .. , . rIlhe injury to Nellie Cohen did not result from a sensory perception
of the injuries caused to her son or the injury producing event. Thus, the
emotional distress which she suffered is more akin to the anguish that any
person feels after being informed of death or injury to a loved one than it is to
the distress, which we have deemed compensable, that involves firsthand obser-
vation of a defendant's negligence or the consequence thereof.
Id. at 342-43, 450 N.E.2d at 589-90.
3" 399 Mass. 249, 249-50, 503 N.E.2d 951, 952 (1987).
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The Supreme judicial Court affirmed the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the issue of liability for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress.'" The Court found that, because the
plaintiff learned of her son's death several hours after the accident
and never actually observed the injuries until twenty-four hours
later, the employer's negligence did not proximately cause the plain-
tiff's injuries. 42 The Court stated that the case before it resembled
its decisions in Miles and Cohen rather than those in Dziokonski and
Ferriter, and on that basis affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant.'"
Aside from an initial extension in the Ferriter case, the Supreme
judicial Court has limited the standard for recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. As first set out in Dziokonski, the
Court determined that the analysis for determining recovery under
this theory consists of a reasonable foreseeability standard.'" Thus,
the imposition of liability would depend on weighing the particular
facts of an individual case to determine if the harm complained of
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's neg-
ligence." This analysis, the Court noted, would bring the definition
of the scope of duty in this area of the law more in line with general
tort principles."
The subsequent history of the standard ennunciated in Dzio-
konski paints a picture of a Court struggling to define the precise
limits of this newly accepted doctrine. Initially the Supreme Judicial
Court moved to expand these limits. In Ferriter the Court extended
the scope of negligent infliction of emotional distress to plaintiffs
who never witness the defendant's negligence but come upon their
injured family member in the hospital.'" The Court included such
an injury within the scope of reasonable foreseeability as set out in
Dziokonsk08
." Id. at 251, 503 N.E.2d at 952-53.
42 Id. at 252, 503 N.E.2d at 953-54.
• 1 a
Dzlokonski v. liabineau, 375 Mass. 555, 567, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1301-02 (1978).
.0 Id. at 568, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. Once a substantial injury is shown and the question of
causation is answered, the Court indicated that the weighing process is to involve factors
"such as where, when, and how the injury, to the third person entered into the consciousness
of the claimant, and what. degree there was of familial or other relationship between the
claimant and the third person." Id.
1 " Id. at 567, 380 N,E.211 at 1301-02.
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 518, 413 N.E.2d 690, 697
(1980).
," Id. at 518-19, 413 N.E.2d at 697.
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In more recent years, however, the Court has refrained from
expanding recovery under this theory. In Miles the Court ruled that
because the plaintiff's emotional distress did not manifest itself for
two months after the defendant's negligence, there existed insuffi-
cient evidence on which to claim negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 49 Similarly, in Cohen the Court denied recovery to a woman
who learned of the death of her son in an airplane crash seven
hours after the fact and neither witnessed the accident nor observed
her son's injuries." In both of these cases the Coirt ruled that the
manner and timing of the plaintiffs' awareness of the negligence
and the subsequent manifestation of emotional distress precluded
recovery as a matter of law. While the rulings in these two cases did
not amount to unexpected interpretations of the reasonable fore-
seeability standard, they nonetheless failed to clearly establish the
outer bounds of recovery under this theory.
Finally, in Stockdale, the Court limited the time span allowed
between the occasion of the negligence and the plaintiff's first sight
of the victim. In both Dziokonski and Ferriter the Court stated that
the latter must follow closely on the heels of the former, but the
outer limits of that criteria remained undefined. In Stockdale the
Court determined that as a matter of law a twenty-four hour time
span exceeded a reasonable time limit, thus denying plaintiff's re-
covery. 9 ' Although sufficient to dispose of the case before it, the
Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Stockdale failed to clearly de-
lineate the outermost parameters of the appropriate time interval
between the two events sufficient to allow injured plaintiffs a recov-
ery.
After the Court's recent decision in Stockdale, the scope of re-
covery for negligent infliction of emotional distress appears limited
to instances where the plaintiff comes upon the victim during the
accident or immediately thereafter. Although the Dziokonski Court's
announcement of the reasonable foreseeability standard at first re-
flected a broad scope of possible recovery under this theory, sub-
sequent cases demonstrate a curtailment of Dziokonski's broad hold-
ing. While certainly less restrictive than either the "impact" or "zone
of danger" theories of recovery, the reasonable foreseeability stan-
' 19 Miles v. Edward 0. Tabor, M.D., Inc., 387 Mass. 783, 788-89, 443 N.E.2d 1302, 1305
(1982).
5"
 Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 342-43, 450 N.E.2d 581, 589-90
(1983).
5 ' Stockdale v. Bird & Son, Inc., 399 Mass. 249, 252, 503 N.E.2d 951, 953-54 (1987).
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dard is not as broad as its name implies. Rather than focusing on
the foreseeability of the plaintiff's distress, this standard instead
emphasizes the proximity in time between the negligence and the
distress. Such an interpretation will sometimes work to deny recov-
ery for an arguably foreseeable emotionally distressed plaintiff on
the basis that the plaintiff was not "fortunate" enough to have
learned of the accident within the prescribed time limit. The most
difficult question remaining for the plaintiffs who seek to recover
under this theory is what exactly is the prescribed time limit. This
is a question which has not been answered with any clarity by the
Supreme Judicial Court.
C. *interspousal Immunity and Conversion
Massachusetts courts have greatly eroded the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity. Spouses now may bring actions against each
other based on contract' and may maintain negligence actions
against each other. 2 Additionally, spouses may bring actions in
courts with equitable jurisdiction to secure separate property, pre-
vent fraud and coercion, enforce trusts, and establish other conflict-
ing property rights. 5 Massachusetts, thus, has limited the scope of
the interspousal immunity doctrine to preclude a spouse from main-
taining actions for intentional torts against his or her spouse.`'
During the Selected Developments year, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court, in Garrity v. Garrity, held that interspousal
immunity did not constitute a viable defense to a lawsuit containing
claims of fraudulent conveyancing of property, violation of fiduciary
duties, and conversion. 5 The Court declared that courts may "en-
force trusts and ... resolve other conflicting property claims in-
cluding those between husband and wife."'' Although a decision not
to bar the lawsuit was proper in this case, the Court's summary
* Gary J. Oberstein, Staff Member, Bos - roN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
' See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, 11 2, 6 (West 1984).
2 See Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976) (abolishing interspousal
immunity in actions for negligence).
3 See Gahm v. Gahm, 243 Mass. 374, 376, 137 N.E. 876, 876 (1923).
See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). See also J. NOLAN, TORT Law, 37
Mass. PRACTICE SERIES § 121, at 189 (1979) ("The Court has not changed the traditional
immunity as to intentional torts. The spouses are not permitted to maintain actions for
personal torts against each other such as assault and battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, defamation and the like.")
5 399 Mass. 367, 371-72, 504 N.E.2d 617, 620 (1987).
"Id. at 372, 504 N.E.2d at 620.
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treatment of the law of interspousal immunity and its failure to
distinguish between the conversion claim and the other claims re-
flect a potential misunderstanding of the law. A close review of the
case law reveals that the interspousal immunity doctrine, absent
sufficient equitable considerations, may apply to the intentional
conversion of a spouse's personal property.
In Garrity, the plaintiff wife and the defendant husband were
the sole stockholders, directors and officers of a closely held cor-
poration.' The wife's complaint alleged that the husband failed to
pay her for her services to the corporation as an attorney; used
corporate assets and the wife's personal money to purchase rare
stamps, postcards, and artifacts; and refused to repay personal loans
to the wife!' For relief, the wife sought a conveyance of' property
from her husband to her, an accounting of the business ventures,
and dissolution of the dead-locked corporation. 9 The plaintiff based
her complaint on contract grounds, as well as intentional and neg-
ligent tort grounds, including fraud. 19
 The defendant asserted the
interspousal immunity defense against all but the contract claims
and attemped to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction" and for failure to state a claim on which relief' can be
granted.' 2
 The motion judge dismissed the action based on the
interspousal immunity defense.' 3
Upon review, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dis-
missed the claims for negligent: and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress before reaching the interspousal immunity issue"
because the complaint. failed to allege physical harm and outrageous
conduct.' 5
 The Court held the doctrine inapplicable to claims of
fraudulent conveyancing of property, violation of fiduciary duties
/d. at 370, 504 N.E.2d at 619.
"Id. at 370-71, 504 N. E.2d at 619.
"Id. at 368 n. I, 504 N.E.2d at 618 n.l.
The plaintiff based her complaint on "fraud and deceit, undue influence, conversion,
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, negligence, gross negligence, bad faith, con-
spiracy, intentional and negligent infliction of severe emotional distress, interference with
advantageous relationships, unfair competition, interference with prospective advantage and
investment opportunities and fraudulent conveyance." Id.
" MASS. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1): Garrity, 399 Mass. at 368, 504 N.E.2d at 619.
12 MASS. R. CR.. P. 12(6)(6); Garrity, 399 Mass. at 368, 504 N.E.2d at 619.
Garrity, 399 Mass. at 368, 504 N.E.2d at 619.
14 Id. at 369, 504 N.E.2d at 619. The Court, however, did mention that the only claims
in the complaint to which the doctrine of interspousal immunity applied were based on
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
' 5 Id. at 369-70, 504 N.E.2d at 619.
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relating to a trust, and conversion of personal property."' Referring
to each of the claims, including that. of conversion, the Court held
the interspousal immunity doctrine inapplicable because "rclourts
may hear and decide complaints to enforce trusts and to resolve
other conflicting property claims including those between husband
and wife.""
Although the Court properly held the doctrine inapplicable to
claims involving fraud, the Court erred in including the conversion
claim in its holding. The law clearly allows spouses to maintain suits
against one another based on contractual claims and actions con-
cerning fraud and the enforcement of trusts.'" The Court, however,
should have accorded separate treatment to the conversion claim.
Little direct support exists in the case law, absent sufficient equitable
consitlerations,w such as the existence of fraud, for holding the
defense of interspousal immunity inapplicable to the intentional
tort of conversion. Interspousal immunity should not apply to the
conversion claim in this case, however, because it arose out of cir-
cumstances that were equitable in nature, in essence, the fraudulent
dealings of the husband. Although the Court achieved this -result,
its analysis lacked precision and ,should have set out the foregoing
explanation.
First, the case law reveals that interspousal immunity still ap-
plies to the intentional tort of conversion. Neither the Massachusetts
legislature nor the Massachusetts judiciary has yet altered the tra-
ditional grant of interspousal immunity that the 1910 United States
Supreme Court case of Thompson v. Thompson maintained for inten-
tional torts. 2° The Thompson opinion clearly demonstrates that con-
version of a spouse's personal property comes within the immunity's
protection. The Thompson Court, although reviewing an assault and
battery claim, 2 ' declared that the immunity extends to claims con-
"Id. at 371-72, 501 N.E.2d a[ 020. The Court affirmed the motion judge's dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to set forth "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled In relief." Id. The Court permitted the
plaintiff to the an amended complaint. M.
17 Id. at 372, 504 N.E.2d at 020.
"See supra notes 1 and 3.
" See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
'10 218 U.S. 011, 617, 619 (1910). So' J. NOI.AN , OOMESTIC RELATIONS, MASS. PRACTICE
SERLEs § 121, at 189 (1979) ("The Court has not changed the traditional immunity as to
intentional torts. Mlle spouses are not permitted to maintain actions for personal torts against
each other such as assault and battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, defamation
and the like.").
21 Thompson, 2113 U.S. at 614.
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cerning injuries to personal property, as well as to injuries to the
person: it applies to "complaints for assault, slander and libel, and
alleged injuries to property of the one or the other . . . . "22 The Court
reasoned that if the law sanctioned interspousal intentional tort
claims, then litigants would burden the courts with frivolous do-
mestic disputes. 25 The Court maintained that spouses could not
bring such suits against one another "as though they were strang-
ers." 24
Although the Supreme Judical Court in the 1976 case of Lewis
v. Lewis swept away the traditional arguments in favor of the im-
munity — disruption of familial peace and harmony and the fear
of insurance fraud — the Court limited its holding to claims arising
out of motor vehicle accidents, and did not alter the application of
the doctrine to intentional torts. 25 The Court so limited its holding
because Icionduct, tortious between two strangers, may not be
tortious between spouses because of the mutual concessions implied
in the marital relationship . "26 Although in the 1980 case of Brown
v. Brown the Court extended Lewis to cover negligence suits for
personal injuries not arising out of motor vehicle accidents, 27 the
Court has not yet lifted the immunity as to intentional torts.
The Garrity Court stated that spouses may sue one another to
enforce trusts and to settle "other conflicting property claims." 28 It
follows that the Court understood the conversion claim to fall within
the scope of such property claims. A reading of Baxt v. Baxt2° and
Lombard v. Morse, 3° the cases upon which the Court relies, reveals
that early courts did not lift the immunity for the sake of property
interests alone, but, rather, allowed suits between spouses when
circumstances raised substantial equitable considerations.
In Baxt, the Supreme Judicial Court permitted the plaintiff to
sue her husband to enforce a trust containing the plaintiff's em-
ployment earnings.m Although this case supports the Garrity Court's
holding concerning the claim alleging fiduciary duty violations re-




 Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 630, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976).
m Id.
2" 381 Mass. 231, 232-33, 409 N.E.2d 717, 718-19 (1980).
2" 399 Mass. 367, 372, 509 N.E.2d al 620 (1987).
2`J
	 Mass. 762, 70 N.E.2d 799 (1946).
3" 155 Mass. 136, 29 N.E. 205 (1891).
21 320 Mass. at 762, 70 N.E.2d at 800.
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Wing to a trust, it does not support the removal of immunity as to
claims for conversion of property. In dicta, the Baxt Court noted
that the immunity did not apply to the establishment of "other
conflicting rights concerning property." 32 That conversion necessar-
ily falls within such conflicting rights, however, is not evident.
The Baxt Court cited to the 1923 case of Gahm v. Gahm" for
support for its proposition. The Supreme Judicial Court in Gahm
held that spouses may acquire jurisdiction in equity "to secure [the
wife] separate property, to prevent fraud, to relieve from coercion,
to enforce trusts and establish other conflicting rights concerning
property."s4 The Court stressed the importance attached to the
absence of equitable considerations and held that the immunity
applied. 35 Similarly, discussion of equitable considerations per-
meated the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in the Lombard case.
In Lombard, however, sufficient equitable considerations existed —
fraud — that prompted the Court to lift the immunity. In that case,
the plaintiff husband sued to recover property that he had conveyed
to his wife through his wife's alleged fraud before marriage." Thus,
to assume that any conflicting property interest, absent equitable
considerations, necessarily falls outside the immunity is to take a
judicial step beyond the holdings of Gahm, Baxt and Lombard.
Whether interspousal immunity should bar claims for conver-
sion of personal property remains a question that the courts must
answer by determining the extent to which the courts ought to
apply the policy considerations discussed in Lewis" to the intentional
tort of conversion. The Garrity Court failed to address this issue
properly. Although immunity should not shield the conversion
claim in the present case because of the surrounding "equitable
considerations," the Court's analysis does not reflect this reasoning.
Consequently, the holding in Garrity leaves the door open for zeal-
ous attorneys to argue against application of the interspousal im-
munity doctrine to conversion claims that lack sufficient equitable
considerations. The doctrine should become further limited as a
result of careful judicial scrutiny, rather than by the Garrity Court's
cursory treatment of the issue.
32 Id.
33 243 Mass. 374, 376, 137 N.E. at 876 (1923).
:t4
33 Id.
3" Lombard v. Lombard, 155 Mass. 136, 140, 29 N.E. 205, 205 (1981).
17 See supra notes 25 and 26 and accompanying text.
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D. *Current Trends In Defamation Law
The United States Supreme Court made clear in the landmark
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan its intention to protect the
media from the chilling effect of defamation suits where the media
makes a good faith attempt to cover events and persons of public
interest) In New York Times, the Court held that the Constitution
required the public officer plaintiff to establish by "convincing clar-
ity" that the defendant newspaper acted with "actual malice." 2 The
application of this standard to the media, although somewhat ef-
fective in limiting the number of suits brought, did not allay judicial
concerns about the effect of defamation suits upon editorial policy. 3
In order to further the policy of protecting the media's constitu-
tional right to report newsworthy events, courts have attempted to
clarify the use of summary judgment and conditional privileges in
defamation cases involving the media."
During the Selected Developments year, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court in King v. The Globe Newspaper Co. and Jones
v. Taibbi, helped define the roles of both summary judgment and
conditional privileges in media defaMation cases.5 In King, the
Court did not grant the defendant publication's motion for sum-
mary judgment." The Court found that the political plaintiff met
the burden of proving that a jury could find clear and convincing
evidence of defendant's malice.' The King Court, however, used a
test that generally promotes the use of summary judgment in def-
amation cases. In Jones, the Supreme Judicial Court held arat the
"fair report" privilege protected media coverage of an arrest, but
would not similarly protect the publication of unofficial statements
of police or others which directly or indirectly relate to a criminal
investigation. 8 The Jones decision thus defined some limitations on
* Daniel J. Rose, Staff Member, BosToN CoLLEGE LAW REviEw
' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-79 (1968); Louis, Summaryjudgment
and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 707
(1984) [hereinafter Actual Malice].
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
Actual Malice, supra note 1. at 708.
4 See infra notes 11-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the defamation cases
in which the Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court clarified the use of summary judgment
and conditional privileges.
5
 King v. The Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 512 N.E.2d 241 (1987); limes v.
Taibbi, 400 Mass. 786, 512 N.E.2d 260 (1987).
" King, 400 Mass. at 722. 512 N.E.2d at 251.
Id.
"Jones, 400 Mass. at 794-98, 512 N.E.2d at 266-67.
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privileges granted to the news media's coverage of newsworthy
events.9 King and Jones help to define the important relationship
between news coverage, which ,promotes open robust discussion,
and the need to protect the rights of individuals. Helping to clarify
the boundaries to this delicate relationship may deter future suits.
This is crucial because the very threat of a defamation suit may
have a chilling effect on the media due to high litigation costs.'°
1. Summary Judgment in Defamation Actions: King v. Boston
Globe Newspaper Co.
The United States Supreme Court's decision, in Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, will help protect the media from defamation suits." In Cel-
olex, the Supreme Court decided that a defendant moving for sum-
mary judgment need not produce evidence which negates the plain-
tiff's claim. 12 The defendant merely must indicate in his or her
motion that the plaintiff failed to establish an element essential to
the plaintiff's case.' 3 This test removes a significant burden from
the defendant and thus increaSes the likelihood that a court will
grant summary judgment. ' 4 Consequently, this test will aid motions
for summary judgment by media defendants.
Although not binding on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, Celotex did influence the Massachusetts high court. In King,
former governor Edward King argued that The Boston Globe de-
famed him by the publication of a series of cartoons and articles. 15
The lower court granted The Globe's motion for summary judgment
on all claims.'" The court found all but one of the written pieces
constitutionally protected expressions of opinion." Although the
court held that one article was a statement of fact and not a pro-
tected opinion, the court held that the statement failed to rise to
the level of defamation. 18
1' Id,
t" Actual Malice, 57 S. CAL. 1.. HEN. at 708.
n 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
12 Id. at :422-23.
13 id .
" See generally Actual Malice, supra note 1. at 714-18.
15 King v. The Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 706-07, 512 N.E.2d 241, 242-43
(1987).
I" Id. at 707, 512 N.E.2d at 243. The motion [or summary judgment was originally
denied by a juitlge in the Superior Court. Two years later, the court granted the judgment
timed within the 'ext. Id.
L7 Id .
I" Id.
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The King Court noted that the lower court improperly granted
summary judgment regarding the fact statement because there was
a genuine issue of fact as to whether the article's author acted with
actual malice. 19 In making this determination, the King Court ap-
plied a summary judgment test which placed a large burden on the
plaintiff (the party opposing the motion), while also giving notice
that it might reduce the defendant's burden of producing evidence
for its motion. 20
The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure govern summary
judgment procedures and mandate that a court grant summary
judgment only where no issue of material fact exists. 2 ' The Supreme
Judicial Court requires that the plaintiff in opposing a motion of
summary judgment meet the substantive evidentiary standard of
proof applicable at trial. 22
 Thus, the King Court required King to
produce material from which a jury could infer the existence of
clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. 23 The Court found,
however, that King satisfied this heavy burden of proof and there-
fore denied summary judgment, remanding the case to the superior
court. 24
The Supreme Judicial Court went further in protecting the
news media by intimating that it might adopt the Celotex standard,
which would ease the proof required to obtain summary judg-
ment. 25
 Under current law, Massachusetts courts require a defen-
dant moving for summary judgment to produce evidence to show
that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. 26 A defendant
" Id. at 718-22, 512 N.E.2d at 249-51. The lower court did not reach this issue because
they decided that the statement was not susceptible to a defamatory meaning. Id.
" Id. at 719, 512 N.E.2d at 249.
2 ' MASS 12. Civ. P. § 56(c) states in pertinent part: "[tihe judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material ram
xs See, e.g.. King, 400 Mass. at 719, 512 N.E.2d at 249; Godbout v. Cousens, 396 Mass.
254, 258-59, 485 N.E.2d 940, 943 (1985). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 277-79 (1968). The Supreme Court required plaintiff to prove at trial, with convincing
clarity, that the media acted with actual malice. Id.
"King, 400 Mass. at 719-22, 512 N.E.2d at 249-51.
2' Id. at 722, 512 N.E.2d at 251.
'5 Id. at 719, 512 N.E.2d at 249. See also Jones v. Taibbi, 400 Mass. 786, 805 n.3, 512
N.E.2d 260, 272 n.3 (1987) (Abrams, J., concurring). In referring to the new rule, Justice
Abrams noted: "1 believe that in ruling on the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
the judge should ... place on the plaintiff a somewhat greater burden because the plaintiff
has the burclerCof proof on the issue of fault and opposes the motion. Id.
26 Nat'l Ass'n or Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220,
231, 396 N.E.2d 996, 1003 (1979) (Court noted that "the defendant was required to establish




may not simply move for summary judgment, but must produce
evidence, usually in the form of affidavits, negating the plaintiff's
claim and indicating that no genuine issue exists as to a material
fact. 27
The King Court, in deciding whether the Boston Globe met their
burden of proving the articles were written without malice, dis-
cussed both the Massachusetts test and the recent Supreme Court
test. 28 Under the Celotex test, The Boston Globe need only state that
the plaintiff did not prove malice. 2" The Court concluded, however,
that even if it required The Globe to meet this lighter burden, the
material before the judge in this case demonstrated that a jury could
conclude that clear and convincing evidence of actual malice ex-
isted.st' Although the King Court discussed the Celotex test, the Court
did not adopt it." The Court's discussion, and its comments in
recent cases indicate that it may soon adopt this test. 52
Thus, although it denied summary judgment, the burden the
Supreme Judicial Court required of both parties in King procedur-
ally favors the use of summary judgment for media coverage of
public events or figures. li the court adopts the Celotex standard,
summary judgment will become' even easier for a defendant such
as the Boston Globe. The King case is therefore in keeping with the
general trend of protecting the media from the chilling effects of
defamation suits."
2. Fair Report Privilege: Jones v. Taibbi
In Jones v. Taibbi, the Supreme judicial Court defined the use
of the "fair report" privilege afforded the media in their coverage
of public events." The fair report privilege is a product of the
common law and originally protected the publishing of "reports of
judicial, legislature, or other official proceedings!" 35 Currently, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the rule to include the re-
27
 Id, at 231, 396 N.E.2d at 1001
" King v. The Globe Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 719, 512 N.E.2d 241, 249 (1997).
29 Id.
3" Id. at 719-22, 512 N.E.2d at '299-51.
31 Id. at. 719, 512 N,E..2d at 299, The Court noted that "even applying" the Celotex Corp.
standard, the defendant. did not meet the summary . judgrnent burden. Id. The Court went
no further in adopting the Celotex test than the " even applying" language. Id.
" See supra note 25.
33 Actual Malice, supra note 1, at 709-10.
3{ loses V. Taihbi, -100 Mass. 796, 512 N.E.2d '260 (1997).
7.5
	 at 799, 512 N.E.2d at 266.
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porting of official actions or proceedings or of meetings open to
the public." The Court in Jones used the Restatement's formulation
of the privilege to support its holding."'
In Jones, the defendant news station reported on a police in-
vestigation which culminated in the arrest of the plaintiff, who was
later released uncharged.'" Among other claims, the plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant inaccurately stated that the police had
charged him with murder." The plaintiff also argued that the de-
fendant's use of statements made by witnesses and by police re-
porting witnesses' statements were defamatory." The defendant
argued that the reporting of all these statements fell within the fair
report privilege and therefore, the court should grant its motion
for summary judgment:" -
The Supreme Judicial Court adopted the Restatement view in
holding that the fair report privilege encompassed the defendant's
erroneous report of the arrest:r2 The Court held that a substantially
accurate report of an official arrest receives protection.''; Although
the police had charged the plaintiff, as the defendant. had stated,
the Court held that the overall report of the plaintiff's arrest was
"not substantially inaccurate."'" Utilizing a test under which a report
of an official arrest is privileged if it is not "substantially inaccurate"
gives much discretion to the media's coverage of such events.
The Jones Court further defined the fair report privilege by
holding that unofficial statements made by police fall outside the
scope of the privilege." The Court held that statements which the
defendants received from the police and republished are only priv-
ileged if the police statements are considered official." The Court
did not, however, define what type of statements are "official," and
held that it lacked sufficient evidence to decide if these particular
statements were official:17 Justice Abrams, in her concurring opin-
ion, noted that the developing law suggested that statements made
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977).
37 lones, 400 Mass. at 794-97,512 N.E.2d at 266-67.
3K N. at 787-88,512 N.E.2c1 at 262.
" Id. at 792-93,512 N.E.2d at 265.
Id,
4 ' Id. at 794-95,512 N.E.2d at 266-67.
12 /d. at 795-96,512 N.E.2d at 266-67.
11
' 4 Id. at 795,512 N.E.2d at '266.
"Jones, 400 Mass. at 796,512 N.E.2d at 267.
"hi. at 796-97,512 N.E.2d at 267.
17 •14. at 802,512 N.E.2d at 270.
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by officials at a press conference which relate to an investigation
leading to a subsequent arrest constitute official statements." Thus,
the Court noted that the statements presented inpmes might receive
protection if made at a press conference.'" Finally, the Court de-
cided that the defendant's publication of the witnesses' own views
clearly exceeded the privilege because such witnesses are unofficial
so u rces. 5"
The Jones Court's ruling that unofficial police reports fall out-
side the scope of the lair report privilege helped to clarify the scope
of the protections afforded to the media's coverage of news events.
The issue as to what constitutes an official statement must still be
resolved. If the Court adopts Justice Abrams' view concerning state-
ments made at press conferences, the Court will need to define the
parameters of the term "press conference." Additionally, the Court
stretched the Restatement's definition of the fair and accurate re-
porting requirement to a less demanding standard of "not substan-
tially inaccurate."'' This change may significantly ease the burden
faced by the media in their coverage of public events.
Ensuring the robust discussion of events necessitates the need
to protect the media's coverage of events. The news media has faced
more suits and have had to pay more damages in this decade than
in the past. 52 Because of this increase in litigation, courts must make
clear the burdens of proof required of each party in a summary
judgment hearing. During this Selected Developments year, the Su-
preme Judicial Court addressed the important issue of summary
judgment and conditional privileges in defamation litigation."
The Supreme judicial Court's holding in King, including the
intimation that the court may apply the Celotex standard, greatly
adds to the protection afforded the media's coverage of public
events. The court's holding in Jones helped to define when the media
falls within the "fair report" privilege. The court, however, must
further clarify the parameters of this privilege. Thus, although
' 1 ' id. at 803-04, 512 N.E.2d at 271 (Abrams, J., concurring). justice Abrams noted that
"tile developing law appears to be that statements made at a press conference by law en-
hat:einem officials relating to an arrest and the investigations Forming the basis of the arrest
should be considered official statements and therefore should fall within the fair report
privilege." Id.
49 Id.
"Id. at 797. 802, 512 N.E.2d at '267, 270.
51 Id. at 795, 512 N.E.2d at 266.
52 N.Y. Times, March 11, 1988, at L- 11, The Law, The Verdlel is Libel, and the Trend is Up.
" Jones v. Taibbi, 400 Mass 78(1, 512 N.E.2d 260 (1987); King v, Roston Newspaper Co.,
400 Mass. 705, 512 N.E.2d 241 (1987).
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these cases shed some light on this important area there are many
questions left unanswered. The trend towards a liberal use of sum-
mary judgment as well as the use of conditional privileges to protect
the media will likely continue.
E. *Recent Developments in Strict Liability and Products Liability
Actions
In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, actions commenced
under the rubric of strict/products liability usually originate via a
statutory cause of action.' Unlike many jurisdictions that follow the
strict tort liability approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
Section 402A, 2 Massachusetts follows the breach of implied war-
ranty of met chantability approach in products liability actions. 3 Al-
,
* Paul A. Nappi, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
See, e.g.., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 106, § 2-314 (West 1958) (goods sold by a merchant
carry an implied warranty of merchantability if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West Supp. 1988) (legislature abolished
requirement of privity in breach of warranty action); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 106, § 2-
318 (West Supp. 1988) (suppliers of goods cannot limit the operation of 2-318 by contract);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West Supp. 1988) (merchants may not disclaim
the implied warranty of merchantability). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . I 1 1, § 199 (West
Supp. 1988) (imposes liability on a landlord for failure to remove lead-based paint chips
from a premises accessible to children under six years of age).
2
 See SIEA•O, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 9 7.02121 (1987). Restatement (Second)
Section 402A, demonstrating the strict tort liability theory in products liability actions, reads
in pertinent part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his [her) product, and
(h) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Many jurisdictions follow the strict tort liability approach of the Restatement. See, e.g.,
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 162 W. Va. 857, 253 S.E.2d 666 (1979) (court
adopted Restatement (Second) § 402A approach); Temple v. Wean United Inc., 50 Ohio
St.2d 317. 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977) (adopted Restatement (Second) § 402A); Phipps v. General
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976) (adopted Restatement (Second) § 402A);
Zaleskie v. Joyce, 333 A.2d 110 (Vt. 1975) (adopted Restatement (Second) § 402A); 1-leavner
v. Uniroyal. Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973) (follows strict tort liability approach);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973) (follows the strict
tort liability approach).
' See Back v. Wickes, 375 Mass. 633, 639, 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (1978).
March 1989]	 SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS 	 715
though this theory of recovery differs superficially from the ap-
proach utilized in other jurisdictions, the Massachusetts approach
is "nearly congruent" in most respects with jurisdictions following
the more modern strict tort liability approach embodied by Section
402A.'1
During the Selected Developments year of 1987, decisions in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts have clarified and extended the
law in strict/products liability actions.' In a products liability case,
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld a jury's verdict
allowing an injured plaintiff to recover notwithstanding the plain-
tiff's failure to produce evidence on two of the five factors essential
to a jury's determination of a design defect. 0 In an action alleging
a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the Massachu-
setts Appeals Court held that the plaintiff must demonstrate that
the defect created a condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer in order to surmount the proximate cause hurdle.' If
the defect only indirectly triggered the injury, the plaintiff will
probably be denied recovery. 8 Finally, the Supreme Judicial Court
imposed strict liability on a landlord who failed to comply with the
statutory command to remove lead-based paint from premises in
which the paint was accessible to children under six years of age,
notwithstanding the landlord's ignorance of the dangerous condi-
tion."
4 /d. at 640, 378 N.E.2d at 960.
See Marchant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 836 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1988); Barry v. Stop
& Shop Cos., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 507 N.E.2d 1062 (1987); Bencosme v. Kokoras, 400
Mass. 40, 507 N.E.2d 748 (1987).
In addition to these cases addressing substantive issues, the Supreme judicial Court
delivered a decision affecting proceddral issues associated with an action based on the breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability. In Goviet v. Whitin Machine Works, inc., 399 Mass.
547, 506 N.E.2d 95 (1987), the Court held that. the plaintiffs' claim alleging negligent design
on behalf of the manufacturer was broad enough to encompass•the less rigorous breach of
implied warranty of merchantability claim. Id. at 550-51, 506 N.E.2d at 98. The Court noted
that the trial judge erred in denying the plaintiff's' leave to amend their complaint to add
the breach of warranty couni because the allegation of negligent design framed in the
pleadings implicitly alleged a breach of implied warranty of merchantability and, therefore,
the addition of Ibe warranty claim to the complaint would be only a mere formality. Id. at
551, 506 N.E.2d at 98. Given the liberal policy towards allowing plaintiffs leave to amend
their complaints, the Court held that the Motion judge improperly denied the plaintiffs'
request to amend their complaint to encompass the breach of implied warranty of merchant-
ability claims. Id. at 551-52, 506 N.E.2d at 98-99.
"See Marchant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 836 F.2d 695, 699-700 (1st Cir. 1988).
Barry v. Stop & Shop Cos., '24 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 507 N.E.2d 1062 (1987).
See id. at 226-28, 507 N.E.2d at 1063-64.
Bencustne v. Kokoras, 400 Mass. 40, 41, 507 N.E.2d 748, 749 (1987).
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1. Plaintiff's Burden of Proof in a Products Liability Action:
Marchant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co.
In the 1988 case of Marchant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co.,'°
argued during the Selected Developments year, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit addressed the issue of the plaintiff's burden of
proof in maintaining a successful products liability action." The
court applied Massachusetts law and held that the plaintiff's failure
to introduce evidence on the feasibility and costs of an alternative
design did not bar the plaintiff's right to recover for his injuries.' 2
The circuit court clarified an earlier Supreme Judicial Court deci-
sion delineating the types of evidence that plaintiffs may submit in
proving a design defect." The court interpreted the earlier decision
as demonstrating the types of evidence that plaintiffs may submit in
actions based on design defects, rather than conditioning the plain-
tiff's recovery on producing enough evidence to satisfy each "re-
quirement."' 4
The Marchant plaintiff, an employee of J & P Trucking Com-
pany, had been seriously injured when a tire he was replacing
exploded while he was inflating it." Commencing a breach of war-
ranty products liability action against the tire manufacturer, the
plaintiff claimed that an alleged design defect in the "bead" of the
tire triggered the explosion." In challenging the design of the bead,
the plaintiff introduced evidence of an alternative design used by
Michelin, a French manufacturer, that would have enhanced the
tire's strength." Although the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the
existence of the Michelin design in 1973, the year of the "faulty"
tire's manufacture, the plaintiff did demonstrate the simplicity of
the alternative design, suggesting that it had been mechanically
feasible prior to its actual development." As an alternative, the
plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer failed to properly warn of
the maximum air pressure that the tire could withstand before
exploding.I 9
1 " 836 F.2d 695,699-700 (1st Cir. 1988).
" See id, at 698-700.








1 " Id. at 698.
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After hearing all of the evidence, the jury delivered a• favorable
verdict: for the plaintiff. The district: court, however, granted the
defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
because the plaintiff failed to introduce evidence as to the costs and
consequences of an alternative design. 2" In so ruling, the court
applied the earlier Supreme Judicial Court decision in Back v.
Wickes. 21 The Back decision clarified the essential factors that a jury
must consider in reaching a verdict in a products liability action
based on design defect. 22 According to the Back Court, a jury must
consider the following five factors: (1) the gravity of the danger
posed by the challenged design; (2) the likelihood that such danger
would occur; (3) the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative
design; (4) the financial cost. of an improved design; (5) the adverse
consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result
front an alternative design. 2" The district court stated that it granted
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiff
failed to produce evidence on the last two factors, which comprise
the cost/benefit analysis of the jury's decision. 24 The district court
interpreted Back v. Wickes to require a plaintiff to satisfy all five
components before a jury could properly find for the plaintiff. 25
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the district
court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict and ordered
reinstatement of the jury verdict for the plaintiff. 2" In rejecting the
action of the district court, the circuit court held that the district
court improperly applied the Back v. Wickes factors. 27 The circuit
2" Id. at 698, 699.
21 H. at 698-99 (citing Back v. Wickes, 375 Mass. 633, 642, 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (1978)).
22 Back, 375 Mass. at 642-43, 378 N.E.2d at 970.
" Id. at 642, 378 N.E.2d at 970. The Supreme Judicial Court, in Back, held that
In deciding this issue, the jury must weigh competing factors much as they
would in determining the fault of the defendant in a negligence case. The
inquiry focuses on product characteristics rather than on the defendant's con-
(ilia, but the nature of the decision is essentially the same , • In evaluating
the adequacy of a product's design, the jury should consider, among other
Factors, "the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood
that such danger would occur, the mechanical Feasibility of a safer alternative
design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences
to the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative
design."
Id. (citing Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237, 573 1).2d
443, 455 (1978)).
24 MarChani, 836 17.2d al 699.
25 Sec id.
2" id. at 700.
27 Id. at 699-700.
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court noted that the issue in Back involved introducing evidence of
trade practices at the time of manufacture of the allegedly defective
product in order to demonstrate the existence of a design defect in
light of safer alternatives. 28
 The circuit court, however, held that
the plaintiff's failure to address the last two factors delineated in
Back did not severely undermine the plaintiff's case. 29
 Instead, these
factors, according to the circuit court, demonstrated the types of
evidence that injured plaintiffs may introduce in order to prove
that a product suffers from a design defect." Thus, the circuit court
held that the district court improperly interpreted Back in requiring
the plaintiff to produce evidence on all five factors.'"
In addition, the circuit court held that the district court's de-
cision conflicted with earlier decisions recognizing the right of a
jury to determine the reasonableness of a design based on its own
lay understanding. 32 In Smith v. Ariens" and doCanto v. Ametek, Inc.,"
the Supreme Judicial Court held that a plaintiff need not always
introduce expert testimony in order to prove a design defect. 35 In
some cases, according to the Court, a jury can properly determine
the reasonableness of the design using only its lay knowledge and
understanding." Thus, given the disposition of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court in these cases, the circuit court held that the plaintiff's
failure to introduce evidence as to the feasibility and efficiency of
safer alternatives did not undermine the plaintiff's case and inval-
idate the favorable jury verdict. 37
In addressing the issue of the failure of the manufacturer to
provide a proper warning, the circuit court held that the plaintiff
provided sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict that the
manufacturer failed to supply warnings that would adequately
guard against foreseeable dangers associated with the use of the
product's In so ruling, the circuit court again rejected the district
court's reasoning that the plaintiff's failure to introduce evidence
25 Id.
74 Id. at 700.
" Id. at 699-700.
3 ' See id.
52 Id. at 700.
55 375 Mass. 620,377 N.E.2d 954 (1978).
" 367 Mass. 776, 328 N.E.2d 873 (1975).
5 ' Smith, 375 Mass. at 625, 377 N.E.2d at 957; daCanto, 367 Mass. at 782-83,328 N.E.2d
at 877.
' 7 See Marchant, 836 1.2d at 700.
" Id. at 701-02.
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focusing on the "trade-offs," or cost/benefit analysis for providing
more specific warnings, invalidated the jury's verdict in favor of the
plaintiff." The circuit court recognized that a lay jury could rea-
sonably determine the adequacy of the warnings despite the lack of
evidence as to the costs and benefits of providing more effective
warnings to the foreseeable consumer. 4° As a result, the circuit court
held that the evidence introduced at trial supported the jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiff on the count based on a failure to warn,
and therefore, the court reinstated that verdict imposing liability on
the manufacturer. 4 '
Marchant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. clarifies the state of prod-
ucts liability law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Although
earlier cases such as Back v. Wickes described the essential consid-
erations in the jurors' deliberation on claims of design defects, 42 the
Marchant case demonstrates that these elements do not impose ev-
identiary requirements on plaintiffs." Instead, the Marchant court
recognized that the deliberation process is more complex and in-
volves a balancing of the five factors in order to resolve the issues
as to the design defect." Marchant further suggests that, in balancing
these factors, a jury may rely on its own lay knowledge in order to
determine if a product had been defectively designed." Thus, a
strong case presented by a plaintiff ought not be denied recovery
simply because the plaintiff has failed to introduce evidence reflect-
ing the feasibility of alternative designs.
Although the Marchant case does not introduce new elements
into the practice of products liability law, it clarifies the scope of the
plaintiff's burden in proving a design defect.'" Marchant reconciles
the decisions in Back v. Wickes and Smith v. Ariens by recognizing the
importance of the five factors supporting a design defect, but also
noting that a jury, in certain circumstances, can rely on its own lay
knowledge to determine if a product has been defectively de-
signed. 47 Marchant, therefore, prevents defendants from applying
the Back decision so as to preclude a plaintiff's recovery by claiming





Mass. 633,642,378 N.E.2d 964,970 (1978).





16 Sec id. at 699-700.
47
 See id. at 700.
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that the five factors presented in Back create evidentiary "hurdles"
that a plaintiff must clear in order to obtain a favorable jury verdict
in a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability action.
2. Unreasonably Dangerous Defects: Barry v. stop & Shop Cos.
Plaintiffs seeking to impose strict liability on retailers or man-
ufacturers for injuries sustained in the course of using a particular
product. can proceed on at least one of two possible grounds." One
means of establishing liability focuses on a failure to warn a fore- ,
seeable consumer of a dangerous condition associated with the use
of the product. 4 • The second ground, addressed in a recent Mas-
sachusetts Appeals Court decision, involves demonstrating that the
manufacturer designed the product defectively, and as a result, the
defect created an unreasonably dangerous condition for the con-
sumer. 5°
In the 1987 decision of Barry v. stop and Shop Cos., the Mâssa-
chusetts Appeals Court addressed the issue of unreasonably dan-
gerous defects leading to injuries to consumers. 51 The Appeals
Court affirmed the trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding
the verdict! The lower court's ruling denied recovery to a plaintiff
who failed to demonstrate that a product's design defect created an
unreasonably dangerous condition for the user or consumer when
the injuries resulted from the plaintiff's unreasonable actions in
attempting to remedy the clef'ect. 53 The Appeals Court applied cau-
sation principles in holding that the plaintiff's unreasonable re-
sponse to the design defect proximately caused her injuries.`''' Thus,
the Appeals Court hinged a plaintiff's recovery in a products lia-
bility action on proving successfully that the challenged design de-
fect created an unreasonably dangerous condition for the user or
consumer. 55
In Burly, the plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of attempting
to adjust the curved metal piece on the underside of a lawnmower,
48 See Marchant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 836 E.2d 695, 698 (1st Cir. 1988).
-19 Id.
5" See Barry v. Stop & Shop Cos., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 226-27, 507 N.E.2d 1062,
1063-64 (1987).
'" Id,
52 Id. at 226-27, 230, 507 N.E.2d at 1063-64, 1066.
33 Id.
34
 Id. at 228-30,507 N.E.2d at 1064-66.
55 See id, at 226-27, 507 N.E.2d 1063-64.
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known as the "baffle."" The first few times she attempted to adjust
the loose baffle, the plaintiff turned off the lawnmower." During
her last attempt, however, the plaintiff failed to turn off the lawn-
mower when she reached down to fix the baffle and, as a result,
severely injured her hand in the blades of the lawnmower."
In her suit against the retailer, .Stop & Shop Companies, and
the manufacturer, Wheeling Manufacturing Company, the plaintiff
alleged a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability for her
injuries arising from the dangerous condition created by the defec-
tive baffle.• The plaintiff claimed that. an alternative design would
have held the baffle in place, precluding the need for her to re-
peatedly adjust the baffle in the course of using the lawnmower. 6°
Thus, the plaintiff claimed that. the defective baffle proximately
caused her injuries because, absent the defect, the plaintiff had no
reason to reach under the lawnmower.t"
The Appeals Court ruled that the defect in the attachment of
the baffle did not create an unreasonably dangerous condition to
the user or consumer." 2 While the baffle may have been defectively
attached to the deck of the mower, the court maintained, the plain-
tiff sustained her injuries not as a direct result of the faulty baffle
attachment, but instead, as an indirect result of reaching down to
adjust the baffle during the lawnmower's operation.° The lawn-
mower itself' contained warnings advising users not to place their
hands anywhere near the blade." As a result, the Barry court ob-
served that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in confronting a moving
blade in light of the warnings,65 and therefore, the defect in the
attachment of the baffle did not amount to sufficient proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries to warrant imposing liability on the
retailer. 66
Barry demonstrates that a product can have a defective design,
yet still not result in the imposition of liability on the retailer or
manufacturer. The key to determining liability when dealing with
66. Id. at 225, 507 N.E.2d at 1063.
67 Id.
"Id. at 225-26, 507 N.E.2d at 1063.
" Id. at 224, 507 N.E.2d at 1062-63.
6" Id. at 226-27, 507 N.E.2d at 1064.
"' hi. at 229 n.11, 507 N.E.2d at 1065 n.11.
6, Id. at 227, 507 N.E.2d at 1064.
63 Id. at 227, 230, 507 N.E.2d at 1064, 1065-66.
64 hi. at 227 11.8, 507 N.E.2d at 1064 n.8.
63 Id. at 230, 507 N.E.2d at 1065-66.
6" Id. at 229-30, 507 N.E.2d at 1065-66.
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design defects lies in the condition created by the defects' If the
design defect creates a condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer, then liability will be imposed. If however, the
defect, as in Barry, only remotely or indirectly results in injury to
the plaintiff, then liability will not be imposed on the retailer or
manufacturer. Although the defect may have been the sine qua non,
or cause in fact of the injury, Barry indicates that the plaintiff must
prove that the defect, in and of itself, created the dangerous con-
dition to the user or consumer, and not merely that the defect
triggered a chain of events culminating in injury to the plaintiff. 68
Barry recognizes a distinction between reasonable design defects
and design defects creating an unreasonably dangerous condition
for the user or consumer. By requiring a plaintiff not only to
demonstrate the existence of a design defect, but also to prove that
the defect itself proximately caused the injuries, the Barry court may
be allowing the contributory negligence defense to resurface in an
inconspicuous fashion. Although contributory negligence fails to
bar a plaintiff's recovery in strict liability actions, 69 theories of cau-
sation focusing on the "reasonableness" of design defects provide a
viable defense to retailers and manufacturers. Thus, Barry presents
another example of a court sidestepping the bar to the contributory
negligence defense by precluding recovery for plaintiffs acting un-
reasonably in response to a known product defect.
67 See id. at 226, 507 N.E.2d at 1063.
" See id. at 227, 507 N.E.2d at 1064.
69 See Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co., 398 Mass. 32, 494 N.E.2d 1324 (1986) (Supreme judicial
Court applied the assumption of the risk defense by recognizing an "unreasonable use" of a
dangerously defective product by a plaintiff who is aware of the defect as a valid defense to
a personal injury claim based on an alleged breach of implied warranty of merchantability
action); see also Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033
(1983) (Supreme Judicial Court held that contributory negligence is not an available defense
in breach of warranty actions based on strict liability).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toicrs § 402A comment n (1965). Comment n to the
Restatements (Second) of Torts reads in pertinent part:
n. Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this Section deals is
not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to
strict liability cases ... applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a
defense when such negligence consists merely of a failure to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other
hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes
under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in
other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and
is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of
the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
Id.
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3. Strict Liability Developments in Landlord-Tenant Law:
Bencosme v. Kokoras
In addition to developments in products liability, the Massa-
chusetts judiciary has also applied strict liability theories to the
evolving relationship between landlords and tenants. In the 1987
decision of Bencosme v. Kokoras, 7 " the Supreme Judicial Court inter-
preted Massachusetts General Laws chapter 111, section 199, to
impose strict liability on landlords who fail to remove paint, plaster
and other materials accessible to children under six years of age in
accordance with section 197. 71 In so ruling, the Court rejected the
requirement that the landlord know of the dangerous condition,
thus holding landlords strictly liable for injuries caused by those
conditions. 72
The plaintiffs, two small children under six years of age, had
ingested the lead paint chips that the landlord failed to remove
from their apartment building in violation of section 197. 73 The
trial court interpreted section 199 to impose strict liablility on the
400 Mass. 40, 507 N.E.2d 748 (1987).
7 ' Id. at 41, 507 N.E2d at 749. The Bencosme Court based its decision on Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 11 I, section 199, which reads in pertinent part:
The owner of any residential property shall be liable for all damages caused
by his failure to perform the duties required of him pursuant to subsection (a)
of section one hundred and ninety-six or section one hundred and ninety-seven.
The owner of any residential property who is notified of a dangerous level
of lead in paint, plaster or other material present upon his premises pursuant
to section one hundred and ninety-four, and who does riot satisfactorily correct
or remove said dangerous conditions shall in addition to the provisions of the
preceding paragraph be subject to punitive damages, which shall be tre-
ble[triple] the actual damages found.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch." 111, § 199 (West 1983), amended by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch .
1 1 1, § 199 (West Supp. 1988). The amended version of section 199 now reads as follows:
[T]tle owner of any residential premises shall be liable for all damages
caused by his failure to comply with the provisions of subsection (c) of section one
hundred and ninety-four A, subsection (a) of section one hundred and ninety-six,
or section one hundred and ninety-seven. The owner of any residential premises
who is notified of a dangerous level or lead in paint, plaster, soil or other material
present upon his premises pursuant to section one hundred and ninety-four,
and who does not satisfactorily correct or remove said dangerous conditions
shall in addition to the provisions of the preceding paragraph be subject to
punitive damages, which shall be treble the actual damages •found. The remedy
provided by this section is not exclusive and supplements any existing statutory or common
law cause of action. No bank, lending institution, mortgage company or mortgagee, except
where such mortgage[e] takes actual possession pursuant to applicable law, shall be liable
in any action brought under this section.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I 1 I, § 199 (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
72 fiencosme, 400 Mass. at 43-44, 507 N.E.2d at 750.
" Id. at 42, 507 N.E.2d at 750.
724	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:601
landlord. 74 Therefore, the court allowed the plaintiffs to recover
for their injuries despite the landlord's absence of fault or knowl-
edge of the dangerous condition. 75
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower
court's decision and held that the statute imposes strict liability on
landlords for failure to abate the dangerous conditions in areas
accessible to children under six years of age. 76 In so ruling, the
Court noted that section 199 imposes greater liability in the form
of punitive damages on landlords who have knowledge of the dari-
gerous conditions but fail to abate them." Because section 199
provided greater compensation in the case of a landlord who knew
of the danger, the Court reasoned that the legislature intended to
impose strict liability on the landlords for failure to remove lead
paint even if those landlords failed to realize that a dangerous
condition existed. 78
Bencosme provides a clear example of judicial interpretation of
ambiguous provisions contained in legislative enactments. The Su-
preme Judicial Court focused on the provisions imposing punitive
damages on landlords when they knew of a dangerous condition in
order to support its ruling that the general provisions of section
199 impose strict liability on landlords rather than a standard akin
to negligence. 7tt Such a determination fits within the scheme of the
continually evolving landlord-tenant relationship in which courts
have, in more recent years, recognized the gross inequality in the
"bargaining" relationship between the landlord and the tenants. 80
The Bencosme case "encourages" landlords to remedy dangerous
conditions as soon as practicable by removing the requirement of
knowledge, thus eliminating a possible loophole for absentee land-
74 See id. at 41, 507 N.E.2d at 749-50.
75 Id.
7 ' Id. at 43, 507 N.E.2d at 750.
" Id. at 43-44, 507 N.E.2d at 750.
78 Id.
79 Id.
'1" See Javins v. First National Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (court rejected
common law property principles viewing the landlord-tenant relationship as one based on
an interest in land, in holding that the landlord-tenant relationship revolves around a contract
that carries an implied warranty of habitability that the premises be fit for dwelling purposes).
See also Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196, 396 N.E.2d 981 (1979) (Supreme
Judicial Court held that landlords do not have a reasonable time to repair a defect rendering
the premises uninhabitable before the tenant may abate the rent); Boston Housing Authority
v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973) (Supreme Judicial Court adopted the
view set out in the /twins case in holding that a lease agreement carries an implied warranty
of habitability).
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lords who are quite unfamiliar with the condition of the premises
that they lease.
IV. SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
During the Selected Developments year, the Supreme judicial
Court and the Appellate Tax Board addressed a number of contro-
versial tax issues dealing with issues ranging from the tax conse-
quences of liquidations of corporate subsidiaries and the deduction
of gambling losses, to matters relating to the taxation of foreign
corporations. In addressing the tax consequences of liquidations of
corporate subsidiaries, the Supreme Judicial Court granted favor-
able treatment to corporations with corporate subsidiaries by treat-
ing dividends received after liquidations of those subsidiaries as
non-taxable dividends. In matters relating to gambling, the Appel-
late Tax Board adopted a "facts and circumstances" analysis to deny
a taxpayer-gambler the right to deduct gambling losses where his
activities failed to rise to the level of a trade or business.
In addition to these tax issues, the Court and the Board decided
a number of cases which have significant consequences on foreign
corporations doing business in the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts. The Appellate Tax Board granted favorable treatment to
affiliated corporations by allowing these corporations to combine
their incomes and losses before apportioning the total net income
to the states in which the corporations conduct business. The Mas-
sachusetts Legislature, realizing that the Board's decision dimin-
ished significant revenues for the Commonwealth, amended chap-
ter 63, section 32B, which in effect reversed the Board's decision
by requiring affiliated corporations to apportion their incomes to
the states before combining these incomes to produce a total net
income.
In other cases, the Supreme judicial Court treated "hybrid"
corporations, which are corporations with both utility and non-
utility characteristics, as utility corporations for tax purposes,
thereby denying these corporations the benefit of deductions avail-
able to non-utility, business corporations. The Appellate Tax Board,
focusing on the statutory framework for apportioning income, is-
sued a decision prohibiting foreign corporations from relying on
the Commissioner of Revenue's past practices in determining
whether a statutory alternative for apportioning income is available
to.these foreign corporations. Instead, the corporations must satisfy
the burden of demonstrating that the statutory framework does not
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reasonably approximate the corporation's net income allocable to
Massachusetts for each tax year before receiving the benefit of an
alternative statutory method of apportionment. Finally, in tax mat-
ters relating to domestic international sales corporations (DISCs),
the Appellate Tax Board broadly interpreted Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws chapter 63, section 38G, to require a corporation to
include the income of its wholly-owned DISC when the tax years of
both the parent and the subsidiary end concurrently, notwithstand-
ing the statutory language requiring inclusion only when the DISC's
tax year ends immediately after the parent corporation's tax year.
A. *Distributions from Liquidation of Corporate Subsidiaries:
Commissioner of Revenue v. Northeast Petroleum Corp.
The Supreme Judicial Court in the 1984 decision of Commis-
sioner of Revenue v. Shafner' held that distributions following liqui-
dation of a corporate trust should be treated as dividends, and there-
fore excluded from taxable income under Massachusetts General
Laws chapter 62, section 2(a)(2)(D). 2
 During the Selected Developments
year, the Supreme Judicial Court in the 1987 decision of Commis-
sioner of Revenue v. Northeast Petroleum Corporation, 3 applied its earlier
Shafner decision in finding that a distribution following liquidation
of a fifty-percent owned corporate subsidiary should also be treated
as a dividend, and exempt from taxable income under Massachu-
setts General Laws chapter 63, section 38(a)(1). 4
In Northeast Petroleum, Northeast Petroleum, a Massachusetts
corporation, entered into a joint venture with Ingram Corporation,
a foreign corporation, to build a petroleum refinery in Louisiana. 5
Northeast and Ingram formed a separate corporation, Energy, each
taking a fifty percent interest. 6
 Energy, in turn, formed a wholly-
owned subsidiary, ECOL, Ltd, a Louisiana corporation, which
sought to purchase a refinery site and construct a refinery.' ECOL's
only asset consisted of its stock, which Energy subsequently sold to
* John R. Caterini, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REV1EIA'
392 Mass. 256, 465 N.E.2d 788 (1984).
2 1d. at 260, 465 N.E.2d at 791; see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 62, 2(a)(2)(0) (1986).
'401 Mass. 44, 514 N.E.2d 359 (1987).
Id. at 49, 514 N1E.2d at 362.
5 Id. at 45, 514 N.E.2d at 359.
"Id.
Id.
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an unrelated corporation. 8 Energy itself was then liquidated, and
Northeastern realized a capital gain of $44,658,048." Because En-
ergy adopted a plan of complete liquidation under section 337 of
the Internal Revenue Code,'" Energy was not taxed on this gain."
Instead, tax fell on the stockholders of Energy's corporate parents,
Northeast and Ingram, based on the distribution amount as rec-
ognizable gain.' 2
Northeast, in its corporate excise return for the year ending
June 30, 1977, failed to include the $44,658,048 liquidation distri-
bution income, causing the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
assess against Northeastern an additional tax based on this
amount.'' After the Commissioner denied application for abate-
ment, Northeast paid the assessed tax and appealed to the Appellate
Tax Board. 14 The Board affirmed the Commissioner's assessment.
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of the Court's holding in Commissioner of
Revenue v. Shafner.' 5
Shafner involved distributions upon liquidation of a corporate
trust.'" Under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 62, section 8(c),
dividends on shares of any corporate trust are exempt from taxa-
tioni 7 The issue in Shafner, then, focused on whether a distribution
upon liquidation of corporate trust would constitute a non-taxable
dividend. Noting that Massachusetts General Laws chapter 62, sec-
tion 1(e) defines dividend as "any item of federal gross income
which is a dividend under section three hundred sixteen [316] of
the [Internal Revenue] Code or which is treated as a dividend under
any other provision of the Code," 8 the Supreme judicial Court
found that the distributions constituted dividends under section 316
of the Code, and therefore were dividends for the purposes of the
statute.'" Adopting the reasoning of Shafner on remand, the Board
" Id.
" Id.
'"1.R.C. § 337 (1982).




13 Id. (citing Commissioner v. Shafner, 392 Mass. 256, 465 N.E.2d 788 (1984)). See infra
notes 16-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of Shafner.
16 392 Mass. at 259, 465 N.E.2d at 790.
17 See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 62, § 8(a) (1988).
'" See id. § 1(e) (1988).
1 " Shreiner, 392 Mass. at 259-61, 465 N.E.2d at 790-92.
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in Northeast ruled in Northeast's favor, holding that the distribution
on liquidation of Energy constituted a dividend. 20 The Commis-
sioner appealed. 2 '
In affirming the Board's decision, the Supreme Judicial Court
first noted that in Massachusetts a business corporation computing
its net income subtracts from its Massachusetts gross income all the
deductions (but not the credits) allowable under the Internal Rev-
enue Code. 22 It noted also that, under Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 63, section 38(a)(1), dividends in Massachusetts are de-
ducted when calculating taxable income. 2' Whether Northeast
would have to include the liquidation distribution in its Massachu-
setts income tax return therefore turned on the proper categori-
zation of the distribution. The Court agreed with the Board that
the Massachusetts Legislature's adoption of the Code's definition of
gross income for the purpose of Massachusetts General Laws chap-
ter 63, section 30, supported adopting the Code's definition of
dividend . under section 316,21 which would include the liquidation
distribution in question as a dividend. 25
The Court also noted that no "intrinsic difference" existed
between the present case and Commissioner of Revenue v. Shafner. 2"
The Supreme Judicial Court in Northeast thus concluded that be-
cause the legislature nowhere indicates that dividends should re-
ceive treatment separate from that of the Code for the purpose of
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 63, they therefore will not
receive separate treatment. 27 The Supreme Judicial Court in North-
east therefore makes clear that distributions upon liquidation of a
corporate subsidiary will be treated like distributions upon liqui-
dation of a corporate trust, and thereby accords favorable treatment
to liquidations of corporate subsidiaries by recognizing subsequent
distributions as .non-taxable dividends.
• Northeast, 401 Mass. at 45, 514 N.E.2d at 360.
▪ Id.
22 Id. at 46, 514 N.E.2d at 360.
23 Id.
24 1.R.C. § 316 (1976). Section 316 of the Internal Revenue Code defines dividend as
"any distribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders." Id. Under I.R.C.
§ 316, then, distributions upon liquidation of Energy would be a dividend.
xs Norlheast, 401 Mass. at 47, 514 N.E.2d at 360.
2" Id. at 47, 514 N.E.2d at 361 (citing Commissioner v. Shafner, 392 Mass. 356, 465
N.E.2d 7118 (1984)).
27 Id. at 49, 514 N.E.2d at 362.
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B. *Gambling Loss Deductions and the United States Supreme Court's
Commissioner v. Groetzinger Definition of "Trade or Business":
Cerpovicz v. Commissioner
During the Selected Developments year, the Appellate Tax Board
adopted a narrow interpretation of "trade or business" for the
purposes of gambling loss deductions. In the 1987 decision of Cer-
povicz v. Commissioner,' the Appellate Tax Board held that in order
to deduct gambling losses in Massachusetts, a taxpayer must engage
in the trade or business of gambling. 2
 Employing a "facts and cir-
cumstances" analysis in accordance with the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Commissioner v. Groetzinger,' the Board
held that a taxpayer who listed his occupation as "teacher" but. who
also gambled five hours a day on jai alai games during nine months
of the year failed to engage in the trade or business of gambling
under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 62, section 2(d). There-
fore, the Court concluded that the taxpayer could not deduct his
losses from such activity.''
Taxpayer Cerpvicz, a teacher for the city of Chicopee, noted
on his tax return for 1978, in addition to his $17,517.00 salary as
teacher, $1,527.00 in net profit from a business or profession under
Schedule C.' Cerpovicz listed "systematic wagering" as the main
occupation under this section. 6
 Cerpovicz reported $71,612 as his
total income from wagering, but deducted $70,083, the cost of
purchasing tickets, to arrive at his net profit figure of $1,527. 7 A
federal audit, which showed the $70,612 as gambling winnings, led
to an audit by Massachusetts tax authorities. 8 This audit resulted in
a notice of assessment of $5,653.23, calculated by applying a tax
rate to the entire $70,612 winnings but barring any deductions for
ticket purchases." Following denial of a request for an abatement,
Cerpovicz appealed to the Appellate Tax Board.'"
' John R. Caterini, Staff Member. BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
1 12 Mass.] St. Tax Rep. (Gal) 11201-426, at 10,404 (App. Tax Bd. 1987).
2 1d. at 10,406.
3
 107 S. Gt. 980 (1987).
4 Cerpovicz, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,408-09.
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Cerpovicz testified before the Board that from May until De-
cember of 1978, he and his wife made the two-hour drive to Con-
necticut every day after teaching and gambled on every jai alai
game from seven to midnight." He sought to deduct from these
activities the cost of purchasing tickets, excluding the cost of gas,
tolls, and occasional overnight. stays from the deductionsi 2 In de-
ciding the case, the Board had to determine whether a taxpayer in
Massachusetts must engage in a trade or business to deduct gain-
bling losses and, if so, whether Cerpovicz engaged in the trade or
business of gambling. 13
Addressing the question of whether a taxpayer must be in the
trade or business of gambling to deduct gambling losses, the Board
noted that in calculating Massachusetts adjusted gross income, a
taxpayer may, under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 62, sec-
tion 2(d), take all "the deductions allowable under sections sixty-two
[621 . of the (Internal Revenue) Code."" The Board further
noted that Section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code defines adjusted
gross income as gross income minus sixteen specific deductions,
including general trade or business deductions (but excluding spe-
cific deductions for gambling losses).' 5 A taxpayer in Massachusetts,
therefore, must engage in the trade or business of gambling to
deduct gambling losses.' 6
In turning to the trade or business question, the Board first
observed that historically the circuit courts have been split regarding
the appropriate standard for determining whether a taxpayer en-
gages in a trade or business." After discussing the split in the





Id. Gambling losses are not listed under section 62 or the Internal Revenue Code. See
I.R.C. § 62 (1982). Section 165(d) does provide specifically that wagering losses are deductible.
I.K.C. § 165(d) (1982). This section, however, would not be applicable in Massachusetts
because it does not come under the deductions specifically listed in section 62. See I.A.C. § 62
(1982).
Cerpovicz, 12 Mass.) St. Tax Rep., at 10,406.
" Id. Lower federal courts have used two different tests. One test, the "goods or services"
test, requires that a taxpayer hold him or herself out to others as engaged in the selling of
goods or services, a test under which gamblers will not achieve trade or business status. See,
e.g., Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1984). Another test, the "facts
and circumstances" test, looks to whether the taxpayer engages in an activity with continuity
and regularity and with good faith intent to make a profit. See, e.g., Ditunno v. Commissioner,
80 T.C. 362 (1983). Under this test, gamblers have received trade or business status. See Id.
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in Commissioner v. Groetzingeri 8 had resolved the lower court split by
declaring that a "facts and circumstances" analysis is appropriate in
trade or business cases.'" Turning to the facts and circumstances of
Cerpovicz case, the Board held that although Cerpovicz' gambling
activity was more than "a mere hobby," it nevertheless failed to rise
to the level of trade or business.'" The Board said that to allow
trade or business status for Cerpovicz' activity would require
"stretch[ing] [the trade or business] concept to unprecedented lim-
its." 2 '
Cerpovicz makes clear that Massachusetts will follow the Su-
preme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Groetzinger, which, in re-
solving the long standing dispute in the circuit: courts over a proper
standard for determining trade or business status, adopted a "facts
and circumstances" analysis. Although a "facts and circumstances"
type test often provides limited guidance, resulting in a tendency
toward increased litigation, the situation with Massachusetts taxpay-
ers confronting the trade or business issue may be different. The
many federal court cases which had previously applied. the "facts
and circumstances" test in the trade or business context provides a
large body of case law to which Massachusetts taxpayers can already
turn for guidance.
C. *Calculating Net Income for Affiliate.Corporations: United States
Shoe Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue
During the Selected Developments year, in deciding the 1987 case
of United Slates Shoe Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue,' along
with two companion cases, 2 the Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board
("the Board") held that affiliated corporations subject to the taxing
authority of Massachusetts and filing a consolidated federal tax
return may elect to combine their net incomes (and losses) prior to
apportioning that part of the group's total taxable net income upon
I8
 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987).
1 " Cerpovicz, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,408.
211 Id.
21 H.
* James Michael Leahy, Staff Reporter, Boston College Law Review.
' [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) II 201-409, a 10,361 (App. Tax Rd. 1987).
2
 CDE, Inc, v. Commissioner of Revenue, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep. (Cal) 201-407, at
10,358 (App. Tax Rd. 1987): General Electric Company v. Commissioner of Revenue, [2
Mass.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 201-408. at 10,360 (App. Tax Rd. 1987). The facts of all three
of these cases arc for all practical purposes identical. And the issue in each is the same as
well: should combination of income precede apportionment.?
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which the Massachusetts corporate excise tax is assessed. 3
 The issue
arose in each of the three companion cases over how to interpret
the phrase "combined net income" found in chapter 63, section 32B
of the Massachusetts General Laws. 4 Since the United States Shoe
decision, the Massachusetts Legislature has amended the language
of chapter 63, section 32B. The definition of "combined net income"
now comports with the Commissioner's proposed definition of that
phrase as argued before the Board in the United States Shoe case.
The amendment now requires the corporations to apportion their
incomes taxable in Massachusetts before combining these incomes
to arrive at net income.5
In United Stales Shoe, the Board referred to the legislative history
of section 32B and interpreted "combined net income" to allow
corporations to combine their net incomes prior to apportionment.
In so ruling, the Board initially noted the discriminatory effect that
the Commissioner's interpretation would have on groups of inde-
pendently incorporated business entities. In addition, the Board
acknowledged the Commissioner's failure to adequately promulgate
its interpretation of the statute contemporaneously with its enact-
ment. Finally, the Board observed that the Supreme Judicial Court
similarly interpreted the statute in another context." Thus, the
Board held that the combination of income necessarily precedes
apportionment.'
In United States Shoe, U.S. Shoe and its wholly owned and sep-
arately incorporated subsidiary, U.S. Specialty Retailing, were Ohio
corporations that did part of their business in Massachusetts. 8 These
corporations filed a consolidated federal tax return for the fiscal
3
 U.S. Shoe, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,363; CDE, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,359;
General Electric, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,361.
4 CDE, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,363; General Electric, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at I0,361,
U.S. Shoe, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,362. The controversy is over the order in which
income is combined and apportioned. At stake is whether a group of corporations which file
a consolidated Massachusetts tax return is able to offset the profits of some corporations with
revenue losses sustained by others of the affiliated group. 11 the consolidated group of
corporations is able to offset profits with losses by combining its income prior to apportion-
ment, it will have a smaller net income to tax and consequently a smaller tax liability. The
Commissioner argued that apportionment should precede combination. In other words, the
Commissioner argued that a consolidated group of corporations should not be allowed to
take advantage of losses in arriving at the group's taxable net income. U.S. Shoe. [2 Mass.]
St. 'f'ax Rep., at 10,362; GDE, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,359; General Electric. [2 Mass.] St.
Tax Rep., at 10,361.
1988 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 225, 228-29 (Law. Co-op.).
6 U.S. Shoe, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,365 (citing Walter Kidde
	 Co., Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Revenue, 389 Mass. 577, 451 N.E,2d 420 (1983)).
Id. at 10,363.
Id. at 10,361-62.
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year ending July 31, 1976 (the fiscal year)." For the same year,
however, they filed separate Massachusetts corporate excise returns.
The sum of the state excise tax liability contained in the separate
returns totaled $144,891 for the fiscal year.'"
The two corporations later elected under Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws chapter 63, section 32B to amend their separate tax
returns by filing a consolidated state return based on their combined
net income.' ' By first combining the net income of the corporations
and then apportioning that part of the total to business taxable in
Massachusetts, the corporations calculated their new tax liability for
the fiscal year at $126,474.' 2
 Accordingly, they petitioned the Com-
missioner for an abatement of the difference between the earlier
calculation of liability, which was $19,128 higher than the liability
calculated on the combined net income of the corporations, plus
interest.'"
The Commissioner denied the request for abatement. In doing
so, he contended that the determination of combined net income
taxable in Massachusetts is properly arrived at by requiring each of
the corporations to separately determine and apportion that portion
of net income taxable in Massachusetts." Having arrived at separate
determinations of tax liability, continued the Commissioner, the two
corporations could then combine those figures to arrive at their
combined net income. 15
The Board reasoned that Massachusetts General Laws chapter
63, section 32B is properly evaluated in conjunction with Massa-
chusetts' three-step scheme of corporate taxation.'" In the first step
of that scheme, corporations determine their net income.' 7 Second,
they determine their taxable net income.'H Finally, they geographi-








i" Id. at 10.303.
17 Id. (citing MASS. GEN. L. CH. 63, § 30(5)(i) (1973)),
'" Id. (citing MAss. GEN. L. CH. 63, § 38(A) (1973)). This is accomplished by deducting
dividends and disregarding long-term capital gains and losses. Id.
,9 /d. (citing MASS. GEN. L. cll. 63, §§ 38(B)-38(1) (1973)). Corporations with income that
is taxable in Massachusetts and in other slates must apportion their taxable income for
taxation by Massachusetts through a formula based on property, wages, and income gener-
ated or paid by the corporation in Massachusetts relative to the corporation's total properly,
wages and income. Id.
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Reading section 32B in conjunction with this three-step taxing
scheme, the Board concluded that combination of' net income nec-
essarily precedes apportionment. 2° The Board reasoned that allow-
ing business entities composed of separately incorporated subsid-
iaries to combine their profits and losses before apportioning the
resulting sum prevents discrimination against such entities attempt-
ing to compete with large multistate corporations which are subdi-
vided into separate departments rather than into separate corpo-
rations." The large multistate corporation, subdivided into
departments, may take advantage of losses in some departments
when reporting its taxable net income. 22
The Board concluded that its interpretation of section 32B
comported with the legislative history of not only that section but
with its counterpart in the federal tax code as welL 25 Underlying
this history and the Board's reasoning,' is the idea that substance
should control over form. 24 A group of separately incorporated
business entities operated as a single business unit and owned by
the same shareholders should be treated as a single business unit
despite the legal form — separate corporations — which is merely
a legal fiction. 25 The Board recognized that the same reasoning
underlies permitting certain groups of separately incorporated busi-
ness entities to file a consolidated federal tax return. 26 The Board
further noted that such reasoning has been adopted in Massachu-
setts since the enactment of the first corporate excise statute in 1919
which contained the phrase "combined net income." 27
The manner in which the Board dismissed the Commissioner's
contention that its interpretation of section 32B should be given
" Id. The Board argued that it had already adopted the principle of combination of
income prior to apportionment in interpreting section 32B in a previous case involving an
investment tax credit. Id. at 10,365 (citing Walter Kidde & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Revenue, No. 99-262 (App. Tax Bd. July 30, 1982), aff'd, 385 Mass. 577 (1983)).
The Board also surveyed the law of the several states on this issue and concluded that
its interpretation was in accord with the twenty-eight states that either permit or require
affiliated corporations to file consolidated returns. Only four of these states require appor-
tionment prior to combination. In each of these four cases, post-apportionment combination
of income is required by explicit statutory language. Id. at 10,366.
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"great weight" deserves mention." The Commissioner argued that
its interpretation of section 32B was contemporaneous with a 1959
amendment to the Massachusetts tax statute. 29 The Board con-
cluded that the phrase "combined net income" appeared in the
original tax statute in 1919 and has been preserved in all subsequent
amendments to the statute. As a matter of statutory construction,
ruled the Board, a phrase in a statute which remains intact through
successive amendments retains its original meaning and contents"
The Board concluded that a contemporaneous interpretation of
"combined net income" would have to have been promulgated in
1919 to have any weight in a current interpretation of the statute."'
The Board also found that the Commissioner's sole promul-
gation of its interpretation was by a 1979 letter ruling." The Com-
missioner promulgated this ruling after the Fiscal year in question
in United States Shoe. In fact, the promulgation appeared even after
U.S. Shoe requested an abatement." There was no mention of the
Commissioner's interpretation of section 32B on the required form
that U.S. Shoe used to calculate and report its combined net in-
come." The Board ruled that the retroactive application of new tax
rules on a selective basis can be unfair."
In rendering the United States Shoe decision, the Board arrived
at a fair interpretation of the statute. The real significance of the
case, however, is that the Board's decision diminished the potential
tax revenues for the state more than had the Commissioner's ar-
guments prevailed. Consequently;
 in 1988 the legislature amended
the language of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 63, section
32B and essentially codified the Commissioner's interpretation of
"combined net income" as he argued that phrase should be inter-
preted in the U.S. Shoe decision." The end result of the legislature's
2" Id. at 10,366,
29 Id. For the text of the present version of section 32B, see infra note 36.
Id. at 10,364-65.
" Id. at 10,362, 10,366.
'v Id. at 10,362, 10,366, Letter Ruling 1979-42.
" Id. at 10,363.
" Id. Form 355B, the Foreign Business or Manufacturing Corporation Excise Return.
"Id. at 10,366.
I988 Mass, Adv. Legis. Scrv. 225, 228-29 (Law. Co-op.). On July 26, 1988 the Governor
approved Chapter 202 of the Massachusetts Session Laws. Section 15 of Chapter '202 states
in relevant part that MASS. GEN. L. cu. 63, § 3211 is amended by adding the following
language:
The combined net income shall he determined as follows: (a) the taxable net
income of each such corporation [members of a consolidated group] appor-
tioned to this commonwealth pursuant to the provisions of section thirty-eight
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action is that a group of corporations which file a consolidated
Massachusetts tax return are not able to offset the profits of sonic
corporations with revenue losses sustained by others of the affiliated
group.
D. *Taxation of Foreign Corporations
During the Selected Developments year, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held, in the 1987 decision of Tenneco v. Com-
missioner,' that a corporation which manifests both utility and non-
utility characteristics would be treated for tax purposes as a utility
corporation if it fell within the statutory definition of a utility cor-
poration:2
 This has important consequences for such "hybrid cor-
porations" given the tax differences between utility and business
corporations. For example, utility corporations are taxed at a 6.50%
rate; 3
 business corporations at an 8.33% rate.' Although its tax rates
may be higher, a business corporation benefits from a federal tax
provision which permits such entities to deduct dividends received
from any corporation in which the business owned at least 15% of
the voting stock.' In contrast, utility corporations can only deduct
dividends distributed from certain other utility corporations. 8 After
Tenneco, utility corporations can no longer take advantage of tax
provisions applicable to business corporations.
In Tenneco, the taxpayer incorporated in Delaware in 1943 and
received a certificate of foreign corporation registration to conduct
business in Massachusetts in 1954. 7
 Although originally established
to construct an interstate natural gas pipeline, Tenneco expanded
to become an international conglomerate with varied activities. 8
From its certification in 1954, until 1979, Tenneco filed its Massa-
shall first be separately determined; and (b) the taxable net income of each such
corporation, as so determined, shall then be added together and shall constitute
their combined net income taxable under this chapter.
* David H. Ganz, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE. LAW REVIEW
401 Mass. 380, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep. (CC14) 4I 201.462, at 10,503 (1987).
2 See id. at 384-86. [2 Mass.' St. Tax Rep., at 10.505-06.
MASS. GEN. L. ch.63, § 52A(2) (1987).
4 Id, § 39(3)(a)(2).
Tenneco, 401 Mass. at 383, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep.. at 10,505.
6 1d.	 •
7 Id. at 381,[2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,504.
Id. at 382, 12 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,504. Tenneco expanded into such areas as oil
and gas operations, automotive parts, insurance, agriculture and land management, and
shipbuilding. Id. at 382, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,504-05.
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chusetts tax returns as a utility corporation using a public service
corporation franchise tax return provided for in Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 63 section 52A."
Because it filed as a utility corporation and not as a business
corporation, Tenneco benefitted from several preferential tax treat-
ment devices afforded to utility corporations. First, Tenneco allo-
cated its net income solely on the basis of its property holdings, as
compared to the three Factors considered in apportioning a business
corporation's net income (income, property and employment))°
Second, filing as a utility corporation allowed Tenneco to use the
lower tax rate of 6.50%, as compared to 8.33% for business cor-
porations."
In addition to calculating its taxes as a utility corporation, Ten-
neco also took advantage of a tax provision favoring business cor-
porations. Specifically, Tenneco deducted dividends it received
from all of its subsidiaries; had it consistently acted as a utility
corporation, Tenneco could only deduct dividends received from
other utility corporations.' 2 After reviewing its returns, the Com-
missioner disallowed Tenneco's deductions for nonutility dividends
for the years 1977-1979, included those dividends as taxable in-
come, and assessed additional taxes to Tenneco totalling
$1,998,624) 3
Tenneco applied to the Commissioner for a tax abatement and
the Commissioner denied the application." Subsequently, Tenneco
appealed to the Appellate Tax Board . 15 In affirming the Commis-
sioner's refusal to abate Tenneco's taxes, the Board concluded that
despite the numerous activities of its divisions, Tenneco still quali-
fied as a utility corporation and would be taxed as such, and not as
a business corporation." Tenneco appealed the Board's decision.
The Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court upheld the Tax
Board's ruling. In dispensing with Tenneco's claim that because of
its diverse activities the state should treat Tenneco as a business or
Id. at 382, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,505.
1 " See id. at 382-83, [2 Mass. I St. Tax Rep., at 10,505.
' 1 See id.
12 Id.
" Id. at 381, [2 Mass.] Si. Tax Rep., at 10,504.
" /4. at 381-82, [2 Mass.] St. 'Fax Rep., at 10,504. Tenneco urged the Commissioner to
grant a tax abatement, arguing that because of its varied business interests, only Tenneco's
pipeline division should be taxed under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 63's section
52A, arid that chapter 63's sections 30-4219 should apply to its nonpipeline divisions. Id,
16 Id. at 382, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,504.
IS hi.
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hybrid corporation, the Court concentrated on the applicable Mas-
sachusetts tax provisions.' 7 The Court concluded from its reading
of Massachusetts General Law chapter 63 section 52A, that Tenneco
clearly fell within the definition of "utility corporations," regardless
of the business it transacted outside of Massachusetts." Moreover,
the Court held that nothing in the statute compelled a determina-
tion that a foreign utility, operating with both utility and nonutility
components had to be taxed in Massachusetts as a hybrid or business
corporation."
in its appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, Tenneco also
alleged several constitutional violations. First, Tenneco argued that
the Commissioner's inclusion in net income of dividends paid to
Tenneco by nonutility subsidiaries operating outside of Massachu-
setts violated its due process right because no reasonable connection
existed between Tenneco's in-state activities and the value of its
interstate business interests. 2° Tenneco next claimed a federal due
process violation based on the one-factor income apportionment
test appearing in section 52A. 2 ' Tenneco argued that the formula
did not justly apportion its income with respect to its Massachusetts
activities. 22 Tenneco also pursued an equal protection claim, con-
tending that the Massachusetts taxing structure discriminated
against utility corporations. 25 Tenneco's final objection concerned
the policy against double taxation. Tenneco alleged that the state
violated this policy when it included the dividends in Tenneco's net
income even though the subsidiaries that distributed those divi-
dends paid corporate taxes in Massachusetts.'"
The Supreme judicial Court addressed and rejected each point
raised by Tenneco. The Court first considered Tenneco's due pro-
cess claims. Not only did the Court conclude that Tenneco failed to
show an absence of a nexus between the value of its in-state activities
and the nonutility subsidiaries' dividend distributions, but sufficient
evidence existed to prove that interrelatedness and therefore, the
17
 See id. at 384-86, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,505-06.
Id, at 386, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,506. "Utility corporation," as defined in chapter
63, section 52A, includes "every domestic or foreign pipeline corporation engaged in the
transportation or sale of natural gas within the commonwealth ...." MASS. GEN. L. ch. 63,
§ 52A(1)(a)(viii) (1987).
Tenneco, 401 Mass. at 384-86, (2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,506.
2" Id. at 386, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,506.
21 Id. at 387, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,507.
22 Id .
23 See id. at 388, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,507.
29 Id.
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dividend income's inclusion did not violate due process. 25 The Court
dispensed with Tenneco's other due process claim based on the one-
factor apportionment formula. Relying on the 1978 United States
Supreme Court ruling in Moorman Mfg. v. Bair, the Court upheld
single-factor apportionment formulas, even where income which
originates outside of Massachusetts is taxed as a result. 2°
In addition to rejecting Tenneco's due process claims, the Court
found no merit in Tenneco's equal protection or double taxation
arguments. Although Tenneco could not use an alternative appor-
tionment formula as authorized under Massachusetts General Law
chapter 63, section 42, the Court found no discrimination against
utility corporations because it could obtain relief under chapter 62C
section 37's abatement procedure where section 52A's application
yielded a disproportionate net income allocation. 27 Finally, the
Court reasoned that no double taxation occurred because the state
designed the excise tax to tax Tenneco for conducting business in
Massachusetts and not to tax the individual elements comprising
taxable net income. 28
Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected Tenneco's claims
that the Commissioner should treat it as a business or hybrid cor-
poration and further rejected Tenneco's constitutionally based al-
legations. 29 Because Tenneco fell within section 52A's definition of
"utility corporation," the Court held that the Tax Board correctly
classified it as such.3° Accordingly, the Court agreed that the Com-
missioner properly imposed additional taxes on Tenneco by deny-
ing the deductions Tenneco claimed from its nonutility subsidiaries
and including these dividends as taxable incomes'
11' Id. at 387, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,507. The Court considered the following
information in reaching its decision: the degree of integration of Tenneco's oil and gas
facilities; and its nonpipeline subdivisions, as well as three subsidiaries, that generated reve-
nues within Massachusetts. Id.
25 Id. at 388, 12 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,507 (citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437
U.S. 267, 273 (1978)). In Moorman, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated that the
Supreme Court has continually recognized that a single-factor formula was "presumptively
valid." 937 U.S. at 273.
27 Tenneco, 401 Mass. at 388, [2 Mass.] Si. Tax Rep., at 10,507. Section 37 provides: "Any
person aggrieved by the assessment of a tax, other than a tax assessed under chapters sixty-
live or sixty-live A, may apply in writing to the commissioner, ... for an abatement thereof
," MASS. GEN. L. ch. 62C, ti 37 (1987).
23 Tenneco, 401 Mass. at 389,12 Mass.( St. Tax Rep., at 10,508 (quoting Commissioner v.
Massachusetts Mut.. Life his. Co., 384 Mass. 607, 618 (1981)).
2" See Tenneco, 401 Mass. at 384-89, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,505-08.
3" Id. at 386, 389, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,506, 10,508.
n Id. at 389, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,508.
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Tenneco is significant because of its impact on Massachusetts'
tax scheme and on foreign utility corporations. By rejecting Ten-
neco's due process and equal protection claims, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court reinforced the constitutionality of Massachusetts' taxing
utility and business corporations separately by rendering it less
impervious to attack. Tenneco also has important ramifications for
foreign utility corporations. Corporations falling within section
52A's definition of "utility corporations" will be treated and taxed
as such, regardless of whether the corporation has nonutility sub-
sidiaries or extensively diverse operations.
Notwithstanding the added taxes incurred as a result, Tenneco
suggests that utility corporations may no longer benefit from pref-
erential tax treatment reserved solely for business corporations.
This is an important principle because utilities corporations are still
treated differently than business corporations 32 even though Mas-
sachusetts tax law has changed significantly since the dispute arose."
Not benefitting from tax provisions aimed at a certain type of
corporation could result in a marked difference in taxes owed.
In another case decided during the Selected Developments year,
the Appellate Tax Board issued a ruling that significantly impacts
future applications of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 63, sec-
tion 38, which determines the apportionment of a corporation's
taxable net income in Massachusetts. Under section 38's formula,
property, payroll and sales all play key roles in the determination
of taxable net income. 34 A corporation, however, may apply under
section 42 to the Revenue Commissioner for a different allocation
method. 35 If the Commissioner holds that section 38 does not rea-
sonably approximate the corporation's net income arising from
business conducted in Massachusetts, the Commissioner may adopt
an alternative method. 36
"Tax rates provide the clearest illustration. Massachusetts assesses an 8.33% tax rate on
a business corporation's net income. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 63, § 32 (1987). In contrast,
Massachusetts imposes a 6.50% tax rate on a utility corporation's net income. See id. § 52A.
" At the time Tenneco tiled the disputed returns, the applicable tax law provided that
a gas, eledric, pipeline, water, or aqueduct corporation's net income allocable to Massachusetts
consisted of that percentage of net income that the costs of its plant, property and equipment
constituted. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 63, § 52A(3) (Law. Co-op. 1971 Supp. 1978).
Presently, the formula to determine a utility corporation's taxablC Massachusetts income
includes sums representing sales,. property and payroll. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 63. § 52A(3) (1987).
3 ' See Mass. GEN. L. ch. 63, § 38 (1987).
35
 Id. § 42.
3" Id.
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In the 1987 case of Engelhard Minerals and Chemical Corp. v.
Commissioner of Revenue:37 the Appellate Tax Board held that the
Commissioner may lawfully reject an alternative plan that the Rev-
enue Department had accepted for the past fifteen years." The
Board reasoned that prior acceptances did not compel the Com-
missioner to find that a section 42 alternative apportionment
method must be used each year." Accordingly, unless the taxpayer
demonstrated that section 38's application resulted in a grossly un-
fair apportionment, the Board concluded that the Commissioner
need not continue to accept an alternative plan, despite a long
history of doing sO. 4"
In Engelhard, Engelhard incorporated in Delaware, qualified to
do business in Massachusetts and sought to have its Massachusetts
taxable income derived from a method different than the allocation
and apportionment procedure prescribed in section 38. 4 ' Engelhard
determined its net income taxable in Massachusetts by excluding
from its calculations the final status of one of its acquired Massa-
chusetts corporations, D.E. Makepeace Company. 42 Engelhard's cor-
porate predecessor used this alternative plan since 1958 and En-
gelhard since 1967. 4 ' The Commissioner of Revenue (and his or
her predecessor, the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation)
approved Engelhard's accounting method until 1977:14
The Commissioner, on February 18, 1977, sent Engelhard No-
tices of Intention to Assess added corporation excises for the years
1972-1974:15 Intradepartmental documents, however, revealed that
37 Engelhard Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep. (CCM
III 201-428, at 10,430 (App. Tax Bd. 1087),
"See Id. at 10,435-36.
"Id. at 10,436.
1 " Id, at 10,436-37.
" Id. at 10,430,
' 42 See id. at 10,432, 1n 1953, Engelhard's predecessor. Engelhard Industries, Inc. acquired
D.E. Makepeace Company by merger. /4. at 10,431. Since 1958 and alter the 1967 merger
of Engelhard Industries, ltic. with Minerals and Chemical Corporation, the alternative
method was the following: Engelhard deterinined the income, sales, property and salaries
for Engelhard and separately Inr Makepeace; then Engelhard apportioned the income of
each within and outside of Massachusetts. id. at 16,432. According to Engelhard, "the
Massachusetts operations were treated as if [Makepeace] were still a separate corporation,
with its own income allocation factors for property, payroll and sales ...." Id. (quoting
memorandum pp. 3-4).
as 14.
.11 See Engelhard, [2 Mass.] St. Tax Rep., at 10,432.
"Id. at 10,430,
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the Commissioner approved the accounting method for 1972 and
so the Commissioner assessed additional taxes for 1973 and 1974
using the apportionment and allocation procedures found in Mas-
sachusetts General Laws chapter 63, section 38. 46 The Notices of
Intention to Assess reflected two primary reasons for the Commis-
sioner's rejection of Engelhard's alternative method. First, Engel-
hard's financial records did not include Makepeace as a separate
, 
subdivision and Ma kepeace's finances simply were : nOt mentioned.47
Second, the structure of Engelhard revealed that management
„..
viewed the corporation as one entity and not as separate subdivi-
sions. 48
 Accordingly, the Commissioner concluded that only section
3.8 itOpropriafely determined Engelhard's Massachusetts taxable in-
come. 49
Engelhard filed for a tax abatement on November 4, 1977,
whidt the Reyenue Commission"er subsequently denied on Septem-
ber 2, 1?80. 6°.Engelhard appealed to the Appellate Tax Board,
arguing that th0 stAtitorily prescribed apportionment method did
not adecitiately 4;01-' imate net income and that the Commission-
er's past acceptance provided the basis for Engelhard's reliance on
continued ap.proval. 61 In ruling that Engelhard did not. demonstrate
sufficient justification for tax abatement, the Appellate Tax Board
held that the . Revenue COmmissioner's determination of the appli-
cability of section 38 each year and that prior practices of accepting
alternative methods did not coinpel similar acceptance in future tax
years. 52
The Appellate Tax Board based its conclusion that Engelhard
did not deserve abatement on three grounds. First, the Board stated
46 Id. at 10,433.
" See id. Rider A to the Notices of Intention to Assess stated:
the separation of the D.E. Makepeace Co., which is part of the Engelhard
Industries Division, is difficult to achieve since the performance, standing, and
the financial position of [Makepeace] are not mentioned anywhere (i.e., financial
reports, federal purposes, annual reports, etc.). The only divisional analysis is
the three divisions mentioned above [Minerals & Chemicals Division, Engelhard
Industries Division, Engelhard Industries Division and Philipp Brothers Divi-
sion].
Id, (quoting Rider A to Notices of Intention to Assess).
" Id. (quoting Rider A to Notices of Intention to Assess).
"Id. (quoting Rider A to Notices of lmention to Assess).
5 " Id. at 10,430.
51 M. at 10,433. In addition, Engelhard argued that the Commissioner's "retroactive
revocation of approval" constituted improper and arbitrary action on the Commissioner's
part. Id. (citing Appellant's Proposed Conclusions of Law).
52 Id. at 10,436, 10,437.
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that section 42 did not require the Revenue Commissioner to adopt
an alternative plan from that announced in section 38 unless in the
Commissioner's opinion, the prescribed apportionment calculation
did not reasonably reflect the corporation's net income." The Board
found that despite continued acceptance of the alternative plan, the
Commissioner never expressly found that the section 38 method
did not reasonably approximate net income." Second, in response
to Engelhard's claim that it relied on the Commissioner's past ac-
tions, the Board reasoned that the statute did not compel the Com-
missioner to reach the same decision each year as to section 38's
applicability: 55 Finally, because that statute required a company to
apply and file fOr an alternative apportionment annually, the Board
concluded that the Commissioner's determination as to necessity of
an alternative method was an annual decision.'"
Thus, after Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Revenue, a foreign corporation qualified to do business in
Massachusetts may no longer rely on the Commissioner's past prac-
tices with respect to receipt of tax returns, especially if in past years
the corporation filed and the Commissioner accepted an alternative
method of apportionment of net income. The foreign corporation
has the burden of demonstrating that the statutorily prescribed
method in Massachusetts General Laws chapter 63, section 38, does
not reasonably approximate its net income in Massachusetts. The
corporation must sustain this burden each year because, as Engel-
hard evidences, the Revenue Commissioner annually determines the
appropriateness of section 38 and is not compelled to reach the
same judgment year after year.
Another recent development in Massachusetts tax law that oc-
curred in 1987 involved domestic international sales corporations
(DISC)." The DISC provisioh, Massachusetts General Laws chapter
5" Id. at 10,435.
'' Id.
5' Id. at 10,436.
Id. The Board SUM cc!: "The Cumtnissi(mer's responsibility under the statutes is to
determine whether a taxpayer is fairly entitled to the special treatment applied For in the
tax years at issue; he cannot be precluded From changing a practice folls)wed in earlier years
if he later determines that it was mistaken Id. (citing John S. Lane & Son. Inc. v.
Commissioner, 396 Mass. 137, 140 ([985)).
' 7 Mass. Gran. L. ch. 63. § 30(15) (1087) defines a DISC as a corporation which meets
the amended Federal Internal Revenue Code's section 992(a)(1) delipition. Section 992(a)(1)
defines a DISC as a corporation incorporated under any state's law and which meets live
requirements: 95% or 'note of its gross receipts must consist of qualified export receipts; the
corporation's adjusted basis of its qualified export assets must at the end of the taxable year,
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63, section 38G, generally provides that a corporation subject to
Massachusetts taxes must include in its income, the income of a
wholly-owned DISC 58
 for the DISC's taxable year that ends imme-
diately following the corporation's taxable year.'`' A taxpayer, in
White Consolidated Industries Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue,"() chal-
lenged section 38's language as inapplicable where the DISC's tax-
able year ended concurrently with the corporation's. The Appellate
Tax Board, in interpreting the statute, rejected the taxpayer's ar-
gument and held that the provision covers such circumstances."'
In White, the taxpayer, White Consolidated Industries, Inc., was
a business corporation organized in Delaware in 1926 and which
had a principal office in Massachusetts." 2 White, in 1972 and under
Ohio law, organized a wholly-owned subsidiary, WCI International
Sales Corp. (WCI) that. qualified, under the Internal Revenue Code,
as a domestic international sales corporation (DISC)." Although
WCI owned no property, had no employees, and had not bought
or sold any property, White and its subsidiaries paid WCI commis-
sion income from their sales of tangible property."
White reported in its 1973 foreign manufacturing corporation
excise return, as WCI's income, the money that White paid to WCI
but not those commissions paid by White's subsidiaries.65 The Rev-
',
enue Commissioner, on March 14, 1977, assessed an additional tax
of $46,732.60 including in White's net income those commissions
omitted from WCI's that White's subsidiaries paid to WCI."" White
equal or exceed 95% of the sum of the adjusted basis of all the corporation's assets at the
taxable year's end; the corporation cannot have more than one class of stock and the par or
stated value of its outstanding stock equals at a minimum, $2500 each day of the taxable
year; the corporation has elected to be treated as a DISC and the election is effective for the
taxable year; and the corporation is not a member of' any controlled group of which FSC is
a member. 26 U.S.C. § 992(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
5" A wholly-owned DISC is a "DISC all of whose outstanding shares, except directors'
qualifying shares, are owned by a single corporation, either directly or indirectly through
other corporations all of whose shares are owned directly or indirectly by such corporation."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 63, § 30(15) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1978). The same definition
appears unchanged in Mass. GEN. L. ch. 63, § 30(15) (1987).
5" MASS. GEN. L. ch. 63, § 38G (1987).
"() [2 Mass.] S!. Tax Rep. (CC14) 11201-444, at 10,453 (App. Tax Ed. 1987).
"I Id. at 10,455.
" 2 Id. at 10,453.
"3 Id.
' 4 Id. In 1973, WCI received commissions totaling $4,334,031, broken down as follows:
$43,777 from White; $1,081,332 from a wholly-owned subsidiary of White organized in
Massachusetts; and the remainder from other wholly-owned subsidiaries of White who were
not organized or doing business in Massachusetts. Id. at 10,454.
65 Id.
Id. at 10,453.
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applied for and received a tax abatement, but , because it was
minimal, White appealed to the Appellate Tax Boarcl." 7
White raised two issues on appeal, the first of which concerned
a statutory reading of the Massachusetts DISC tax provision. That
provision, section 38C; of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 63,
provided that a foreign or domestic business corporation must in-
chide in its income, any wholly-owned DISC's income for the DISC's
taxable year which ends immediately after the corporation's taxable
year. 68 White argued this language precluded the state from re-
quiring White to include WCI's income for its taxable year ending
on the same date.""
The Board rejected the reading of section 38G that suggested
the exclusion of WCI's income For its taxable year that ended con-
currently with and not immediately after White's taxable year.'" A
literal reacting of the statute would render it inoperable, and this,
the Board concluded, was not what the legislature intended." Ac-
cordingly, the Board ruled that section 38G applied not only to
income of DISCs whose taxable year ended one day after a parent
corporation's taxable year, but also to the income of those DISCS
whose tax year ended simultaneously with that of the parent cor-
poration's:7 '2
White's second argument centered not on the statute's lan-
guage, but instead, on potential constitutional violations. White con-
tended that including in WCI's income those funds paid by White's
subsidiaries who were neither organized nor doing business in Mas-
sachusetts contravened principles found in the United States and
Massachusetts Constitutions." Specifically, White claimed that no
connection existed between Massachusetts and White's activities, a
nexus the Massachusetts and federal courts have required before a
67 Id. The Commissioner abated the tax in the amount of $3,904.40 but refused to reduce
it any further. Id.
"The applicable 1973 tax provision read in pertinent part:
A domestic or foreign corporation subject to tax under this chapter shall ...
include in the report of its income all the income of any wholly-owned DISC,
whether such DISC is organized under the laws of the commonwealth or the
laws of any other state, for the taxable year of such wholly-owned DISC which
ends immediately after the taxable year of such corporation ....
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. eh. 63, § 38G (Law. Cu-op. Supp. 1978). Section 38C remains un-
changed in the current Massachusetts tax code. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 63, § 38G (Supp. 1987).
"9 While, [2 Mass.' St. Tax Rep., at 10.454.
7° Id. at 10,455.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 10,456.
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state may include in a foreign corporation's income, income derived
from out-of-state activities. 74 Because no nexus existed, White
claimed a due process violation occurred. 75
In addressing the constitutional question, the Appellate Tax
Board noted that Massachusetts courts consider the nexus require-
ment satisfied when the activities carried on in and outside of Mas-
sachusetts were part of a "unitary business." 76 Contrary to White's
contention that for a unitary business to be established, a necessary
relationship must exist between the taxing state and the DISC's
income before that state may tax that income, 77 the Board held the
proper governing standard to be whether the taxpayer demon-
strated by "clear and cogent evidence" that the state taxed extrater-
ritorial values. 78 Applying this standard, the Board held that WCI
was part of a unitary business with White. 7° The Board based this
determination on White's apparent failure to show otherwise. Al-
though White claimed that its Massachusetts and foreign subsidiar-
ies were not part of a unitary business, the Board reasoned that the
record could not support such a finding. 8° Additionally, the Board
noted that White never alleged that its subsidiaries did not engage
in the same business as did White.'" Accordingly, the Board con-
cluded that White and its subsidiaries constituted a unitary business
and that White failed to demonstrate the absence of a nexus be-
tween White's in-state and out-of-state activities." In the Board's
opinion then, section 38G did not violate the Massachusetts Consti-
tutional requirement that excises be reasonable. 83
74 Id. (citing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Department of Revenue, 383 Mass. 786 (1981);
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner, 378 Mass. 577 (1979); Weyerhaueser Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 1987 Mass. Adv. Sh. 308 (App. Tax Bd, 1987)).
75 See id.
76 Id. (citing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Department of Revenue, 383 Mass. 786 (1981);
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner, 378 Mass. 577 (1979); Weyerhaueser Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 1987 Mass. Adv. Sh. 308 (App. Tax Rd. 1987)). The Board noted that the Massachu-
setts decisions were consistent with United States Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 10,457.
" See id. at 10,458.
78 Id. at 10,458-59 (quoting Container Goi-p; bi Ant. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159,
175 (1983)).




85 See id. The Massachusetts Constitution provides in pertinent part: "full power and
authority are hereby given and granted to the said general court, to impose and levy
proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and
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Thus, in White, the Appellate Tax Board affirmed the Revenue
Commissioner's assessment of an excise upon a taxpayer who failed
to include in its income the commissions that its out-of-state subsid-
iaries paid wits wholly-owned DISC.". The Board ruled that section
38G governed, even though WCI's taxable year ended simulta-
neously with White's taxable year. 85 Furthermore, because White
failed to show an absence of a nexus between White's in-state and
out-of-state activities, the Board concluded that a unitary business
existed and hence, no due process violation occurred by the Com-
missioner's imposing a tax. 8"
The White decision is important for two reasons. First, White
upholds the principle that Massachusetts may tax a foreign corpo-
ration's income that is derived from out-of-state activities. White
adds another link to a chain of Massachusetts cases that hold that
the state may assess a tax in such circumstances when the taxpayer
constitutes a unitary business. A clue process violation may occur
but White makes clear that the taxpayer bears the burden of dem-
onstrating by "clear and cogent evidence" the absence of a unitary
business.
More importantly, White's significance lies in the Appellate Tax
Board's statutory interpretation of section 38G. That provision pro-
vides relatively clear guidance on the inclusion of a DISC's income
in a foreign or domestic business corporation's net income. Under
section 38G, such inclusion must occur for the DISC's taxable year
which ends immediately after the parent corporation's taxable year.
The Board rejected a literal interpretation that would have ren-
dered the provision inoperable where the DISC's taxable year ended
simultaneously with the parent corporation's. Instead, based on
what it perceived to be the legislature's intent, the Board declared
section 38G applicable even where the DISC and its parent corpo-
ration had concurrent taxable years. Unless declared erroneous by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Appellate Tax
Board's novel interpretation of section 38G will result in the inclu-
sion of more DISC income, and hence more taxable income for the
parent corporation, because a DISC's taxable year no longer must
end immediately after the parent corporation's taxable year.
persons resident, ... within the said Commonwealth ...." MASS. CoNs•r. art. IV, pt. 2, el. I,
§1
"4 See White, 12 Mass.] St. Tax Rep.. at 10,453, 10,455,
"Id. at 10,455.
"6 See id. at 10,459.
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V. SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE LAW
The selected • developments surveyed indicate an interesting
dichotomy in the treatment of corporate management by the leg-
islature and the judiciary. In general, the legislature has enacted
several measures that tend to favor corporate management of Mas-
sachusetts corporations. In particular, the legislature has amended
the Massachusetts corporate statute to allow corporations to elimi-
nate or limit the liability of their directors for breaching their duty
of care to the corporation and to allow corporations to issue "blank
stock."
The judiciary has been less accommodating. In Hyde Park Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Connolly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined the
enforcement of the Massachusetts anti-takeover statute. In Common-
wealth v. L.A.L. Corp., the Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court
sustained a lower court ruling that a closely held corporation was
criminally liable for the actions of its employees under the same
standards as a large publicly held corporation. Finally, in Bodio v.
Ellis, the Supreme judicial Court further developed the fiduciary
duties that the directors of a closely held corporation owe to each
other. Although one should not overemphasize the point, the con-
trast between the treatment of corporate management by the dif-
ferent branches of government is striking.
A. *Limitation or Elimination of Director Liability for Breach of the
Fiduciary Duty of Care: The Amended Section 13(b)(1 112)
Commentators often divide the fiduciary duties that members
of a corporation's board of directors owe to the shareholders into
two categories: the duty of care' and the duty of loyalty.? For many
years, courts have limited director liability for breaching the duty
of care through the business judgment rule.' In recent years, how-
* John P. D'Amato, Staff Member, liosToN COLLEGE LAN' REVIEW
The duty of care requires that directors exercise diligence in managing a corporation
and discharge their duties after informing themselves of all material information that they
can obtain through reasonable efforts. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
The duty of loyalty requires that directors make all business decisions in the good faith
belief that the decision is in the best interests of the corporation. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984). Duty of loyalty questions arise often in certain contexts such as when
a director has interests in a transaction different from the interests of the corporation. when
the director usurps a corporate opportunity or when a director directly competes with a
corporation. HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 235 (3d ed. 1983).
3 if in the course of managing a corporation the directors arrive at a decision for which
they have a reasonable basis and they arrive at that decision through a good faith examination
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ever, courts have held directors liable for large damage awards for
breaching their duty of care. 4 These damage awards have contrib-
uted to the skyrocketing cost of obtaining liability insurance for
corporate directors. The increasing chance that courts will hold
directors liable for huge damage awards in breach of duty cases
and the difficulty of obtaining reasonably priced liability insurance
have combined to discourage qualified people from accepting po-
sitions as outside directors on a corporation's board. In response to
this reluctance to join corporate boards, several states, led by Del-
aware, have amended their corporate statutes to allow a corporation
to eliminate, or at least limit, the liability of its directors for breach-
ing the fiduciary duty of care.'
On December 24, 1986, the Massachusetts Legislature joined
with these jurisdictions in amending its corporate statute." In
amending the Massachusetts corporate statute, the legislature
adopted the Delaware statute virtually verbatim.' Several aspects of
this amendment merit explanation.
The amendment does not by itself alter the fiduciary duty of
care that Massachusetts law requires of corporate directors. Rather,
it simply allows corporations to amend their articles of organization
to limit director liability." Thus, the shareholders of a corporation
must approve any limits upon the liability of its directors for breach-
ing the duty of care.''
of the best interests of the corporation, courts will riot penalize the directors for any losses
that result from that decision. Id. § 242.
E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1.985).
1 DEC CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Stipp. 1986). One article asserts that Indiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, New, jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have all enacted similar
provisions to the Delaware amendment. lialoni & Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of Director
Liability pr Delaware Grmporations, 12 DEL. J. Cow% L. 5, 10 n.22 (1987).
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 15613,	 13(b)(I 1/2) (Stipp. 1988).
Section I 3(b)(1 1/2) reads:
(I 1/2) a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director notwithstanding any provision ()flaw imposing such liability;
provided, however, that such provision'shall not eliminate or limit the liability
of a director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation
or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, (iii) under section sixty
one or sixty-two, or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper benefit;
Id.
"Section I3(b) contains permissible provisions for the articles of incorporation, not
mandatory terms. MASS, GEN. L. ch. 15611, § 13(h) (Sapp, 1988).
• 1 Id. §, ..4 70-71 (1970 & Stipp. 1988),
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Section 13(b)(1 1/2) also applies only to directors acting in their
capacity as directors. 1 ° Thus, while a corporation may limit its di-
rectors' liability, it may not limit the liability of its officers for breach-
ing their fiduciary duties. Neither may a corporation limit the lia-
bility of inside directors for actions they take in their roles as
corporate officers rather than corporate directors.
Additionally, section 13(b)(1 1/2) only applies to shareholder
derivative suits arising after a corporation amends its articles of
incorporation." Thus, directors will continue to be subject to liabil-
ity for any transgressions against third parties outside of the cor-
poration. Furthermore, a corporation may not adopt an amend-
ment authorized under section 13(b)(1 1/2) to shield liability from
pending litigation.
Under section 13(b)(1 1/2), a corporation may only limit the
liability of its directors for monetary damages.' 2 Thus, shareholders
may still bring actions for equitable relief from a director's breach
of the duty of care. Such actions may include preventing an unfa-
vorable action with an injunction or rescinding a transaction tainted
by a director's breach of the duty of care.' 3
The most important limitation on amendments authorized by
section 13(b)(1 1/2) lies in its restriction to actions based on the duty
of care. A corporation may not limit the liability of its directors for
breaches of the duty of loyalty to the corporation, for intentional
misconduct or violations of the law, for distributing assets when
those distributions would render the corporation insolvent, or for
any transactions from which a director derived an improper bene-
fit...14 By limiting or eliminating directors' liability for breaching the
duty of care but not the other duties, amendments under section
13(6)(1 1/2) place tremendous significance on the distinction be-
tween the duty of care and these other duties, especially the duty
of loyalty.
The distinction between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty
may often appear blurry. 15 Amendments under section 13(b)(1 1/2)
may eliminate director liability on one side of this blurry line but
not on the other. This uncertainty may well generate a great deal
of litigation. Nonetheless, in adopting section 13(b)(1 1/2), Massa-




0 Balotti & Gentile, supra note 5, at 15-16.
14 MASS. GEN. L ch. 1568, § 13(1)(1 112) (Supp. 1987),
155 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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chusetts joins with a number of other jurisdictions.'" As long as
Massachusetts courts move in unison with these other jurisdictions
in clarifying the distinction between the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty, the threat of this potential litigation may be limited.
B. *Allowing Corporations to Issue Blank Stock: Section 26
On July 21, 1987, the Massachusetts Legislature amended the
Massachusetts corporate statute to allow a corporation to grant its
directors authority to determine the rights, preferences, powers and
privileges of any class or series of stock before that corporation
issues any stock in that class or series.' This amendment allows the
corporation to issue "blank stock" in order to better compete in the
securities market. 2 This amendment brings the Massachusetts cor-
porate statute into line with the Delaware statute and allows Mas-
sachusetts-based corporations the flexibility to compete with their
Delaware counterparts.
Under the amended section 26, a Massachusetts corporation
may authorize its board of directors to determine the preferences,
voting powers, qualifications and privileges of any stock series or
class which the corporation has not previously issued. 3 Such a series
or class of stock is "blank stock." 4 The device of blank stock allows
a corporation to tailor its securities issues to the current conditions
in the securities market.' A corporation may adjust the dividend
percentage of a stock series to reflect the most recent developments
in the market." Without the device of blank stock, a corporation
must engage in the expensive and time-consuming process of seek-
ing shareholder approval to amend the articles of incorporation to
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
* John P. D'Amato, Staff Member, Bos-roN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
I MASS, GEN. L. ch. 15613, § 26 (1988 Supp.). The amended section 26 provides, ill part:
Section 26. If the articles of organization so provide, the directors may
determine, in whole or in part, the preferences, voting powers, qualifications,
and special ... rights or privileges of (I) any class of stock before the issuance
of any shares of that class or (2) one or more series within a class before the
issuance of any shares in that series.
'4 A corporation has blank stock when the directors may determine the rights and pref-
erences of the stock at a later date. W. FLETC HER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5284.1 (permanent ed. 1986).
3
 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 15613, 26 (Stipp. 1988).
W. FtxrcriER, supra note 2, § 5284.1.
'
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authorize the specific rights and preferences of each new class or
series of stock.'
The amended section 26 provides that to authorize the issuance
of a new series or class of stock, the corporation must file a certificate
with the state secretary.' That certificate must state the full text of
the directors' decision determining the rights and preferences of
the stock." That. certificate constitutes, in effect, an amendment of
the articles of organization.'"
By allowing Massachusetts corporations to use the device of
blank stock, the amended version of section 26 allows them to better
compete with their Delaware counterparts. Modern securities mar-
kets can fluctuate a great deal in a short period of time." Seeking
shareholder authorization to adjust the percentage of dividends of
a stock series can be a cumbersome processi 2 Through the device
of blank stock, a corporation may decide what preferences are
appropriate for a stock series given the current market conditions."
Thus, corporations based in states that allow blank stock have more
flexibility to react to a changing market than corporations located
in states that do not allow blank stock. By amending section 26 in
this manner, the legislature has, therefore, given Massachusetts-
based corporations a useful device for adjusting to a fluctuating
securities market.
Moreover, allowing corporations to issue blank stock may prove
useful to corporations subject to hostile takeovers." Under the
amended version of section 26, a Massachusetts corporation may
issue "poison pill" preferred stock. "Poison pill" shares are pre-
ferred shares of stock issued prd rata to the holders of common
stock.' 5 "Poison pill" shares have special redemption privileges.' 6
Typically, holders of "poison pill" shares have the right to redeem
these shares for cash if another company gains control over the
Id.




" W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 5284.1.
Id.
13 Id.
" See Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison
Pill" Preferred, 97 1-[ ARV. L. Rev. 1964 (1984).
Id. at 1964,
"l Id. at 1964-65.
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target corporation. 17 Furthermore, the price paid by the target cor-
poration For these redeemed shares generally equals the highest
price offered during the previous year." Thus, when a target cor-
poration issues blank stock, the takeover "shark" faces the prospect
of the target company's shareholders liquidating their holdings and
depleting the newly acquired company's assets.
C. *First Circuit Court of Appeals Enjoins Enforcement of the
Massachusetts Takeover Statute: Hyde Park Holdings, Inc. v.
Connolly
The United States Supreme Court has twice determined the
constitutionality of state anti-takeover statutes.' First, in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.,2 in 1982, the Court invalidated an Illinois statute on
commerce clause grounds while a plurality also found that the
federally enacted Williams Act preempted the statute.' The Illinois
statute empowered the Illinois Secretary of State to delay indefi-
nitely tender offers while preventing some offers altogether even
where the target corporation was not incorporated in that state.' In
1987, the Supreme Court, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
held that an Indiana statute which allowed disinterested sharehold-
ers to decide whether voting rights would be attached to shares
purchased by a bidder in a control transaction was constitutional. 5
In 1988, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hyde Park Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Connolly, affirmed a lower court's grant of an injunction
enjoining enforcement of certain provisions of a Massachusetts take-
over statute.'' In this case, Hyde Park 7 sought to enjoin enforcement
of section 3 of the Massachusetts Takeover Bid Regulation Act' on
the grounds that its provisions, which prohibited further takeover
bids (for a 1-year period) by any bidder exceeding the 5% stock
' 7 Id.
' 8 Id. at 1965.
* Paul F. Carroll, Staff Member, Bosroic CoLLEGE 	 REVIEW
1 See c-rs corp. v. Oyninnics Corp. ol . Ain., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
2 457 U.S. 624.
See id. at 634, 646.
See id. al 627.
5 See CTS, 107 S. Ct.. at 1652.
" 839 F.2d 837, 854 (1st Cit -. 1988).
7 Hyde Park consists of Hyde Park Partners, 1-.1'. and Hyde Park Holdings, Inc. Id. at
810.
8 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 1 10C, § 3 (1986).
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ownership level in its target without announcing its intent to acquire
control of such corporation, were unconstitutional." Hyde Park as-
serted that section 3 violated both the commerce clause and the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.m
The relevant facts in Hyde Park are straightforward. On Decem-
ber 9, 1987, Hyde Park Holdings, Inc. made purchases of High
Voltage Engineering Corporation's shares that resulted in owner-
ship in excess of the 5% level." The company failed, however, to
announce its intent to gain control of the corporation until Decem-
ber 21, 1987. 12 The court in Hyde Park rioted that the bidder did
not deny that it was in fact seeking control of the target.' 3 As a
result of the bidder's failure to announce, section 3 of the statute
would have prohibited any further purchases of High Voltage
shares until December 9, 1988.' 4
Subsequent to an analysis of several procedural questions and
an examination of the proper standard of review, the court consid-
ered Hyde Park's likelihood of success on the merits of its commerce
clause challenge. 1 ' Utilizing the two-part test enumerated by the
Supreme Court in CTS, the Hyde Park court concluded that the
statute neither discriminated against interstate tender offers nor
subjected Massachusetts corporations to inconsistent r6gulations.' 6
The court did warn, however, that application of the statute to a
corporation having its principal place of business in Massachusetts
but being incorporated elsewhere would probably be unconstitu-
tional under the commerce clause due to the aforementioned po-
tentially inconsistent regulation by more than one state. 17 In addi-
tion, although the court stated that a balancing test which weighs a
statute's burdens on interstate commerce against its purported local
benefits"' may not be appropriate in all commerce clause cases, it
applied the test in this instance because of the statute's "direct
regulation of interstate transactions."'" Regarding the disclosure
provision, the court was unwilling to accept as certain the state's




' 4 See id.
u See id. at 840-43.
35 Id. at 844.
n Id.
18
 This balancing test was enumerated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
19 Hyde Park, 839 F.2d at 844-45.
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contentions that this provision would increase shareholders' chances
to obtain premiums for their shares and that the statute would aid
Massachusetts corporations on the whole. 2° The court noted that
nonresident shareholders do not represent legitimate local interests,
that less takeovers may not benefit corporate shareholders, and that
"mere protection of local economic interests is generally an imper-
missible purpose under the Commerce Clause."2 ' The court con-
cluded, therefore, that due to the above-mentioned legitimate and
conflicting arguments, Hyde Park had not demonstrated sufficiently
the necessary likelihood of success on the merits regarding its com-
merce clause challenge to this provision. 22
The court did acknowledge, however, the likelihood of the
penalty provision's violating the commerce clause and likened the
provision to that in MITE in that it represented a direct prohibition
on the actual transfer of shares. 28 Moreover, the court of appeals
rejected the argument that because the provision would deter vio-
lation of the constitutional disclosure provision, it should be held
constitutional. 24 Courts may consider whether the particular penalty
in question is as unollensive to interstate commerce as other alter-
natives would be, the court added. 25 In fact, the court noted that
this penalty provision could serve to undermine the underlying
purpose of the statute (i.e. investor protection) by denying them
opportunities to maximize their profits by selling their shares to the
tender offeror for one year. 26 Because the court could cite only one
benefit created by the provision — its deterrent effect on disclosure
violations — it concluded that the penalty provision was sufficiently
likely to violate the commerce clause to warrant an injunction."
Under a preemption analysis, 28 the court initially pointed out
that Congress had not stated that the Williams Act, the federal
statute regulating takeovers, was meant to preempt all state legis-
2° Id. at 845-47.
2 ' Id. at 845-46.
22 Id. at 847.
" Id. at 847-48.
24 Id.
2' See id.
26 See id. at 848.
27 See id.
2K The court noted that it had earlier held, in Agency Rent-A-Car v. Connolly, 686 F.2d
1029 (1st Cir. 1982), that the penalty provision did not violate the Supremacy Clause, Hyde
Park, 839 F.2d at 848, The court added, however, that its decision therein was based 011 the
stipulation by both parties that the disclosure provision did not conflict with federal legislation
— a stipulation not present in this case. Id.
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lation in this area.29 The court did note, however, that section 3
must be examined to determine whether it would prevent the ob-
jectives of the Williams Act from being achieved. 30 The main goal
of the Williams Act, the court asserted, is to protect investors. 3 '
Because the disclosure provision would potentially reduce the num-
ber of tender offers for shares of Massachusetts corporations with-
out offering any protection to shareholders additional to that al-
ready provided by the Williams Act and due to the Williams Act's
explicit enumeration of . the proper extent and timing of disclosure
in takeover bids, the court concluded that the disclosure provision
would likely be preempted. 32 As a result, the court held that the
penalty provision, intended to deter violations of the disclosure
provision, was also likely violative of the supremacy clause. 33
The court's decision in Hyde Park reaffirms the judiciary's in-
tolerance for provisions potentially allowing for the outright pre-
vention of sales of stock. That, of course, represented a significant
distinction between the two statutes examined by the Supreme
Court in MITE and CTS. Whereas the Illinois statute invalidated in
MITE empowered a state official to prevent outright a tender offer
where he or she found its terms to be inequitable, 34 the Indiana
statute upheld in CTS involved only the voting rights to be attached
to shares subsequent to a control purchase. 35
Regarding preemption, courts have varied in their willingness
to accept state legislation which regulates along similar lines as the
Williams Act. In Hyde Park, the court of appeals expressed little
tolerance for the statute's disclosure requirement which called for
an announcement of intent to control the target corporation prior
to the federally imposed regulation. The court concluded that Con-
gress had struck a balance between the timing and extent of disclo-
sure and the potential adverse effects on the number of takeover
bids36 and that the disclosure requirement of section 3 frustrated
that balance."
29 Id. at 849.
3" See id.
31 Id.
'2 See id. at 850-53.
," Id. at 853.
3.1 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982).
" See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1641 (1987).
"See Hyde Park, 839 E.2d at 853.
97 Id.
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D. *Criminal Liability for Close Corporations: Commonwealth v.
L.A.L. Corp.
In 1987, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided in
Commonwealth v. L.A.L. Corp. that courts could hold a closely held
corporation criminally liable for acts committed by its agents.' In
deciding the L.A.L. case, the Supreme Judicial Court relied heavily
on its previous ruling in Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Company
which held several non-closely held, or "endocratic," corporations
criminally liable for the acts of their employees. 2 By refusing to
create an exception from the rule of the Beneficial Finance case, the
Court reinforced that decision and avoided making a difficult dis-
tinction between endocratie and closely held corporations.
In Beneficial Finance, the Supreme Judicial Court sustained the
convictions of three finance corporations as well as several individ-
uals for various crimes associated with a scheme to bribe members
of the Small Loans Regulatory Board.' The defendant corporations,
in Beneficial, argued that they should not incur criminal liability for
the actions of their agents unless the corporation's officers, directors
or other high managerial agents authorized these actions before
they occurred, ratified them after they occurred, or tolerated them
as they occurred. 5 The Supreme Judicial Court rejected these con-
tentions and stated that courts could hold a corporation criminally
liable for the actions of its agent if the corporation placed the agent
in a position where that agent had enough authority and respon-
sibility to act for the corporation in the particular project. that gave
rise to the criminal act." In reaching this conclusion, the Court
expressed considerable concern over the ability of large endocratic
corporations to escape liability for their actions.' The L.A.L. Cor-
poration seized upon these statements of concern to argue that the
* John P. D'Amato, Stall Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
1 400 Mass. 737. 511 N,E.2d 599 (1987). Closely held corporations are corporations in
which a small closely-knit group of shareholders own the vast majority of the stock. HENN &
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 257 (3t1 ed. 1983). Most, though trot all, closely held
corporations are small businesses. Id.
▪31111 Mass, 188, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971).
" Eildocralic corporations are Large, publicly held corporations whose stock is scattered
in midi groups among thousands of stockholders. 1d. at 11.58, 275 N.E.2d at 84 n.58.
▪Id. at 200-01, 373, 275 N.E.2d at 42-43, 136.
' id. at 254, 275 N.E.2d at 71.
"Id. at 280, 275 N.E.2c1 al 86.
'id. at 276-79, 175 N.E.2d al 83-85.
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rule of the Beneficial Finance case should not apply to closely held
corporations.
L.A.L.'s affidavit stated that the L.A.L. Corporation was a small
closely held corporation that operated an establishment known as
The Ranch House. 8 Only two people owned stock in the L.A.L.
Corporation. 9 The L.A.L. Corporation was duly licensed to serve
alcoholic beverages at The Ranch House." On several occasions,
minors purchased alcoholic drinks at The Ranch House, but the
bartender failed to ask any of these minors for proper age identi-
fication." Thus, each sale violated Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 138, section 34.' 2 L.A.L.'s affidavit stated that the corpo-
ration's manager, officers and directors played no role in the actions
which triggered this controversy." The affidavit also stated that the
company maintained a firm policy of prohibiting its employees from
selling drinks to minors. 14
.At trial, the L.A.L. Corporation moved to dismiss the com-
plaint, arguing that the Beneficial Finance standard should not apply
to closely held corporations." Rather, L.A.L. contended that a
closely held corporation should only incur criminal liability for the
actions of its agents if the corporation's officers, directors or other
high managerial agents approved of the actions." L.A.L. pointed
to the concern expressed by the Supreme Judicial Court in Beneficial
Finance over controlling large endocratic corporations."
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected L.A.L.'s position." In its
opinion, the Court stated that the distinction between large endo-
cratic corporations and closely held corporations makes "no differ-
ence" in holding a corporation criminally liable for the actions of
its employees.' 9 In so holding, the Court added that nothing in the
Beneficial opinion suggested that it should distinguish between
8 400 Mass. at 738-39,511 N.E.2d at 600-01.
" Id. at 739,511 N.E.2d at 601.
Id. at 739,511 N.E.2d at 600-01.
" Id. at 739, 511 N.E.2d at 601.
12 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 138, § 34 (1986), This provision reads as follows: "Whoever makes
a sale or delivery of any alcoholic beverages or alcohol to any person under twenty-one years
of age ... shall be punished by a line of not more than one thousand dollars or by impris-
onment for not more than six months, or both." Id.
,3 400 Mass. at 739, 511 N.E.2d at 601.
11 Id.
15 Id. at 740, 511 N.E.2d at 601.
16 Id. at 741, 511 N.E.2d at 601.
17 Id. at 740, 511 N.-F...2d at 601.
18 Id.
Id.
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closely held and endocratic corporations. 2° The Court added that
the defense advanced no sound reason for making such a distinction
in this context. 21 Turning to the facts of the case, the Court held
that the trial court. could reasonably find that the bartenders were
engaged in authorized conduct on behalf of the corporation when
they served drinks to the minors." The Court, therefore, concluded
that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss and remanded the case for further proceedings. 2"
In ruling against the defendants in Commonwealth v. L.A.L.
Corp., the Supreme judicial Court affirmed a strong public policy
in favor of holding corporations accountable for their actions, and
avoided making a distinction between closely held and endocratic
corporations in an inappropriate context. Corporations, unlike nat-
ural persons, can only act through their agents. To allow a corpo-
ration to benefit from these acts when they produce profits but not
incur liability when they act in a criminal fashion would allow a
corporation to exert tacit pressure on its employees to violate laws
that reduce profits. In this case, when the bartenders sold the drinks
to the minors, the L.A.L. Corporation received the profits from
these sales as well as from any other sales that went undetected.
L.A.L. should not. be able to hide behind a cloak labelled "legal
fiction" to avoid liability for these sales. Furthermore, allowing a
closely held corporation to escape liability for these actions would
defeat the underlying social policies behind the provisions of the
criminal law.
The decision of the Supreme judicial Court in the L.A.L. case
also avoids making a potentially troublesome distinction. While the
distinction between closely held and endocratic corporations seems
relatively clear when one compares a Fortune 500 company to a
prototypical "Mom and Pop" store, the distinction can blur as the
size of the business moves away from these two extremes. This is
not to say that making legal distinctions between endocratic and
closely held corporations is generally unwise. Indeed, in a number
of contexts the needs and operations of these two types of corpo-
rations differ greatly. 2 ' Such a distinction, however, could cloud the
au
	 at 743-44, 511 N. E.2d at 603.
2 ' Id. at 744, 511 N.E.2d at 603.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Closely held corporations generally have no publicly held voting shares of stock. HENN
& ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 257. Closely held corporations are generally concerned with
reducing the burden of formal procedures, avoiding deadlocks amongst the shareholders,
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issue of criminal liability in cases such as Commonwealth v. L.A.L.
Corp. and undermine the public policies embodied in the field of
criminal law.
E. *Fiduciary Duties Among Shareholders of Close Coprorations: Bodio
v. Ellis
In 1975, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Donahue
v. Rudd Electrotype Co., established that a close corporation's share-
holders owe to one another duties of loyalty.' This decision repre-
sented an extension of the fiduciary duties concept. more commonly
considered in connection with a corporation's officers and directors,
and their responsibilities to the corporation.? These fiduciary duties
owed by a close corporation's shareholders to one another have
been further defined in Massachusetts cases following Donahue. 3
Specifically, in 1987, in Bodio v. the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that where shareholders of a close corporation
clearly indicate their intent to maintain equal control between two
of the corporation's three shareholders and that. equality is later
disturbed by some shareholders to the detriment of another, courts
may find a breach of fiduciary duty among shareholders and order
that the transaction disturbing the envisioned equality be undone.'
Bodio involved the shareholders of Bright Insurance Agency, a
close corporation incorporated in Massachusetts." The company had
originally authorized 1000 shares and issued 450 shares in 1952. 7
Karl Bright was the majority shareholder of the corporation with
300 shares, while minority shareholders, Henry Bodio and Elsie
Apicella, had 105 shares and 45 shares respectively. 8 In 1965, Ap-
providing an active role in the management of the company for stockholders, and generally
keeping many of the attributes of a partnership. Id.
* Paul F. Carroll, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE Law REviEw
' 367 Mass. 578, 597, 328 N.E.2d 505, 517 (1975).
Sec R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 141 (1986).
3 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976) (a minority shareholder's being "frozen out of a close corporation by majority share-
holders absent a legitimate business purpose constituted a breach of the fiduciary duties
owed among a close corporation's shareholders); Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 7 Mass. App.
Ct. 68, 385 N.E.2d 1033 (1979) (where shareholders of' a close corporation purposely create
equal control among them, transactions that disturb that equality may be subject to invali-
dation by the courts).
-I 401 Mass. 1, 513 N.E.2d 684 (1987).
See id. at 10, 513 N.E.2d at 689.
6 Id. at 2, 513 N.E.2d at 685.
Id. at 4, 513 N.E.2d at 686.
"Id.
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icella sold her shares to Peter Ellis, who, by acquiring 60 shares
from Bright in 1968, became an equal minority shareholder along
with Bodio." By 1982, Bodio and Ellis had become vice-president
and president of the corporation respectively."'
- in 1972, however, Bright had transferred two shares to Gordon
Shaw, an attorney, so as to make Shaw a mediator in deadlock votes
between Ellis and Bodio." In 1973, the three shareholders executed
several agreements, the most significant of which provided that Ellis
and Bodio would each be entitled to one-half of Bright's shares on
the date of Bright's death. 12 Shaw,- however, transferred his two
shares to Ellis in 1974, at the direction of Bright, thereby upsetting
the originally intended equality between Ellis and Bodio." Both
Ellis and Bodio purchased 119 shares of Bright's 238 upon Bright's
death in 1981."
This case, therefore, focused on whether the decision by Bright
to direct Shaw's two shares to Ellis violated Bright's fiduciary duty
to Bodio.' 5 The Court examined all agreements among the parties
and concluded that the shareholders had intended to maintain
equality between Ellis and Bodio. 17 The Court noted that Bright's
initial two-share transfer to Shaw did not upset the equality estab-
lished between Bodio and Ellis.' 8 Although the Court conceded that
Bright apparently changed his mind by directing Shaw to transfer
the two shares to Ellis, thereby giving him eventual majority share-
holder status, it concluded that Bright's decision violated his duty
of "utmost loyalty, trust and confidence."'" As a result of the breach,
9 Id.
1 " See id. at 4-5, 513 N.E.2d at 686.
' 1 Id. at 6, 513 N.E.2d at 687.
12 Id. at 5, 513 N.E.2d at 686-87.
See id. at 6, 513 N.E.2d at 687.
14 Id.
1 ' See id. at 9, 513 N.E.2d at 688. The Court initially rejected defendants' argument that
Bodio had "de facto" retired and thereby subjected his shares to repurchase pursuant to an
earlier agreement among the parties. See id. at 6-7, 513 N.E.2d at 687.
111 0ther agreements provided for Ellis' rights upon Bodio's retirement and vice versa,
as well as their salaries, responsibilities and rights as directors. Id. at 5, 513 N.E,2d at 686.
17 See id, at 8-9, 513 N.E.2d at 688.
Id, at 9, 513 N.E.2d at 688.
'" Id. at 9, 513 N.E.2d at 688-89 (citing Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass.
578, 594-97, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975)). The Court also cited 1 lallnhurt v. Haltom Corp. wherein
the Massachusetts Appeals Court found a breach of fiduciary duties among shareholders
where four shareholders were intended to have equal control of the corporation and that
equality was disrupted by a shareholder's acquiring by proxy the right to vote the shares or
a fifth party not intended to be a participant in the corporation's affairs. Id, at 9, 513 N.E.2d
at 689 (referring to Ha&than, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 68, 69-71, 385 N.E.2d 1033 (1979)).
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the Court ordered that the corporation re-acquire two of Ellis'
shares. 2°
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Bodio, further
clarified the duty of loyalty owed among shareholders of closely
held corporations. The Court established that even where share-
holders do not possess equal power initially, subsequent agreements
among the shareholders to create and to maintain such a balance
cannot be rendered ineffective by transfers that would disrupt that
equality, as such would constitute breaches of the fiduciary duties
owed among shareholders of close corporations. The Court also
demonstrated its willingness to resort to equitable remedies where
such equality is indeed disrupted.
VI. SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN PROPERTY AND ZONING LAW
Several noteworthy developments in property law occurred
during the Selected Developments year. Section A first will consider
the effect of the recently enacted statutory provision Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 40A, section 6, on the exemption of non-
conforming uses from local zoning by-laws. Next, Section B exam-
ines the requirements for exempting a non-profit educational cor-
poration from local zoning regulations. Section C addresses recent
Massachusetts Appeals Court decisions that interpret what consti-
tutes a subdivision within the meaning of Massachusetts General
Laws chapter 41, section 81P and relatedly, whether a plan may be
exempt from the local planning board subdivision approval process.
Section D discusses recent decisional law concerning adverse pos-
session of an easement. Finally, Section E concludes with a general
review of Massachusetts law regarding a real estate broker's right
to a commission, and a particular critique of a 1987 First Circuit
decision that interprets Massachusetts law concerning the broker's
fee issue.
A. *Discontinuance or Abandonment of Nonconforming Uses: Bartlett
v. Board of Appeals of Lakeville
Under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 40A, section 6, a
"zoning ordinance or by-law may define and regulate nonconform-
ing uses and structures abandoned or not used for a period of two
Bodio, 401 Mass. at 10, 513 N.E.2c1 at 689.




years or longer."' The exemption of nonconforming uses from
zoning ordinances and by-laws has existed since the legislature first
granted authority to cities and towns outside of Boston to adopt
such ordinances and by-laws. 2 Cities and towns, however, may reg-
ulate non-use of nonconforming structures so as to terminate the
nonconforming use.' Many city and town ordinances and by-laws
which extinguished nonconforming uses usually required a period
of "discontinuing" use before they could extinguish the noncon-
forming use. 4
The Supreme Judicial Court, in the 1954 decision of Pioneer
Insulation & Modernizing Corp. v. Lynn, held that the term "discon-
tinued" was the equivalent of "abandoned." 5 The Court stated that
to determine whether an owner discontinued a nonconforming use,
a court should examine two concurring factors: first, the intent to
abandon, and second, any voluntary conduct, whether affirmative
or negative, that implies an abandonment. 6 The Court noted, how-
ever, that non-occupancy of the premises or suspension of the busi-
ness due to causes beyond the owner's control did not alone con-
stitute a discontinuance.' According to the Court, the lapse of time
during which the premises were unoccupied or the business sus-
pended was riot controlling, although such a period of non-use
would constitute evidence of an intent to discontinue the noncon-
forming use.'
During the Selected Developments year, the Massachusetts Ap-
peals Court, in Bartlett v. Board of Appeals of Lakeville, equated the
words "discontinued for a period of two years or longer," appearing
in the relevant portion of a town's zoning by-law, with the language
"not used for a period of two years or more," as used in section 6. 0
The court also held that the owners of a building are precluded
from re-establishing a nonconforming use that the operation of the
by-laws had extinguished absent any by-law provision which would
MASS. GEN L. ch. 40A 6, (1975).
2 Bartlett v. Board of Appeals of Lakeville, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 664, 666-67, 505 N.F..2d
193, 195 (1987). See Inspector of Buildings of Burlington v. Murphy, 320 Mass. 207, 209,
68 N.E.2d 918 (1946). '
3 Bartlett, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 667, 505 N.E.2d at 195.
4 12.




Bartlett, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 670, 505 N,E,2(1 at 197. See MASS, GEN. L. ch. 40A, 6
(1975).
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allow them to do so. 10 In Bartlett, the court held that the Lakeville
Board of Appeals (the "Board") correctly equated the language of
the town by-law extinguishing a nonconforming use with the re-
cently enacted cognate provisions of Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 40A, section 6 (the "Statute")." A city or town, the court
stated, may not adopt a new or amended zoning ordinance or by-
law which conflicts with general enabling legislation. 12
 A city or town
may, however, adopt either or both criteria set forth in the statute
to extinguish nonconforming uses." In other words, a city or town
may extinguish a nonconforming use by using the abandonment
standard, or by using the two year time period of non-use, as stated
in the statute.'''
In Bartlett, a town building inspector refused to issue a permit
for the renovation of a three-unit dwelling in the residential zoning
district of the town.'' The building had been exempt since 1959
from a by-law that did not permit three-family dwelling units in the
residential zone in which the building was located.'€ The previous
owner had lived in one of the units, but had not rented out the
other two for a period of ten years, during which time she was in
declining health for several years.' 7 Because of her declining health
she failed to rent the premises or to alter or eliminate the apart-
ments."
In 1984, the plaintiff, as present owner of the property, applied
for a building permit for use in connection with the renovation of
all three dwelling units.' 9 The building inspector refused the permit
on the grounds that the zoning by-laws prohibited three-family units
unless protected by the nonconforming use provisions of the by-
iaw.20 The plaintiff appealed to the Board, which upheld the action
of the building inspector. 2 ' The Board equated the words "discon-
tinued for a period of two years or longer" in the town by-law with
Bartlett, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 672, 505 N.E.2d at 198.
" Id. at 670, 505 N.E.2d at 197.
' 2 Id. (citing Planning Bd. of Reading V. Board of Appeals of Reading, 333 Mass. 657,
660, 132 N.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1956)).
' 3 Bartlett, 23 Mass App. Ct. at 688-89, 5(15 N.E.2d at 196.
' Id. See Mass. GEN . L. ch 40A, § 6 (1975).
' Bartlett, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 666, 505 N.E.2d at 194.
' 6 Id. at 665, 505 N.E.2d at 194.
17 Id. at 665-66, 505 N.E.2d at 194.
' 6 It
' 9 Id. at 6613, 505 N.E.2d at 194.
2° Id.
2 ' Id. at 666, 505 N.E.2d at 194-95.
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the words "not used for a period of two years or more" in the
statute, and sustained the building inspector's decision, prompting
the plaintiff to appeal the decision to the Superior Court. 22 The
Superior Court sustained the Board's decision on appea1. 23
The Appeals Court held that the Board correctly equated the
language of the by-law with the language of the statute." In choos-
ing the language of the by-law, the court held, the town meeting
selected the objective criteria of "not used for two years or more"
for terminating a nonconforming use.2 ' The court refused to apply
the traditional voluntary or intentional action requirement, a part
of the abandonment criterion, to the second "discontinued" use
criterion. 26 The legislature, the court held, had established an ob-
jective standard with the second criterion that was both easily under-
stood and easily applied. 27 The legislature could not have intended
to merely repeat the abandonment test in the second criterion. 28 It
would have been a tautology, the court stated, if the legislature had
meant to extinguish a nonconforming use that had been "aban-
doned or abandoned for a period of two years or more." 29
Bartlett is significant because it provides guidance in framing a
by-law or ordinance used to terminate nonconforming uses. Al-
though a city or town cannot adopt a new or amended zoning
ordinance or by-law which conflicts with general enabling legisla-
tion, a city or town can select either or both criteria for extinguishing
a nonconforming use. Either the traditional "abandonment" stan-
dard can be used, which requires intent plus voluntary action or
inaction and is not dependent on a time period, or the two year
provision which terminates a nonconforming use according to the
time period, regardless of intent. In doing so, the court has made
it relatively easy to extinguish a nonconforming use. The court.
upheld the policy that cities and towns should have the ability to
terminate such nonconforming uses.
This interpretation of the statute and the by-law is especially
hard on indigent property owners. In Bartlett, the previous owner,
whose protection was extinguished, was in declining health and
112
23 Id. at 666, 505 N.E.2d at 195.
sa hl. at 670, 505 N.E.2d at 197.
25 N.
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unable to rent the units for at least part of the ten-year period of
non-use. The court did not address the issue of whether the pro-
tection would have been extinguished had the previous owner been
incapacitated for the entire period of non-use. If the protection
would have been extinguished despite the owner's incapacity to
exercise the nonconforming use, then indigent or disabled property
owners would be unfairly deprived of the protection. Buyers seek-
ing the protected property would have an enormous advantage over
an owner whose nonconforming use would be terminated even if
they are unable, rather than unwilling, to maintain it. After Bartlett,
towns and cities may now choose the "abandonment" standard or
the two year time period or both in order to extinguish a noncon-
forming use. Although voluntary action is not required for the two-
year standard as it is for the abandonment standard, the Appeals
Court has not yet decided whether physical inability to maintain the
nonconforming use will affect the running of the statutory period.
Thus, until the courts incorporate a physical incapacity exception
to the two-year period for extinguishing a nonconforming use,
towns may easily destroy nonconforming uses by adopting the less
restrictive two-year standard, thereby depriving indigent property
owners their nonconforming uses.
B. *Zoning: Zoning Exemptions for Nonprofit Educational Corporations
Massachusetts prohibits municipalities from enforcing zoning
restrictions which exclude educational and religious organizations,
and significantly restricts the ability of municipalities to regulate
educational and religious uses of property.' The Massachusetts zon-
ing exemption for educational and religious organizations accords
with the majority view that such organizations are important to
society generally and therefore municipalities may not exclude them
from residential districts. 2 In 1950, the Massachusetts Legislature
enacted legislation to preclude municipalities from exercising pref-
erences as to the type of educational and religious uses of property
they would tolerate. 3 The legislature amended this enactment in
* Kristin E. McIntosh, stall member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW .REVIEW.
' See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 3 (West 1979).
2 See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPE, THE LAW or ZONING AND PLANNING § 20.01(2)(a)
(1986).
Bible Speaks v. Board of Appeals of Lenox, 8 Mass. App. Ct.. 19, 27 n.10, 33, 391
N.E.2d 279, 283 n.10, 286 (1979). See Newbury junior College v. Town of Brookline, 19
Mass. App. Ct. 197, 205, 472 N.E.2d 1373, 1379, rev. denied, 394 Mass. 1102, 475 N.E.2d
401 (1985). The statute as amended in 1956, provided "that no ordinance or by-law which
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1975 to require that the property be leased or owned by a "nonprofit
educational corporation" in addition to requiring that the property
be used for "educational purposes." 4
Massachusetts courts broadly define education as the process
of developing human abilities and preparing individuals for "activ-
ity and usefulness in life." 5 The courts likewise broadly define "ed-
ucational purpose" within the context of the Massachusetts General
Laws chapter 40A, section 3. 6 They focus on the particular use of
the structure or the land at issue and require that the proposed use
of that land be primarily educational.' In contrast to the definition
of "educational purpose," Massachusetts courts have not required
that a corporation's general activities be primarily educational to
qualify as a "nonprofit educational corporation." 8
prohibits or limits the use of land for any church or other religious purpose or ftw any
educatilmal purpose whether public, religions, sectarian or denominational shall be valid."
City or Worcester v. New England Inst. and New England School of Accounting, 335 Mass.
486, 488, 140 N.E.2d 470, 472 (1957).
See Gardner-Athol Arca Mental Health Ass'il v. 'hitting Bd. of Appeals of Gardner,
101 Mass. 12, 15 n.5, 513 N.E.2d 1272, 1275 n.5 (1987). No zoning ordinance or by-law shall
"prohibit, regulate or restrict the use of' land or structures ... for educational Imposes on and
owned or leased ... by a nonprofit educational corporation." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 40A,
§ 3 (West 1979) (emphasis added). The statute permits "reasonable regulations concerning
the bulk and height of structures and determining yard sizes, lot area, setbacks, open space,
parking and building coverage requirements." hi.
'Commissioner of Code Inspection of Worcester v. Worcester Dynamy, Inc., 11' Mass.
App. Ct. 97, 99, 413 N.E.2d 1151, 1153 (1980) (quoting Mt. Hernum Boys' School v. Gill,
145 Mass. 139. 146, 13 N.E. 351, 357 (1887)); Fitchburg Housing Auth. v. Board of Zoning
Appeals of' Fitchburg, 380 Mass. 869, H75, 400 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 (1980) (quoting Mt.
Hermon Boys' School v. Gill, 145 Mass. 139, 14ti, 13 N.E. 354, 357 (1887)). See also Harbor
Schools v. Board of Appeals of Haverhill, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 000, 604-05, 360 N.E.2t1 764,
767-68 (1977) (education includes rehabilitation of emotionally disturbed children); New
England Ind., 335 Mass. at 493, 140 N.E.2d at 474 (education includes vocational training).
"See MID rcester County Cliristiati Communications, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Spencer,
22 Mass. App. Ct. 83, 89, 49 1 N.E.2d 634, 638-39 (1986) (radio station's intended use not
for educational purposes, althimgh radio programing might be for an educational purpose
under other circumstances). See Newbury, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 199, 472 N.E.2d at 1379-80
(dormitories as "use for an educational purpose"); Radcliffe College v. City of Cambridge,
350 Mass. 013, 618, 215 N.E.2t1 892, 895 (1906) (automobile parking facilities for students
and faculty as ''use for an educational purpose").
Whitinsville Retirement Soc'y, Inc. v. Town of Northbridge, 394 Mass. 757, 760, 477
N.E.2d 407, 409 (1985); Fitchburg, 380 Mass, at 874, 406 N.E.2d al 1009.
See Gardner-Athol, 401 Mass. at 15 - 16, 513 N.E.2d at 1275. See also Christian Communi-
rations, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 87, 491 N.E.2d at 637 (although its land use was lot educational,
radio station's articles of organization stated its purposes were charitable, scientific and
educational); Whitinsville, 394 Mass. at 758, 477 N.E.2d at 408 (nonprofit corporation's E n id
use for nursing home not educational); Newbury, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 206-07, 472 N.E.2d
at 1379 (junior college's land use educational); Dynamy, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 98, 413 N.E.2d
at 1152 (lump-oil! corporation organized exclusively for educational purposes); Bible Speaks
t'. Board of Appeals of Lenox, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 21, 391 N.E.2d 279, 280 (1979) (runtimtlit
religious and educational corporation).
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During the Selected Developments year, in the 1987 decision of
Gardner-Athol Area Mental Health Ass'n v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
Gardner, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explicitly
ruled that the phrase "nonprofit educational corporation" did not
require that education be the primary activity of a nonprofit cor-
poration for the corporation to be exempt from zoning require-
ments.`' Gardner-Athol establishes that the general corporate pur-
poses set forth in the articles of organization determine whether or
not a nonprofit corporation is educational."' Consequently, follow-
ing Gardner-Athol, a nonprofit corporation's use of land is exempt
from zoning requirements if the use will be primarily educational
and education is within its corporate purposes as set forth in the
corporation's articles of organization."
The nonprofit corporation in Gardner-Athol operated programs
for the mentally ill and mentally retarded.' 2 Its articles of organi-
zation stated that the corporation's purposes included cooperating
with governmental agencies to "promote a program of mental
health education; providing means and facilities to aid in the pre-
vention, care and treatment of mental health disorders;" and facil-
itating rehabilitation of the mentally handicapped.'s In carrying out
its corporate purposes, the Gardner-Athol Area Mental Health As-
sociation (GAAMHA) leased a single family dwelling to use as a
residential care facility for four adults with mental disabilities." The
Prior to 1975, the statute provided that "no ordinance or by-law which prohibits or limits
the use of land ... fur any educational purpose which is ... public shall be valid." City of
Chicopee v. Jakubowski, 348 Mass. 230, 232, 202 N.E.2d 913, 915 (1964). Massachusetts
courts interpreted "public" to mean non-commercial or nonprofit activity. See, e.g., Harbor
Schools, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 607-08, 366 N.E.2d at 769 (nonprofit school operated for
charitable purposes exempt from zoning requirements); Chicopee, 348 Mass. at 232, 202
N.E.2d at 915 (teaching ceramics for slight profit not "public"); Kurz v. Board of Appeals of
N. Reading, 341 Mass. 110, 113, 167 N.E.2d 627, 629 (dancing school operated as a com-
mercial enterprise for profit not "public").
9 401 Mass. at 15, 513 N.E.2d at 1275. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 90A, § 3 (West
1979).
1 " 401 Mass. at 15-16, 513 N.E.2d at 1275. See also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 180, §§ 2-4
(Law. Co-op. 1987).
" See 401 Mass. at 15-16, 513 N.E.2d at 1275. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90A, § 3
(West 1979).
12
 401 Mass. at 19, 513 N.E.2d at 1274. The corporation was organized under Massa-




March 1989]	 SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS	 769
facility's program would teach the residents daily living and voca-
tional skills to prepare them to live more independently. 15
Shortly before the execution of the lease, a resident of the
neighborhood where the dwelling was located questioned the pro-
posed use of the building.'" The building inspector notified this
resident that Massachusetts law exempted the proposed use from
zoning regulations." Numerous area residents appealed to the Zon-
ing Board of Appeals of Gardner ("the Board").' 8 The Board re-
versed the inspector's ruling without stating its reasons.'`' GAAMHA
appealed to a Massachusetts district court which upheld the Board's
decision, stating that because education played a subordinate role
in GAAMHA's activities, GAAMHA failed to qualify as a nonprofit
educational corporation." The Supreme Judicial Court granted a
request for direct appellate review. 2 '
The Court vacated the judgment of the district court and af-
firmed the determination of the building inspector. 22 The Court
established that persons charged with enforcement should refer to
the articles of organization filed with the state in order to determine
whether or not a nonprofit corporation is educational." As long as
a corporation's articles permit the proposed educational activities,
the Court refused to impose a requirement that the corporation's
overall activities be primarily educational. 24
The Court held that the primary purpose or activity of a cor-
poration need not be educational for the corporation to be a "non-
profit educational corporation." 25 The proper test, the Court stated,
is whether the nonprofit corporation's articles of organization per-
mit it to engage in any educational activities. 20 If the articles of
organization so provide, the Court continued, then as long as the
'" Id. at 14, 513 N.E.2d at 1274-75.
,7 Id. at 14, 513 N.E.2d at. 1275. See MASS. GEN. Laws ANN. ch. 40A, § 3 (West 1979).
Hi Id
" Id.
" Id. at 14-15, 513 N.E.2d at 1275.
Id. at 15, 513 N.E.2d at 1275.
22 Id. at 16, 513 N.E.2d at 1276.
23 /d. at 15-16, 513 N.E.2d at 1275.
24 Id. While the Court held that GAAM14A's use of the property would be educational,
it did not address whether or not its I se would be primarily educational. Id, at 13, 513
N.E.2d at 1274 (citing Fitchburg, 380 Mass. 869, 406 N.E.2d 1006).
2 '' Id. at 15, 513 N.E.2d at 1275.
Id. at 15-16, 513 N.E.2d at 1275.
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corporation's use of the land in question is predominantly educa-
tional, the corporation is exempt from local zoning ordinances.27
The Court noted that this construction does not deprive the
word "educational" of meaning. 28 In contrast, the Court stated that
to interpret "nonprofit educational corporation" as "nonprofit pri-
marily-educational corporation" would be to add words to the stat-
ute and give it a meaning it does not otherwise have. 29 The Court
further noted Massachusetts' policy of continuing deinstitutionali-
zation of mental health patients. 3° Consistent with this policy,
GAAMHA's general activities and proposed use of the particular
property at issue could not have been regulated by zoning provi-
sions prior to 1975 and the legislative history surrounding the 1975
amendment did not indicate any attempt to change this effect. 3 '
Thus, because GAAMHA's articles of organization established it. as
a nonprofit corporation permitted to engage in educational and
rehabilitative activities, the Court held that GAAMHA qualified as
a nonprofit educational corporation within the meaning of the stat-
ute. 32
Justice Lynch, joined by Justice Nolan, dissented and argued
that to qualify as an educational corporation a nonprofit corpora-
tion's purposes should be primarily educational to come within the
statute's protection. 33 The dissent asserted that, because the Court
requires the use of property to be primarily for an "educational
purpose" to qualify for a zoning exemption, the Court also should
require that the overall activities of a nonprofit corporation be
primarily educational to qualify for a zoning exemption. 34 The dis-
sent reasoned that GAAMHA was primarily a social service orga-
nization and, therefore, GAAM HA's use of the particular property
at issue, regardless of whether the use was an educational purpose,
should be subject to zoning regulations."
" Id. at 15, 513 N.E.2d at 1275.
"Id. at 16, 513 N.E.2d at 1275-76.
2'i Id. at 16, 513 N.E.2d at 1276.
" Id. at 15 n.5, 513 N.E.2d at 1275 n.5 (citing Fitchburg. 380 Mass. 869, 406 N.E.2d
1006).
31 Id.
32 Id. al 13, 15, 513 N.E.2d at 1274, 1275. The Court stated that Thiehabilitation surely
falls within the meaning of education." Id. at 15, 513 N.E.2d at 1275 (citing Harbor Schools,
5 Mass. App. Ct. at 604-05. 366 N.E.2d at 768).
"Id. at 18, 513 N.E.2d at 1276-77 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 18, 513 N.E.2d at 1277 (Lynch, J., dissenting). Justice Lynch additionally argued
that the Court's interpretation rendered the word "educational" superfluous in the phrase
"nonprolitAncational corporation." Id. at 17, 513 N.E.2d at 1276 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 18-19, 513 N.E.2d at 1277 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
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Gardner-Athol presents a two-step analysis for determining
whether a nonprofit corporation qualifies for exemption from zon-
ing regulations on educational grounds." In order to qualify, the
articles of organization for a nonprofit corporation must permit it
to engage in educational activities." Additionally, the particular use
of the property at issue must be primarily educational." Thus,
Gardner-Athol establishes that while property must be used primarily
for an educational purpose, a nonprofit corporation does not have
to engage primarily in educational activities to qualify for exemption
from zoning regulations.
The Gardner-Athol Court, on the facts presented, properly in-
terpreted the statutory phrase "nonprofit educational corporation."
While the Court previously had concluded that the phrase "edu-
cational purpose" appearing earlier in the same statute requires that
the specific use of the property be primarily educational," requiring
that a corporation's general activities be primarily educational acids
words to the statute and changes the statute's meaning. 40 The Court
resolved the tension between adding words to the statute and in-
terpreting the word "educational" consistently by reference to Mas-
sachusetts' policy favoring deinstitutionalization of mental health
patients. 4 ' Because of this policy, the Court correctly reasoned that
the legislature probably did not intend that only a nonprofit cor-
poration primarily engaging in educational activities would be ex-
empt from local zoning regulations. 42 In this context, therefore, the
Court correctly held that a nonprofit corporation's overall activities
need not be primarily educational for the corporation to qualify for
zoning exemptions.
In summary, Gardner-Athol continues the broad exemption
from local zoning regulation for educational activities. Municipali-
ties wanting to apply zoning regulations to nonprofit corporations
which claim a zoning exemption on educational grounds must show
either that the corporation's articles of organization do not contain
an educational purpose or that the proposed use of the particular
property at issue would not be primarily educational. Nonprofit
'° See id. at 15, 513 N.E.2d at 1275.
37 See id. at 15-16, 513 N.E.2d at 1275.
33 See supra note 7 and accompanying iext.
See. Gardner-Athol, 401 Mass. at 18, 513 N.E.2d at 1277 (Lynch,,., dissenting). See .supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
See Gardner-Athol, 401 Mass. at 16, 513 N.E.2d at 1275-76.
IL See id. at 15 it.5, 513 N.E.2d at 1275 11.5.
411 Id.
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corporations seeking exemption should therefore ensure that their
articles of organization express an educational purpose and that the
particular proposed use would be primarily educational. Addition-
ally, Massachusetts courts will be permissive in allowing zoning ex-
emptions in the contexts of rehabilitating deinstitutionalized mental
health patients and rehabilitating emotionally disturbed children. 43
Thus, Gardner-Athol reaffirms the Court's view that courts should
construe zoning exemptions for educational activities broadly.
C. *Interpretations of the Subdivision Control Law
Although the precise definition varies from state to state, a
subdivision is generally defined as the division of a parcel of land
into two or more lots.' Every state has passed enabling legislation
authorizing local governments to regulate subdivisions. 2 Ordinarily,
such enabling legislation authorizes the local legislative body to
adopt detailed subdivision regulations and to appoint a planning
board that may grant or deny subdivision applications according to
those regulations. 3
 A municipality's authority to regulate the sub-
division of land is an important tool in planning for community
growth and development. 4
 Regulating such matters as the construc-
tion of streets and the provision of adequate water, sewage, and
other services to the proposed subdivision, such subdivision controls
ensure the efficient development of the municipality. 5
The "subdivision control law," chapter 41, sections 81 K to
81GG of the Massachusetts General Laws,' confers to Massachusetts
municipalities the power to control the subdivision of property.'
Under section 810, a person may not subdivide his or her land
without submitting a plan of the proposed subdivision to the local
planning board for approval." Section 81L of chapter 41 defines a
subdivision as "the division of land into two or more lots." Section
" See id. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
*Peter F. Neronha, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
4 A. RATTIKOPF & D. RATIIKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, § 64.03, at 64-19
(1986) thereinafter RATHROI'll.
2 1d. § 64.04, at 64-41-64-43; 82 Am. juR. 2n, Zoning and Planning § 163 (1976).
RivraticopF, supra note 1, § 64.04, at 64-41-64-42.
' Id. § 64,01, at 64-7.
5 82 Am. init. 26, Zoning and Planning, § 163 (1976).
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 41, § 8IK (1979).
7 1d. § 810.
"Id.
"Id. § 81L. Section 811.. provides in part:
'Subdivision' shall mean the division of a tract of laud into two ur mute lots and
shall include resubdivision, and, when appropriate to the context, shall relate
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81 L also provides, however, that in two instances, the division of a
parcel of land into two or more lots does not constitute a subdivision
within the meaning of the subdivision control law.'° The first ex-
ception under section 81L, hereinafter referred to as the "frontage"
exception, provides that the division of property into two or more
lots does not constitute a subdivision if each newly created lot fronts
(a) on a public way, (b) on a way shown on a development plan
approved under the subdivision control law, or (c) on a way existing
at the time the subdivision control law became effective in the
municipality where the land lies which the planning board has
deemed adequate for traffic need's and the installation of municipal
services."
Additionally, section 81L provides a second exception to the
definition of a subdivision, hereinafter referred to as the "two or
more buildings" exception. Under this provision, the division of
land containing two or more buildings at the time the subdivision
control law went into effect in the municipality does not constitute
a subdivision within the meaning of that law as long as each newly
created lot contains at least one of those buildings. 12
to the process of subdivision or the land or territory divided; provided, however,
that the division of a tract of land into two or more lots shall not be deemed to
constitute a subdivision within the meaning of the subdivision control law if, at
the time when it is made, every lot within the tract so divided has frontage on
(a) a public way or a way which the clerk of the city or town certifies is maintained
and used as a public way, or (b) a way shown on a plan theretofore approved
and endorsed in accordance with the subdivision control law, or (c) a way in
existence when the subdivision control law became effective in the city or town
in which the land lies, having, in the opinion of the planning board, sufficient
width, suitable grades and adequate construction to provide for the needs of
vehicular traffic in relation to the proposed use of the land abutting thereon or
served thereby, and for the installation of municipal services to serve such land
and the buildings erected or to be erected thereon. Such frontage shall be of
at least such distance as is then required by zoning or other ordinance or by-
law, if any, of said city or town for erection of a building on such lot, and if no
distance is so required, such frontage shall be of at least twenty feet. Convey-
ances or other instruments adding to, taking away from, or changing the size
and shape of, lots in such a mariner as not to leave any lot so affected without
the frontage above set forth, or the division of a tract of land on which two or
more buildings were standing when the subdivision control law went into effect
in the city or town in which the land lies into separate lots on each of which
one of such buildings remains standing, shall not constitute a subdivision.
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These exceptions to the definition of a subdivision under sec-
tion 81L have a significant impact on zoning law because under
chapter 41, section 81P, only those things defined as a subdivision
are subject to the approval process of the local planning board.' 3
Where a plan for the division of property does not constitute a
subdivision as defined by the subdivision control law, a local plan-
ning board must endorse the plan "approval not required."" Thus,
if a landowner can show that his or her plan for dividing the
property satisfies either exception to the definition of a subdivision
under the subdivision control law, the landowner can avoid the
requirement of obtaining planning board approval before-begin-
ning development.
During the Selected Developments year, the Massachusetts Ap-
peals Court rendered three decisions interpreting the exceptions to
the definition of a subdivision outlined in chapter 41, section 81L
of the Massachusetts General Laws. In Hutchinson v. Planning Board
of Hingham, the Appeals Court interpreted the section 81L "front-
age" exception for the division of land into lots fronting on a public
way to include a requirement that the public way provide practical
access to each 1°0 5 In Fox v. Planning Board of Milton, the court
held that despite the existence of a publicly owned greenbelt lying
between private property and a public way, that private property
nonetheless "fronts" on a public way for the purposes of part (a) of
the "frontage" exception contained in section 8 IL.' 6 in Citgo Petro-
leum Corporation v. Planning Board of Braintree, the court held that
the "two or more buildings" exception need not be read together
with the "frontage" exception, but rather constitutes a separate and
13 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 41, § 81P (Supp. 1988). Section 81P provides:
Any person wishing to cause to be recorded a plan of land situated in a city or
town in which the subdivision control law is in effect, who believes that his plan
does not require approval under the subdivision control law, may submit his
plan to the planning board of such city or town in the manner prescribed in
section eighty-one T, and, if the board finds that the plan does not require such
approval, it shall forthwith, without a public hearing, endorse thereon or cause
to be endorsed thereon by a person authorized by it the words "approval under
the subdivision control law not required" or words of similar import with
appropriate name or names signed thereto, and such endorsement shall be
conclusive on all persons. Such endorsement shall riot be withheld unless such
plan shows a .subdivision
Id.
14 Id.
23 Mass. App. Ct. 416, 502 N.E.2d 572 (1987).
16 24 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 511 N.E.2d 30 (1987).
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distinct exception to the definition of subdivision under section
811- 17
In Hutchinson v. Planning Board of Hingham, the plaintiff land-
owner submitted a plan to the Hingham Planning Board proposing
to divide a parcel of land into five lots, each abutting Lazell Street,
a public w2ty.'s The plaintiff argued that her plan did not constitute
a subdivision under the subdivision control law in that it provided
for the division of lots fronting on a public way, thus falling within
part (a) of the "frontage" exception to the definition of subdivision
under section 8 I L. 19 As a result, the plaintiff argued, the Board
was required to endorse her plan "approval not required" under
section 811). 2° The Board refused to exempt the plaintiff's plan
from the subdivision approval process, arguing that Lazell Street
failed to provide for the additional traffic needs related to the
proposed lots and that the frontage for each of the five lots did not
provide adequate access to a public way as required by the subdi-
vision control law. 2 '
The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the superior
court annulling the decision of the Hingham Planning Board. 22
Citing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's holding in Gif-
ford v. Planning Board of Nantucket, 23 the court noted that in inter-
preting the exceptions to the definition of a subdivision in section
81 L, courts may look to the purposes of the subdivision control law
as expressed in chapter 41, section 81M. 24 Because section 81M
provides that the purpose of the subdivision control law is to ensure
efficient vehicular access to each lot in a subdivision, the court held
that even where each lot has frontage on a public way, thus tech-
nically satisfying the "frontage" exception to section 81 L, if there is
no practical access to the lots from the public way, the "frontage"
exception does not apply. 25 The court noted that in Hrenchuk v.
Planning Board of Walpole, 2" it had refused to apply the "frontage"
exception because, although every lot fronted on a public way, the
public way was a limited access highway which in reality provided
12 24 Mass. App. Ct. 425, 509 N.E.2d 284 (1987).
15 23 Mass. App. Cu, at 416-17, 502 N.E.2d at 573.
'" See id, at 417, 502 N.E.2d at 573.
"Id. at 417, 502 N.E.2d at 573.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 416, 502 N.E.2d at 573.
25 376 Mass. 801, 383 N.E.2d 1123 (1978).
24 Hutchinson, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 419, 502 N.E.2d at 574.
25 hi.
2" 8 Mass. App. Ct. 949, 397 N.E.2d 1292 (1979).
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no access to the lots. 27 Similarly, the Hutchinson court noted that in
Perry V. Planning Board of Nantucket,28 it had refused to apply the
81 L exclusion, notwithstanding technical compliance with the
"frontage" exception, where the public way on which each lot
fronted was listed as a public street on town records, but did not
actually exist. 29
Where the public way provides the quality of access public
streets normally provide, however, the court stated that a planning
board does not enjoy the same discretion it normally has when
reviewing a plan for development under the usual subdivision pro-
cess." The court observed that a planning board may not refuse to
recognize a section 81 L exclusion notwithstanding the fact that
vehicular access could be better provided for."' Where the proposed
lots front on a public way, and that public way is "of sufficient width
and suitable to accommodate motor vehicle traffic and to provide
access for fire-fighting equipment and other emergency vehicles,"" 2
the court held that the practical access requirement embodied in
section 81M is satisfied and a planning board must endorse the plan
"approval not required" under section 81P."
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the court noted the
findings of the trial court that Lazell Street was a paved public way
of the same width as other streets in the area and could provide
adequate access to each lot for the owners as well as -emergency
vehicles." Given these findings, the Hutchinson court held that Lazell
Street provided practical access to each proposed lot, and thus the
plaintiff's plan fell within part (a) of the "frontage" exception con-
tained in section 81L. 3  Accordingly, the court ruled that the section
81P exemption from the usual subdivision approval process applied
to the plaintiff."
Thus, in Hutchinson v. Planning Board of Hingham, the Appeals
Court held that although a plan of development may provide that
each proposed lot will front on a public way, therefore technically
27
 Hutchinson, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 419-20, 502 N.E.2d at 574.
2a
	Mass. App. Ct. 144, 444 N.E.2c1 389 (1983).
29 Hutchinson, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 420, 502 N.E.2d at 574-75.
" 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 420, 502 N.E.2d at 575.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 420-21, 502 N.E.2d at 575 (quoting North Landers Corp. v. Planning Rd. of
Falmouth, 382 Mass. 432, 441, 416 N,E.2c1 934, 940 (1981)).
93 Id.
" Id. at 421, 502 N.E.2d at 575.
" See id.
96 See id.
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satisfying part (a) of the "frontage" exception of section 81L, that
exception will not apply unless the public way provides practical
access to each lot. Under the court's decision, this practical access
requirement does not mean that, in reviewing the access afforded
by the public way, a planning board may exercise the same kind of
discretion utilized in reviewing subdivision applications, denying
approval whenever they feel that access could be better provided
for. The practical access required to be provided by the public way
need not be the best possible. Instead, as long as the public way
provides no less access than that of the usual public street, the
"frontage" exception applies.
As noted above, the "frontage" exception to the definition of a
subdivision under chapter 4l, section 8 IL of the Massachusetts
General Laws requires that each lot created by the division of land
have "frontage" on a suitable way as defined by either part (a), (b),
or (c) of the exception. 37 In Fox v. Planning Board of Milton, the
Appeals Court held that, despite the existence of an intervening
greenbelt between private property and a public way, the private
property nonetheless "fronts" on a public way for the purposes of
part (a) of the "frontage" exception contained in section FO L."
In Fox, the plaintiff landowner submitted a plan for the division
of property to the Milton Planning Board for an endorsement
"approval not. required" under chapter 41, section 81P. 39 The plain-
tiff's plan proposed the division of a parcel of land into four lots,
each lot fronting on land taken by the Metropolitan Park Commis-
sion in 1904 to build the Neponsit Valley Parkway, a public way. 4 "
An intervening greenbelt approximately 175 feet wide, however,
separated the lots from the actual parkway."' The plaintiff proposed
to build a T-shaped driveway across the greenbelt connecting the
four lots to the parkway." 2` The Board denied the section 81P en-
dorsement claiming that the proposed plan failed to satisfy the
"frontage" exception of section 81L and thus constituted a subdi-
vision."
The Board argued that the "frontage on .	 a public way"
required by part (a) of the "frontage" exception must provide ser-
"See supra note 9 for a discussion or the frontage exception.
" 24 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 511 N.E.2d 30 (1987).
99 Id. at 572, 511 N.E.2d ai. 31.
40 Id.
.11 Id.
12 Id. at 572-73, 511 N.E.2d at 31.
" See id. at 573, 511 N.E.2d at 31.
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viceable access from the lot to the public way." Because the inter-
vening greenbelt separated the plaintiff's proposed lots from the
public way, the Board contended that his land did not "front" on a
public way. 45 Accordingly, the "frontage" exception did not apply
and thus the plaintiff's plan failed to bypass the usual subdivision
approval process.46
Rejecting the Board's argument, the Appeals Court held that
owners of land abutting public parkways have a common law right
of access to those parkways, and that an intervening greenbelt,
irrespective of its size, may not impair such right of access. 47 A
greenbelt, the court reasoned, is analogous to a sidewalk lying be-
tween public property and a public way." Certainly, the court main-
tained, the existence of a sidewalk between a lot and a public way
does not mean that the lot does not front on the public way. 49
Accordingly, the court held that even where a substantial greenbelt
exists between a lot and a public parkway, the lot "fronts" on a
public way for purposes of the "frontage" exception contained in
section 81L. 5°
Reviewing the facts of Fox, the court held that under these
principles, despite the existence of the greenbelt between the pro-
posed lots and the Neponsit Valley Parkway, each lot enjoyed a
guaranteed right of access to the parkway. 5 ' Accordingly, the court
found that each lot fronted on a public way within the meaning of
section 81L.52 Because the plaintiff's plan for the division of his
property thus satisfied part (a) of the "frontage" exception to the
definition of a subdivision under section 81L, the court held that
the plaintiff was entitled to an 81P endorsement. 55
" Id. at 573, 511 N.E.2d at 31.
4 ' Id. at 573, 511 N.E.2d at 32.
46 Id.
" Id. at 573-74, 511 N.E.2d at 32.
48 /d. at 574, 511 N.E.2d at 32.
49 See id.
'a See id. The Appeals Court also held that the fact that the proposed driveway connecting
the four lots to the paved part of the parkway was a common driveway was irrelevant to
determining whether or not the plan constituted a subdivision and thus whether the "front-
age" exception applied. Id. at 574, 511 N.E.2d at 32. The court maintained that as long as
all the new lots fronted on a public way, and the access implied by that frontage is not illusory
in fact, the fact that the developer proposed a common driveway was of no concern to the
planning board since the Subdivision Control Law was concerned only with access to each
lot, not each house on those lots. Id. at 574-75, 511 N.E.2d at 32-33.
51 1d. at 575, 511 N.E.2d at 33.
52 See id.
55 See id.
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Thus, in Fox v. Planning Board of Milton, the Appeals Court
held that despite the existence of a publicly owned greenbelt lying
between private property and a public way, the private property
nonetheless "fronts" on a public way for the purposes of part (a) of
the "frontage" exception contained in section 81 L. Given the court's
analogy between greenbelts and other publicly owned parcels of
land such as sidewalks or treebelts, it seems that this holding may
find application beyond those instances where a greenbelt separates
private property from a public way. Instead, the court is likely to
consider any type of public land, irrespective of size, lying between
private property and a public way an extension of that public way.
As long as the private property fronts on that intervening public
land, it will probably be deemed to front on the public way for the
purposes of section 8 I L.
In Citgo Petroleum Corporation v. Planning Board of Braintree, the
Appeals Court for the first time interpreted the "two or more
buildings" exception contained in chapter 41, section 81L of the
Massachusetts General Laws, which excludes from the definition of
a subdivision the division of land containing two or more buildings
standing at the time the subdivision control law went into effect in
the municipality if each newly created lot contains at least one of
those buildings." Citgo Petroleum owned a sixty-eight acre parcel
in Braintree containing several buildings which had been con-
structed before the effective date of the subdivision control law."
Seeking to convey a portion of the tract to another corporation,
Citgo Petroleum submitted a plan to the Hingham Planning Board
for endorsement under chapter 41, section 81 P arguing that ap-
proval was not required because the plan did not constitute a sub-
division. 5° In support of its position, Citgo Petroleum argued that
under the proposed plan for division of the tract, each new lot
would contain a building existing at the time the subdivision control
law went into effect, thus satisfying the "two or more buildings"
exception to the definition of subdivision contained in section 81L. 57
The Board refused to endorse the plan, however, and Citgo Petro-
leum subsequently appealed to the Land Court." The Land Court
54 24 Mass. App. Ct. 425, 425, 509 N.E.2d 284, 284-85 (1987).
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granted Citgo Petroleum's motion for summary judgment, from
which the planning board appealed."
Ruling against the Board, the Appeals Court held that Citgo
Petroleum's plan fell within the "two or more buildings" exception
of section 81 L. 6° The court ruled that this exception was separate
and distinct from "the more commonly used" "frontage" exception
of section 81 L.6 ' Under the "two or more buildings" exception, the
court held, each lot need not have frontage on a suitable public way
as defined by part (a), (b) or (c) of the "frontage" exception of
section 81L. 62 If the frontage exception required a developer to
submit plans dividing a parcel into lots each containing a building
existing at the time the subdivision control law went into effect, the
court reasoned, there would be no purpose for including the "two
or more buildings" exception in the statute.°
Under this interpretation of the section 81 L exclusions, the
court stated, the only inquiry necessary would be a determination
of whether the "frontage" exception applied to the proposed divi-
sion of property. 1i 4 1 f this exception applied, the court reasoned,
the plan would be entitled to a section 81P endorsement; 65 other-
wise, the plan would be subject to the usual subdivision approval
process, and thus, there would be no reason to consider whether
the plan satisfied the "two or more buildings" exception." Unwilling
to accept that the legislature would include a provision in section
81 L as mere "surplusage," the court held the "two or more build-
ings" exception separate and distinct from the "frontage" excep-
tion.° in doing so the court held that it may receive a section 81 P
endorsement exempting it from the subdivision approval process
without also satisfying section 8 I L's "frontage" exception." 8
In so ruling, the court rejected the Board's argument that by
interpreting the "two or more buildings" provision and the "front-
age" provision as distinct exceptions, the court would allow a prop-
erty owner to use any detached building on his property, such as a
shed or garage, as a basis for the unrestricted division of property
3" Id.
"41 Id.
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and thus- undercut the purposes of the subdivision control law.""
First, the court responded, the "two or more buildings" exception
had not been included in the original versions of the subdivision
control law but appeared in a later revision of the statute. 7" Accord-
ingly, the court reasoned, the exception was not the result of leg-
islative oversight, and thus, must. be consistent with the general
purposes of the subdivision control law. 7 ' Second, the court main-
tained, the fact that a developer could divide a parcel under this
exception did not necessarily suggest that developers could readily
obtain approval for the newly created lots under the local zoning
ordinance. 72 Third, the court noted that in the case before it, each
lot contained a building of substantial size. 73 Where the building
standing on a newly created lot resembled "a chicken house or
woodshed," the court noted, the "two or more buildings" exception
might not apply.74 Finally, the court stated that the "two or more
buildings" exception applied only to buildings existing at the time
the subdivision control law went into effect. 75 Accordingly, the court
reasoned that its decision would not encourage persons to construct
new, detached buildings on their property as a means of bypassing
the usual subdivision approval process because the process applied
to new structures' with equal force.'"
Thus, in Citgo Petroleum Corporation v. Planning Board of Brain-
tree, the Appeals Court held the "two or more buildings" exception
to the definition of subdivision in section 81L separate and distinct,
from the "frontage" exception. As long as a landowner's plan for
the division of his or her property provides that each newly created
lot. will contain a building which existed at the time of the adoption
of the subdivision control law, that plan satisfies the above exemp-
tion from the usual subdivision approval process. To obtain a section
81P endorsement under this exception, the landowner need not
show that each lot will front on a suitable way as required by the
"frontage" exception of section 8 IL. Additionally, the court pro-
vides an interesting observation that where the building on a newly
created lot is "insubstantial," such as a woodshed, the "two or more
"9 Id, at 426-27, 509 N.E.2d at 285.
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buildings" exception might not apply. This statement of course
leaves open the question of what constitutes a "substantial" as op-
posed to an "insubstantial" building. Nonetheless, where a planning
board can show that a building on the proposed lot is :Insubstan-
tial," the plan for the division of the property may be subject to the
usual subdivision approval process.
In Hutchinson, Fox, and Citgo Petroleum, the Appeals Court in-
terpreted the "frontage" and "two or more buildings" exceptions to
the definition of subdivision contained in chapter 41, section 81L
of the Massachusetts General Laws. These section 81 L exceptions
are of considerable importance to both private property owners and
local planning boards. Where private property owners can show
their plan for the division of their property satisfies the require-
ments of either of these exceptions, that plan is exempted from the
usual subdivision approval process. These cases reflect a liberal
approach to the exemptions from the subdivision approval process.
By clarifying the circumstances under which these section 81L ex-
ceptions are satisfied, and according a broad interpretation to these
exceptions, the Appeals Court has reduced the likelihood that fur-
ther litigation over these issues will arise.
D. *The Creation and Extinguishment of Easements Through Adverse
Possession
An easement is a privilege, without profit, which the owner of
one parcel of land may have over the land of another.' An easement
may be both created 2 and extinguished through adverse possession. 3
A person may create an easement through adverse possession, often
referred to as a prescriptive easement, by uninterrupted, open,
* Dyan L. Gerslunan, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
M. PARK & D. PARK, REAL ESTATE LAW, 28 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 271 (2d ed. 1981)
sets forth that:
An easement ... [is] a liberty, privilege, or advantage without profit, which the
owner of one parcel of land may have in the lands of another; or, is conversely
stated, it is a service which one estate owes to another, or a right or privilege in
one man's estate for the advantage or convenience of the owner of another
estate.
Id.
2 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch, 187, § 2 (West 1977) provides:
No person shall acquire by adverse use or enjoyment a right or privilege of way
or other easement from, in, upon or over the land of another, unless such use
or enjoyment is continued uninterruptedly for twenty years.
Id.
3 M. PARK & D. PARK, supra note 1, § 283.
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notorious and adverse use of another's land for at least twenty
years.`' A person may extinguish an easement through adverse pos-
session when that person owns the servient tenement`' and uses the
easement for at least twenty years in a manner which is inconsistent
with the existence of the easement, and thus adverse. 6 To extinguish
the easement, the owner of the servient tenement must use the
easement openly and notoriously and this use must be capable of
giving rise to a cause of action in favor of the owner of the ease-
ment.' Where the owner of the servient tenement renders impos-
sible the use of only a portion of the easement, the easement is only
extinguished as to that limited portion.'
During the Selected Developments year, two cases confronted the
issue of adverse possession of an easement.° In Shapiro v. Burton,
the Massachusetts Appeals Court examined the issue of extinguish-
ment of an easement through adverse possession by the owner of
the servient tenementi° In Brooks, Gill and Co., Inc. v. Landmark
Properties, 217 Ltd. Partnership, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
addressed the issue of creation of an easement through adverse
possession."
In Shapiro, two neighboring couples, the Shapiros and the Ma-
graths, brought companion cases to confirm and register title to
their separate parcels of land in Marblehead, Massachusetts.' 2 The
plaintiffs claimed title in part by grant and in part by adverse
possession.'' The defendant, Marilyn Burton, was granted an ease-
ment over plaintiffs' land, by deed, including an easement over two
twenty-five-foot wide paper streets," Neptune Street and Ocean
4 Id. § 275 (1981); see..supra note 2 and accompanying text.
5 M. PARK & 0. PARK, supra note 1, § 271. A servient tenement is the estate upon which
an easement is imposed. Id. A dominant tenement is the estate that enjoys the easement. Id.
6 See. Lemieux v. Rex Leather Finishing Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 917, 421-22, 388 N.E.2d
1195, 1199 (1979); Shaw v. Solari, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 156-57, 392 N.E.2d 853, 857 (1979);
M. PARK & I). PARK, supra note 1, § 283.
Rundell, Easements and Licenses, in 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.102 (A, James
Casner 1952).
8 Pappas v. Maxwell, 337 Mass. 552, 557, 150 N.E.2d 521, 525 (1958).
9 See Shapiro v. Burton, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 327, 502 N.E.2d 545 (1987); Brooks, Gill and
Co., Inc. v. Landmark Properties, 217 Ltd. Partnership, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 528, 503 N,E.2d
983 (1987).
'" 23 Mass. App. Ct. 327, 502 N.E.2d 545 (1987).
11 23 Mass. App. Ct. 528, 503 N.E.2d 983 (1987).
" 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 328, 502 N.E.2d at 546.
13 Id.
14 Id. The term "paper street" indicates a street shown on a recorded plan, but never
actually built. Id. at 328 11.3, 502 N.E.2d at 546 n.3.
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Spray Avenue.'' The defendant was also granted a right of access
easement to Rockaway Beach.'"
The dispute centered on two portions of the defendant's ease-
ment over Neptune Street and on the right of access easement to
Rockaway Beach." Neptune Street, as shown on a 1877 plan, was
to be a twenty-five-foot wide street extending perpendicularly from
Atlantic Avenue on the north to Ocean Spray Avenue on the
south." The deed granted the defendant an easement over the full
length and breadth of Neptune Street.'" In reality, Neptune Street,
as built, ended in a cul de sac before reaching Ocean Spray Ave-
nue.2" There was, however, a three-foot wide footpath which con-
nected Neptune Street to Ocean Spray Avenue. 21
The plaintiffs, the Shapiros and the Magraths, each claimed to
have respectively extinguished, through adverse possession, a ten-
foot strip of the defendant's easement alongside the three-foot wide
footpath." Therefore, the plaintiffs contended that the defendant's
easement over this portion of Neptune Street had been reduced
from twenty-five feet to five feet." The Appeals Court noted that
the Shapiros lived just west of the footpath, and the Magraths lived
just east of the footpath. 24 Furthermore, the Appeals Court stated
that the plaintiffs had respectively maintained hedges and other
plantings over the two ten-foot strips of land, one on each side of
the footpath, which had been subject to the defendant's twenty-five-
foot wide easement. 25 The court additionally noted that the prior
owner of the Shapiros' parcel had "vociferously" opposed the use
' 5 Id. at 328 n.3, 502 N.E.2d at 546 n.3. The deed which granted easements to the
defendant's predecessors provided:
... the right to use Neptune Street for all the purposes of a way and also a
right of access to Rockaway Beach over Neptune Street, Ocean Spray Avenue
and the land between the northerly bound of Ocean Spray Avenue [the hound
closest to the plaintiffs' houses) and the Atlantic Ocean.
Id. at 332, 502 N.E.2d at 548.
'" Id. at 328, 502 N.E.2d at 546.
13 See id. at 329-31, 502 N.E.2d at 546-48.




22 Id. at 329, 502 N.E.2d at 547.
2] Id. Although the footpath is only three feet wide, and not five feet wide, neither the
Shapiros nor the Magraths claimed extinguishment of more than a ten-foot wide strip. Id.
at 329 n.6, 502 N.E.2d at 547 n.6.
2-1 Id. at 328-29, 502 N.E.2d at 546.
25 Id. at 329, 502 N.E.2d at 547.
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of the land by the easement holders. 2" The Appeals Court held,
affirming the Land Court, that the actions of the plaintiffs' prede-
cessors interfered and were inconsistent with the easements over
the two ten-foot strips for the requisite twenty years. 27 Therefore,
the Appeals Court held that the adverse possession of the plaintiffs'
predecessors extinguished these portions of the defendant's ease-
ment, namely the two ten-foot strips of land."
The second portion of the defendant's easement that was in
dispute was a small area called the "jog." 29 The Shapiros' predeces-
sor had treated the 'jog" as his own since 1947 by mowing the area
and later by using it for a fence and for shrubs.'" The Appeals
Court affirmed the Land Court's holding that this portion of the
defendant's easement had also been extinguished through adverse
possession."'
The third issue in dispute in Shapiro was whether the defen-
dant, based on her right of access easement to Rockaway Beach,
could use the Shapiros' staircase in order to be able to reach the
beach. 32 The Appeals Court reversed the portion of the Land
Court's holding which set forth that the defendant had no right to
use the existing staircase."' The Appeals Court remanded this issue
of the defendant's means of access to the Land Court for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion." The Appeals Court reaf-
firmed the Land Court's finding that the defendant had a right of
access easement to the whole of Ocean Spray Avenue and to the
land between the avenue and the ocean, and thus where the existing
staircase is located."' The Appeals Court, however, disagreed with
the Land Court's conclusion that the defendant's rights were limited
to rebuilding a staircase at the end of the footpath where one had
originally existed.'" The Appeals Court stated that the Shapiros'
2" Id. at 329-30, 502 N.E.2d at 547.
27 Id. at 330, 502 N.E.2d at 547. A servient tenement owner may extinguish an easement.
in the servicut tenement by adverse use which is capable of being made wrongful by the
owner of the easement. Ronda, supra note 7, § 8.102.
28 Id. at 330, 502 N.E.2d at 547. Where acts of the servient (eminent owner render the
use of only a portion of the easement impossible, the easement is extinguished only as to
that part. Pappas v. Maxwell, 337 Mass. 552, 557, 150 N.E.2d 521, 525 (1958).
29
 Shapiro, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 331, 502 N.E.2d at 547-48.
3" Id. at 331, 502 N.E.2d at 548.
Id.
32 Id.
"Id. at 336, 502 N.E.2d at 550.
34 Id.
" Id. at 332, 336, 502 N.E.2d at 548, 550.
su Id. at 334, 502 N.E.2d at 519. The Land Court slated that:
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rights to the land over which the existing staircase is located were
no greater than the defendant's rights because both held easements
in common over this land. 37
Furthermore, the Appeals Court noted that building a new
staircase across from the footpath would be expensive and could
damage the bank due to the current state of the erosion of the
cliff." Moreover, the Appeals Court stated, the plaintiffs' repairs to
the bank may have made rebuilding a new staircase more expensive
than it otherwise would have been. 39 The Appeals Court found an
insufficient factual basis to justify finding that the defendant's ex-
clusive access to the beach should be at the location of the old
staircase at the end of the footpath. 4° In addition, the Appeals Court
emphasized that the Shapiros and their predecessors permitted
several other owners of back parcels to use their staircase to reach
Rockaway Beach.'" For these reasons, the Appeals Court stated that
the Land Court had an insufficient factual basis to hold that the
defendant only had the right to build a new staircase at the location
of the previously existing one. 42
The Appeals Court remanded to the Land Court the question
of the defendant's means of access to the beach in light of its
reasoning in this opinion.'" The Appeals Court specified that the
Land Court should resolve this question by balancing the interests
of the plaintiffs and the defendant as holders of an easement in
common over the land where the existing staircase is located." The
Appeals Court stated that the plaintiffs' and the defendant's uses
[Al set of stairs is obviously necessary for the defendant[' to enjoy the access to
the beach previously available to [her], and ruled that the defendant would not
be foreclosed from rebuilding the stairs and assuming responsibility for them
in the area opposite the 5 foot walkway
Id. at 333, 502 N.E.2d at 549.
37 Id. at 332, 333-34, 502 N.E.2d at 548, 549.
" Id. at 334, 502 N.E.2d at 549. The northernmost portion of Ocean Spray Avenue was
on a bluff overlooking the Atlantic Ocean, and the bank itself comprised a major part of the
avenue. Id. at 329, 502 N.E.2d at 546. The bluff was subject to erosion and was supported
by a sea wall which was maintained by the plaintiffs and their predecessors. Id.
Id, at 335, 502 N.E.2d at 550. The Appeals Court stated that "Itlhe owner of property
burdened by an easement whose use of that property impairs the rights of the holder of the
easement may be . , required to take measures at his expense to accommodate the easement
holder's right of use." Id. (quoting Texon, Inc. v. Holyoke Mach. Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 363,
366, 394 N.E.2d 976, 978 (1979)).
4" Id. at 334, 502 N.E.2d at 549.
4 ' Id. at 332, 334, 502 N.E.2d at 548, 549.
42 Id. at 334, 502 N.E.2d at 549.
" Id. at 336, 502 N.E.2d at 550.
44 Id. at 334, 502 N.E.2d at 549.
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of the land are to be governed by equitable principals, specifically
what is reasonable in the exercise of their respective rights." The
Appeals Court noted the need to examine the cost of maintaining
the existing staircase, the need to protect against liability, and the
need to equitably apportion the costs." Should the parties choose,
the Appeals Court stated that they may introduce evidence relating
to the expense, the feasibility and the risks involved in the construc-
tion of a new set of stairs across from the footpath. 47
In Brooks, Gill and Co., Inc. v. Landmark Properties, 217  Ltd.
Partnership, the Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed the issue of
the creation of an easement through adverse possession." In Brooks,
the Appeals Court affirmed the Land Court's holding that the
plaintiff had acquired an easement, through adverse possession, in
a fire escape. 49 The plaintiff had occupied a three-story building
since 1962, and for more than twenty years a third-story door led
to a common fire escape attached to both the plaintiff's and the
defendant's buildings.'" The plaintiff's employees used the fire es-
cape sporadically to reach the roof in order to remove debris and
to make repairs.'' Both the plaintiff and the defendant periodically
repaired the fire escape to maintain it in good working condition. 52
Prior to July 1983, the plaintiff decided to rent the third story of
its building. 53 To rent the third story, however, the continued ex-
istence of the fire escape was necessary in order to satisfy the egress
requirements of the state building code." 4 On June 1, 1983, Land-
mark acquired title to the adjacent parcel, including the building to
which the common fire escape was attached." In July, 1983, Land-
mark destroyed the fire escape in the course of rehabilitating the
building. 56 The plaintiff then brought this action for declaratory
relief and damages. 57
The Appeals Court affirmed the Land Court's holding that the
plaintiff had acquired a prescriptive easement in the fire escape
45 id .
45 Id. at 335, 502 N.E.2d at 550.
47 id
18 23 Mass. App. Ct. 528, 503 N.E.2d 983 (1987),
49 Id. at .530, 503 N.E.2d at 985.
5 )/d. at 529, 503 N.E.2d at 984.
st
52 Id. at 529-30, 503 N.E.2d at 984.
53 Id. at 530, 503 N.E.2d at 984.
ld•
"Id. at 530, 503 N.E.2d at 984-85.
56 Id. at 530, 503 N.E.2d at 985.
57 Id.
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based on its open, notorious, uninterrupted and adverse use of the
common fire escape for at least twenty years. 58 The Appeals Court
rejected the defendant's contention that there was insufficient. evi-
dence of plaintiff's continuous use of the fire escape to establish
the acquisition of the easement through adverse possession." The
Appeals Court stated that the plaintiff had "used" the fire escape
as a method of satisfying the state building code requirements and
that this "use" was sufficient." The Appeals Court then stated that
the defendant's removal of the fire escape over which the plaintiff
had a prescriptive easement was wrongful."'
The Appeals Court then observed that if the defendant had
destroyed the entire building, this may have terminated the plain-
tiff's easement. 62 The court noted, however, that this was not the
case here where the defendant only destroyed the fire escape.°
Moreover, the court stated that the fire escape would not have
hindered the defendant's use of its building." The Appeals Court
affirmed the Land Court's order requiring the defendant to replace
the fire escape or, in the alternative, pay the plaintiff the amount
necessary to install an interior stairway which would meet the ap-
plicable building code requirements. 65
In both cases, Shapiro and Brooks, the Appeals Court confronted
the issue of adverse possession of an easement. The law of adverse
possession of easements is well established." The court in Shapiro
applied the traditional rule of law that a servient tenement owner
may extinguish an easement by adversely possessing it for the req-
uisite twenty years. 67 In Brooks, the court reaffirmed that a person
may create an easement over the land of another by adverse .pos-
m Id. In so ruling, the Brooks court noted that:
The rule in Massachusetts is that wherever there has been the use of an easement
for twenty years unexplained, it will be presumed to be under claim of right
and adverse, and will be sufficient to establish title by prescription ....
Id. at 530-31, 503 N.E.2d at 985 (quoting Truc v. Field, 269 Mass. 524, 528-29, 169 N.E.
428, 430 (1930)).
v Brooks, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 531, 503 N.E.2d at 985.
"" id.
"' Id. at 532, 503 N.E.2d at 985.
"2 Id. at 532,503 N.E.2d at 086.
64 Id.
Ii5
w See, e.g., Rundell, supra note 7, § 8.102; M. PARK & D. PARK, supra note I, §§ 275, 283.
"7 Shapiro v. Burion, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 327, 330, 502 N.E.2d 545, 547 (1987).
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session for twenty years, in this'case an easement in a common lire
escape. 68
Although the Appeals Court in Shapiro, following traditional
property law, allowed the servient tenement owner to extinguish an
easement through adverse possession, it also reaffirmed the rights
of easement owners.° The court reversed the Land Court's holding
which had confined the easement holder's rights to merely being
able to build an new staircase and did not permit her to use the
existing staircase. 76 The Appeals Court remanded to the Land Court
for further findings the question of the easement holder's means
of access to the beach with instructions that this question be deter-
mined based on equitable principles and by taking into considera-
tion both parties' needs."'
The Appeals Court correctly decided this case and its analysis
follows the traditional property law concerns for the protection of
the rights of easement holders. The Appeals Court emphasized the
following three issues in its decision to overturn the Land Court's
holding which had precluded the defendant from using the plain-
tiffs' staircase. First, the plaintiffs and the defendant were holders
of an easement in common in the land over which the existing
staircase stood and therefore, the plaintiffs' rights were no greater
than the defendant's rights. 72 Second, the defendant's right of access
easement to Rockaway Beach would be useless without a means by
which to exercise this right, i.e., a staircase.'" Third, the plaintiff?
efforts in fortifying the bank may have rendered the construction
of a new staircase both more difficult and more expensive. 74 Given
the substantial cost of building a new staircase, the court correctly
reasoned that refusing the defendant access to the plaintiffs' stair-
case would, in effect, deprive the defendant from beach access and
that would be inconsistent with her easement. 75 Based on these three
"9 Brooks, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 530-31, 503 N.E.2d at 985 (quoting True v. Field, 269
Mass. 524, 528-29, 169 N.E. 428, 430 (1930)).
"9 See Shapiro, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 336, 502 N.E,2d at 550.
7" Id.
71 Id. at 334, 336, 502 N.E.2d at 540, 550.
72 Id. at 332, 333-34, 502 N.E.2d at 548, 549.
7" Id. at 333, 502 N.E.2d at 549. The Appeals Court noted that forcing the defendant
to build a new staircase across from the footpath would he expensive and could damage the
hank. Id. at 334, 502 N.E.2d at 549. The Appeals Court stated that this solution would,
because of its cost, deprive the defendant of beach access and was therefore inconsistent with
the defendant's right of access easement, N.
7i Id. at 3'35, 502 N.E.2d at 550.
75 See id. at 334, 502 N.E.2d at 549.
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considerations, the Appeals Court reasonably concluded that, de-
pending on the Land Court's further findings, the plaintiffs and
the defendant either share the staircase and the costs in maintaining
it, or that the plaintiffs must contribute to the construction of a new
set of stairs. 76
The Appeals Court in Shapiro correctly reaffirmed the Land
Court's decision concerning the other two easement questions by
holding that two portions of the defendant's easement had been
extinguished by adverse possession. 77 The court set forth the cur-
rent status of the law when it stated that an easement is extinguished
by prescription through the use, by the servient tenement owner,
of his or her land in such a manner so inconsistent with the ease-
ment that the easement is extinguished after a lapse of twenty
years. 78 Therefore, the adverse use of portions of the defendant's
easement by the plaintiffs and their predecessors for over twenty
years extinguished those portions of the defendant's easement. 79
In Brooks, the Appeals Court applied traditional property law
in holding that the plaintiff had acquired, through twenty years of
adverse possession, an easement in a common fire escape. 8° There-
fore, the court correctly reaffirmed the Land Court's holding that
the owner of the servient tenement had acted wrongfully in remov-
ing the fire escape where its continued existence would not have
impaired the defendant's use of its building. 8 ' The Appeals Court
then affirmed the Land Court's order that the defendant either
replace the fire escape or, in the alternative, pay the plaintiff a
sufficient sum to cover the costs of installing an interior stairway
which would meet the state building code egress requirements. 82
The Appeals Court's reasoning throughout Brooks reaffirmed the
current status of the rights of easement holders in Massachusetts."
Easement holders, whether by grant in Shapiro or by prescrip-
tion in Brooks, have substantial rights in the servient tenement which
the Massachusetts courts continue to recognize and protect. Thus,
the Appeals Court in Shapiro reversed the Land Court's holding
79 Id. at 335, 502 N.E.2d at 550.
" Id. at 330, 502 N.E.2d at 547.
79 Id.
79 Id.
" Brooks, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 532, 503 N.E.2c1 at 985.
Id. at 532; 503 N.E2c1 at 986.
"2 Id.
"See id. at 530-31, 503 N.E.2d at 985. See supra note 58 for a discussion of adverse
possession of easements.
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which had precluded the owner of a right of access easement from
exercising her rights without considerable expense. 84 Traditional
property law, however, also recognizes the ability of a servient ten-
ement owner to extinguish an easement through adverse possession
for a period of not less than twenty years. Thus, the Appeals Court,
applying the traditional law of easements, recognized in Shapiro that
easements may be extinguished, either in part or in their entirety,
through adverse possession by the owner of the servient tenement."
In Brooks, the Appeals Court upheld the easement holder's rights
against those of the owner of the servient tenement by holding that
the latter had acted wrongfully in destroying the fire escape to which
the plaintiff had acquired a prescriptive easement. 8  By reiterating
and reaffirming the traditional rules of property law in Massachu-
setts surrounding the creation and extinguishment of easements,
the Appeals Court has clarified the rights and obligations of both
easement holders and of owners of servient tenements.
E. *Brokers' Fees
Whether the broker' or seller should bear the risk of forfeiture
in real estate transactions remains a central yet surprisingly unclear
issue under Massachusetts law. The majority of states traditionally
hold that a real estate broker earns a commission when the broker
procures a purchaser ready, able, and willing to buy the property
on the seller's terms, regardless of whether the broker and seller
actually consummate the sale. 2 In 1975, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court expressly rejected the majority rules In Tristam's
Landing, Inc. v. Wait, the Court joined a growing number of states
adopting the minority view that, absent a contract to the contrary,
a broker does not earn a commission unless the sale is completed,
except where the seller's wrongful act or interference prevented
the consummation of the sale.'
" Shapiro v. BUrton, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 327, 334, 336, 502 N.E,2d 545, 549, 550 (1987).
85 Id. at 330, 502 N.E.2d at 547; see Rundell, supra note 7, § 8.102.
fly Brooks, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 552, 503 N.E.2d at 985.
* Lisa M. Ropple, Staff Member, BOSTON COLI.EGE LAW REVIEW
1 A real estate broker is an agent who, for a commission or fee, is employed by a principal
to negotiate the sale, purchase, lease or exchange of real property to a third party. R. POWEIA„
7 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, ch. 84C, 11 938.13[1][a( (rev. ed. 1987) [hereinafter POWELL].
2 POWELL, supra note 1, at 9 938.17(11.
See Tristam's Landing v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 629, 327 N.E.2(1 727, 731 (1975).
4 Id. A number of jurisdictions have adopted or expressly approved the minority rule,
which was first enunciated in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 Nj. 528, 551-52, 236
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Despite the generally complete treatment of broker's fees in
the Tristam decision, the Court failed to define explicitly the in-
tended scope of its holding.' In subsequent broker's fees cases,
Massachusetts courts have grappled with whether the Tristam rule
applies only to those situations where a sale is not consummated
because the buyer defaults, or whether Tristam equally applies where
the seller's behavior, short of the prohibited "wrongful acts] or
interference," prevents the successful completion of the real estate
transaction.6 Although the courts have not clearly decided the issue,
Massachusetts courts have suggested that Tristam applies to all real
estate transactions, even if the seller causes the failure of the sale.'
Thus, the courts have intimated, a broker earns a commission only
if the buyer and seller enter into a valid contract to sell the property
and the parties consummate the sale. 8 If the seller's wrongful acts
or interference prevent the successful completion of the transaction,
the courts apply the Tristam exception to permit the broker to
recover a commission if the broker had produced a ready, able, and
willing buyer and the parties had entered into a valid purchase and
sale agreement."
During the Selected Developments year, however, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that a review of Massachusetts law
compels the opposite conclusion.'" In the 1987 decision of Bennett
v. McCabe, the court ruled that, under Massachusetts law, a broker
earns his commission where the broker produces a ready, able, and
willing purchaser for the seller's property, even if the sale is not
completed because of an unknown defect in the seller's title, re-
gardless of the seller's good faith." The court held that Tristan:
A.2d 843, 855-56 (1967). See, e.g., Potter v. Ridge Realty Corp.. 28 Conn. Supp. 304, 31 l,
259 A.2d 758, 761 (1969); Mullenger v. Clause, 178 N.W.2d 420, 429 (Iowa 1970); Winkel-
man v. Allen, 214 Kan. 22, 38, 519 P.2d 1377, 1390 (1974); Dworak v. Michals, 211 Neb.
716, 720-21, 320 N.W.2d 485, 488 (1982); Goetz v. Anderson, 274 N.W.2d 175, 179, (N.D.
1978); Setser v. Commonwealth, Inc., 256 Or. 11, 19-23, 470 I'.2d 142, 145-47 (1970); Staab
v. Messier, 128 Vt. 380, 383, 264 A.2d 790, 792 (1970). Colorado has adopted the minority
rule by statute. See Coto. REV. STAT. § 12-61-201 (1985).
5 See Tristam, 367 Mass. at 630, 327 N.E.2d at 731.
6 See infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text for a review of the Massachusetts cases
interpreting Tristam.
See infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text for a review of the Massachusetts cases
interpreting Tristam.
8 See infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text for a review of the Massachusetts cases
interpreting Tristam.
9 See infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text for a review of the Massachusetts cases
interpreting Tristam.
'" Bennett v. McCabe, 808 F,2d 178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1987).
at 184.
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applies only to situations where the buyer's unwillingness or inability
prevents the consummation of the sale.I 2 A review of Trig am and
its progeny reveals that the Bennett decision significantly departs
from Massachusetts law."
In Tristam, the Supreme judicial Court ruled that a broker does
not earn a commission unless three conditions are met: (a) the
broker must produce a buyer ready, willing, and able to buy on the
terms fixed by the seller; (b) the buyer must enter into a binding
contract with the seller to sell the property; and (c) the buyer must
complete the transaction by closing the title in accordance with the
provisions of the contract." The Court stated that where the parties
do not consummate the contract because of the buyer's financial
inability to perform or because of "any other default [by the
buyer],"' 5 the broker is not entitled to a commission from the
seller.'" The Court noted in contrast that the broker may receive a
commission where the failure to complete the contract results from
the seller's "wrongful act or interference."' 7 The Court recognized
that the broker and seller could easily circumvent the rule by con-
tractually providing otherwise, but warned that courts should scru-
tinize such agreements carefully to insure that they are not unfairly
made, unconscionable, or against public policy.'" The Tristam rule,
the Court emphasized, protects inexperienced property sellers who
are unfamiliar with their legal rights and who typically expect that
the broker's fee will be paid from the proCeeds of the sale.'" The
Court stressed that the rule properly places the burden of the sale's
forfeiture on the broker. 2"
Two of the earliest Massachusetts Appeals Court decisions in-
terpreting Tristam seemed to suggest that the Tristam rule applies
12 Id.
IS See infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text for a review of the Massachusetts cases
interpreting Tristam,
" Tristam's Landing v. Wait, 367 Mass, 622, 629, 327 N.E,2d 727, 731 (1975) (quoting
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 551, 236 A.2d 843, 855 (1967)).
15 Id, (quoting Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J. at 551, 23(5 A.2d at 855),
1"hi, (quoting Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855).
" Id. (quoting Ellsworth Dobbs, 50 N.J. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855).
'" Id. at 630, 327 N.E.2d at 731-32. In 1987, the Massachusetts Appeals Court, relying
on this warning, ruled that any contract provision altering the Tristam rule must explicitly
negate the conditions set forth in Tristam so as to give sufficient notice to a seller that the
broker is entitled to a commission even if the sale is not consummated. Currier v. Kosinski,
24 Mass. App. Ct. 106, 107-08, 506 N.E.2d 895, 896-97 (1987).
wTristarn, 367 Mass, at 630, 327 N.E.2d at 731.
2"Id.
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to situations where the sellerdefaults. 2 ' Both cases, however, applied
the Tristam exception to allow a broker to recover a commission
where the seller's wrongful conduct prevented the consummation
of the sale. 22 In 1979, the Appeals Court ruled in Lipis v. Landano
that a broker is entitled to a commission where the sellers refuse to
sign a purchase and sale agreement containing terms upon which
the parties orally agreed. 23 Citing Tristam, the court found that the
defendant sellers owed the broker a commission because their desire
to enter into a better deal with another buyer and deprive the
plaintiff of his earned commission solely motivated their refusal to
perform. 24 Thus, the sellers' wrongful act triggered the Tristam
exception and permitted the broker to recover a commission even
though the sale was not completed. 25
In the same year, the Massachusetts Appeals Court similarly
held in Kinchla v. Welsh that the Tristam rule permits a broker's
commission only if the sale is consummated, unless the seller's
wrongful act or interference prevents the transaction's successful
completion. 26 The court found that a seller need not act in bad faith
to "wrongfully act or interfere" within the meaning of the Tristam
rule. 27 Thus, the seller's backing out of an agreed deal because of
pressure to do so by others, the court concluded, constituted a
sufficiently wrongful act to justify holding the seller liable for the
broker's commission. 28
In 1984, the Supreme Judicial Court in Lewis v. Emerson seemed
to agree with the Appeals Court that the Tristam rule applies to any
case in which a broker seeks to recover a commission, regardless of
whether the buyer or the seller prevented the consummation of the
sale. 29 'In Lewis, the Court expressly applied the Tristam rule to hold
sellers liable for a broker's commission where the sellers defaulted
on their agreement to convey property." Justice Nolan paraphrased
the Tristam rule to require that, absent an agreement to the contrary,
21 See Lipis v. Landano, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 894, 895, 387 N.E.2d 203, 204 (1979); Kinchla
v. Welsh, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 371-72, 394 N.E.2d 978, 981 (1979).
22 Lipis, 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 894-95, 387 N.E.2d at 204; Kinchla, 8 Mass. App. Ct. at 371,
394 N.E.2d at 981.
26 Lipis, 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 894, 387 N.E.2d at 204.
24 Id.
26 Id. at 894-95, 387 N.E.2d at 204.
Kinchla, 8 Mass. App. Ct. at 371-72, 394 N.E.2d at 981.
t7 Id.
211 Id.
29 Lewis v. Emerson, 391 Mass. 517, 524-25, 462 N.E.2d 295, 300 (1984).
3° Id. at 525, 462 N.E.2d at 300.
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the parties must meet the three conditions set forth in Tristam
"unless closing is prevented by the wrongful conduct of the seller." 31
The Court accepted the trial judge's findings that the first two
requirements were met: the broker had produced a ready, able,
and willing buyer and the parties had entered into a valid purchase
and sale agreement." Because the sellers failed to appear at the
scheduled closing date, the Court concluded, the sellers wrongfully
prevented the consummation of the sale." The Court thus held the
sellers liable for the broker's commission because the broker had
satisfied the Tristam requirements and only the sellers' default had
caused the sale to fall through."
One month later, in Capezzuto v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
Inc. ("Capezzuto I"), the Massachusetts Appeals Court, without ref-
erence to Lewis, interpreted Tristam as applying exclusively to situ-
ations where the buyer's unwillingness, inability, or unreadiness
prevents the consummation of the sale. 35 The court, however, ac-
knowledged that a literal interpretation of Tristam mandates the
conclusion that a broker is entitled to a commission only if the
parties meet the three requirements outlibed in the decision."
Judge Armstrong justified this narrow interpretation of Tristam on
the ground that the purpose of the Tristam rule was to protect a
seller from a buyer's default." The Tristam rule, the court stated,
does not deprive a broker of a commission where he or she produces
a customer ready, able, and willing to buy on the seller's precise
terms, but the seller "has a change of heart or otherwise defeats the
transaction."" The court thus reversed the lower court's entry of
summary judgment in favor of the seller.'"
On the defendant's appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court in Ca-
pezzuto II reversed the Appeals Court's decision.' 1 ° Citing Lewis, the
Court held that where the seller is responsible for the failure to
5 [ Id. at 524, 462 N.E.2d at 300.
32 Id. at 525, 462 N.E.2d at 300.
33 Id.
34 Id.
Capezzuto v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 Mass. App. CL. 46, 48-49, 462
N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (1984) [hereinafter Capezzuto rev'd, 394 Mass. 399, 403-04, 476 N.E.2d
188, 190-91 (1985)
sr Id. at 47, 462 N.E.2d at 1132.
33 Id. at 48, 462 N.E.2c1 at 1 1 33.
" Id. at 48-49, 462 N.E.2d at 1133.
39 Id. at 49, 462 N.E.2d at 1134.
40 Capezzuto v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 394 Mass. 399, 403-05, 476 N.E.2d
188, 190-91 (1985) [hereinafter Capezzuto II].
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complete the transaction, the seller nevertheless owes no commis-
sion unless the first two requirements set forth in Tristam are satis-
fied and the seller engaged in bad faith dealing or other miscon-
duct.'" Thus, the Court found, the seller did not owe the broker a
commission where the broker had procured a buyer ready, able,
and willing to purchase commercial property from the seller on the
seller's terms, but the parties had not entered into a binding pur-
chase and sale agreement. 42
Chief Justice Hennessey justified the Court's broad interpre-
tation of the Tristam rule on the "same considerations" that moti-
vated the Supreme Judicial Court's holding in Tristam." The Court
stated that applying the rule to cases where the seller prevents the
consummation of the sale protects the seller's expectations that
payment of the broker's commission will come from the proceeds
of the sale, that he or she is not bound until signing a purchase and
sale agreement, and that, even where engaging one or more bro-
kers, the seller expects to pay only one commission because only
one broker ultimately will succeed in procuring the final buyer."
The Court concluded that the broker properly bears the burden of
safeguarding his or her own expectations by specifying the desired
terms in a contract with the seller: 15 Finally, the Court noted that,
under Tristam, the broker may receive a commission whei-e the seller
engaged in bad faith dealing or 'other misconduct" which prevents
the parties from entering into a binding purchase and sale agree-
ment. 16 Because there was no inference that the seller acted in bad
faith, the Court concluded that the seller did not owe the broker a
com mission:17
Despite the Supreme Judicial Court's explicit rejection in Ca-
pezzuto II of a narrow reading of Tristam, the First Circuit, inter-
preting Massachusetts law, held in Bennett v. McCabe that Tristam
." Id. at 402, 476 N.E.2d at 190.
• Id. at 404-05, 476 N.E.2d at 191. In 1985, the Supreme judicial Court followed
Capezzuto II in Hunneman & Co., Inc. v. LoPresti, 394 Mass. 406, 409-10, 476 N.E.2d 191,
193 (1985) ("As we recognized in Capezzuto . . . until a binding purchase and sale
agreement is signed, a seller is ordinarily privileged to sell to whomever it chooses."). See
also, Currier v. Kosinski, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 106, 108, 506 N.E.2d 895, 897 (1987) (broker
not entitled to commission where parties did not enter into binding purchase and sale
agreement, thus nut satisfying the second condition set forth in Tristam).
" Capezzuto 11, 394 Mass. at 403, 476 N.E.2d at 190.
44 Id.
" Id. at 404, 476 N.E.2d at 190-91.
4" Id. at 404, 476 N.E.2d at 191.
47 Id.
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applies exclusively to situations where the broker's customer de-
faults." The court therefore ruled that a broker may receive a
commission where an unknown defect in the sellers' title prevented
the consummation of the sale. 49 The fact that the sellers acted in
good faith and lacked knowledge of the defect in the title at the
tirne they entered the purchase and sale agreement, the court stated,
did not relieve the sellers of their duty to pay the broker a com-
mission."
In so ruling, the court rejected the sellers' argument and the
lower court's finding that the sellers did not owe the broker a
commission because the failure to complete the contract was not
the result of sellers' conduct that amounted to "wrongful act[s] or
interference."5 ' Thus, the court held, the broker did not earn a
commission under the Tristam exception. 52 Adopting the Massachu-
setts Appeals Court's analysis of Tristam in Capezzuto /, the First
Circuit agreed that the purpose of the Tristam rule was not to
deprive the broker of a commission where he or she produces a
customer ready, willing, and able to buy on the seller's terms but
the seller "has a change of heart or otherwise defeats the transaction." 53
Therefore, the court concluded, Tristam simply does not apply
where a sale is not consummated because of the seller's conduct,
even if the seller did not act "wrongfully.""
In light of the contrary holding in Lewis that Tristam applies
equally to situations where the seller or buyer defaults, the First
Circuit considered certifying the issue to the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court. 55 The court concluded, however, that certi-
fication was unnecessary because Lewis was distinguishable as an
"unintentionally ... deceptive" interpretation of Tristam. 56 The
court held that Lewis was not persuasive because the decision ad-
dressed numerous issues, the broker's fee question was not the
primary issue in the case, and the seller's affirmative wrongful
conduct made the case "easy" because Tristam's "wrongful act or
interference" language directly governed the outcome." Finally, the
'1" Bennett v. McCabe, 808 F.2d 178, 181-82 (1st Cir. 1987).
46 Id.
50 Id. at 183.
51 Id. at 180.
"Id.
" Id. at. 182 (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 183-84.
55 Id. at 182:
56 Id.
5? Id.
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court concluded that the fact that the Supreme Judicial Court
quoted the Tristam rule verbatim in the 1985 Capezzuto Li opinion
indicated that it rejected its previous "unintentionally . . . deceptive"
paraphrased "reformulation" of Tristam in the Lewis decision."
The First Circuit buttressed its narrow reading of Tristam with
several policy considerations. 59 First, the court stated, requiring the
broker to show that the seller wrongfully acted or interfered would
result in a rule of very difficult application. 60 The First Circuit
decided that the Massachusett's Supreme Judicial Court would pre-
fer a bright line rule entitling the broker to a commission whenever
the seller defaults on a binding purchase and sale agreement be-
cause such a rule is easier to understand and apply.6 ' Second, the
court found that the Supreme Judicial Court, at least in the com-
mercial real estate context, would place the burden of avoiding even
innocent defaults on the seller instead of the broker because the
seller is in a superior position to ascertain the validity of the title,
especially when represented by competent counse1. 62 Finally, the
First Circuit noted that most other states permit a broker to recover
a commission where the transaction fails as a result of a defect in
the seller's title."
The First Circuit's analysis and interpretation of Massachusetts
law governing broker's fees in Bennett is seriously flawed and ulti-
mately unsupportable. In interpreting Tristam and its progeny, the
First Circuit ignored the line of Massachusetts cases which strongly
indicates that the Trig= rule applies to all situations where a broker
claims the right to a commission, regardless of whether the buyer's
or the seller's conduct prevents the completion of the sale." For
example, in Capezzuto II, the Supreme judicial Court clearly estab-
lished that Tristam applies to situations where a seller defaults. 65 The
58 Id.
35 Id. at 183.
66 Id. The court cited Kinchla v. Welsh as evidencing the need to reject a rule which
required courts to make distinctions regarding seller's degree of culpability in Favor of a
bright line test. Bennell, 808 F.2d at 183 (citing Kinchla v. Welsh, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 371,
394 N.E.2d 978, 981 (1979) (broker need not show seller's bad faith to recover commission)).
See supra notes 21, 22, 26-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Kinchla opinion.
61 Rennet, 808 F.2d at 184.
62 Id. at 183.
63 Id.
64 See supra notes 21-47 and accompanying text for a review of the cases interpreting
Tristam.
63
 Capezzuto v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., (Capezzuto II), 394 Mass. 399, 402, 476
N.E.2d 188, 190-91 (1985).
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Court held that a broker is entitled to a commission only if the first
two conditions set forth in Tristam are satisfied and the seller's bad
faith dealing or "other misconduct" prevents the consummation of
the sale.6° The Bennett court simply ignored the Capezzuto II opinion,
instead relying on the narrow interpretation of the Tristam rule
which the Massachusetts Appeals Court advanced in Capezzuto /,
despite the fact that subsequently in Capezzuto II the Supreme ju-
dicial Court rejected the appellate court's reasoning and holding.'i 7
Moreover, the First Circuit provided untenable grounds for
distinguishing Lewis, the second Supreme Judicial Court decision
that applied Tristam to a situation where the seller's conduct caused
the failure of the sale. 68 The fact that the Lewis Court decided several
issues other than the broker's fee issue"9 bears no relevance to the
weight the First Circuit should afford the Court's holding. Similarly,
whether the Supreme Judicial Court paraphrased the rule in a 1984
opinion arid quoted the Tristam rule verbatim in a 1985 decision"
cannot serve as a repudiation of the Lewis holding. This sequence
simply is inconclusive and ultimately meaningless. The fact that the
First Circuit •even proffered this as an argument suggests the ten-
uous basis for its interpretation of Tristam.
Finally, the fact that Lewis was an "easy" case because the seller
displayed clearly wrongful conduct and thus fell squarely within the
language of the Tristam exception 7 ' provides an insufficient ground
on which to conclude that Lewis is not controlling authority. This
interpretation of Lewis actually supports the view that the Tristam
rule applies to the earning of broker's fees generally, and that a
broker may recover a commission only if the seller's misconduct
triggers the Tristam exception. Ultimately, therefore, the Bennett
6" Id. at 402, 476 N. E.2d at 189-90.
67 Bennett, 808 F.2d at 181. The First Circuit relegated its discussion of Capezzuto II to a
footnote, stating that the Supreme Judicial Court "did not quarrel with the lower court's
interpretation" of Tristam. Id. at 181 ti.3. The court considered this fact and the Supreme
Judicial Court's holding in Capezzuto II that the broker earns no commission where the seller
is responsible for an incomplete transaction unless the seller has signed a valid purchase and
sale agreement to be consistent with its interpretation of Tristam. Id. Apparently, the Bennett
court failed to appreciate that the Capezzuto II decision indicates that to recover a commission,
the broker and seller must satisfy at least the first two conditions set forth in Tristam, and
therefore that Tristam applies whether the buyer or the seller's conduct prevents the consum-
mation of the sale. Id. See supra notes 21-47 and accompanying text for a review of the
Massachusetts courts' interpretation of Trislam.
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court's characterization of Lewis as "unintentionally . . . deceptive" 72
is unsupportable and perhaps only indicative of the fact that the
First Circuit disagrees with the minority rule which Massachusetts
adopted in Tristam and applied in Lewis.
The First Circuit offered equally uncompelling policy consid-
erations in support of its narrow interpretation of Lewis. Simply
because the Tristam rule may be more difficult to apply than a bright
line test" does not justify the Court's alteration of Massachusetts
law as announced by the state's highest court. In light of the court's
consistent application of the Tristam rule in Kinchla, Lewis, and Ca-
pezzuto II, the First Circuit articulates no convincing rationale for its
finding that the Supreme Judicial Court would adopt a bright line
test. 74
Similarly, no basis exists for the First Circuit's conclusion that
the Supreme Judicial Court, at least in the commercial context,
would place the burden of even innocent defaults on the seller
rather than the broker." Lewis expressly applied Tristam to a situa-
tion where sellers defaulted on a sale of commercial property."
Moreover, the policy rationales underlying the Tristam Court's adop-
tion of the minority rule compel the contrary conclusion. The Tris-
tam Court predicated its rule on the need to protect the inexperi-
enced seller who lacks familiarity with the law and typically expects
to pay the broker's commission from the proceeds of the completed
sale." The Supreme Judicial Court permits brokers and sellers to
enter into agreements varying the Tristam rule, provided that such
contracts are made fairly. 78 Absent such an agreement, however,
Tristam makes clear that the broker properly bears the risk of for-
feiture. 7° Finally, because Tristam admittedly is a minority rule, the
fact that most other states permit a broker to recover a commission
where the transaction fails as a result of a defect in the seller's title 8°
is inconsequential.
The First Circuit's holding in Bennett, narrowly confining Tris-
tam to cases where the buyer's inability or unwillingness to perform
" Id.
" See id. at 183.
"4 See supra notes 21-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lipis, Kinchla,
Lewis, and Capezzuto decisions.
" See Bennett, 808 F.2d at 183.
" Lewis v. Emerson, 391 Mass. 517, 529-25, 462 N.E.2d 295, 300 (1989).
" See Tristam's Landing v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 628, 327 N.E.2d 727, 731 (1975).
"See id. at 630, 327 N.E.2d at 732.
" See id. at 629, 327 N.E.2d at 731.




thwarts the consummation of the sale, is unconvincing. The Mas-
sachusetts cases interpreting Tristam, particularly Lewis and Capez-
zuto II, suggest that a broker earns a commission only if he or she
satisfies the Tristam conditions, Where the broker fulfills the first
two requirements by procuring a customer ready, able, and willing
to purchase the seller's property on the seller's terms and the parties
enter into a valid purchase and sale agreement, Massachusetts
courts consistently have held the seller liable for the broker's com-
mission only if the seller's wrongful act or interference prevents the
accomplishment of the third requirement — the final closing. De-
spite its flaws, however, Bennett remains significant in that it high-
lights the need for a clarification of Tristam's scope. To protect the
expectations of the broker and seller involved in real estate trans-
actions, the Massachusetts courts should attempt to define clearly
the intended application of this eighteen year old, but still somewhat
unclear, rule.
